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Abstract
Malicious data injections pose a severe threat to the systems based on Wireless Sensor Net-
works (WSNs) since they give the attacker control over the measurements, and on the system’s
status and response in turn. Malicious measurements are particularly threatening when used
to spoof or mask events of interest, thus eliciting or preventing desirable responses. Spoofing
and masking attacks are particularly difficult to detect since they depict plausible behaviours,
especially if multiple sensors have been compromised and collude to inject a coherent set of
malicious measurements.
Previous work has tackled the problem through measurements inspection, which analyses the
inter-measurements correlations induced by the physical phenomena. However, these tech-
niques consider simplistic attacks and are not robust to collusion. Moreover, they assume
highly predictable patterns in the measurements distribution, which are invalidated by the
unpredictability of events.
We design a set of techniques that effectively detect malicious data injections in the presence
of sophisticated collusion strategies, when one or more events manifest. Moreover, we build a
methodology to characterise the likely compromised sensors. We also design diagnosis criteria
that allow us to distinguish anomalies arising from malicious interference and faults.
In contrast with previous work, we test the robustness of our methodology with automated
and sophisticated attacks, where the attacker aims to evade detection. We conclude that our
approach outperforms state-of-the-art approaches. Moreover, we estimate quantitatively the
WSN degree of resilience and provide a methodology to give a WSN owner an assured degree
of resilience by automatically designing the WSN deployment.
To deal also with the extreme scenario where the attacker has compromised most of the WSN,
we propose a combination with software attestation techniques, which are more reliable when
malicious data is originated by a compromised software, but also more expensive, and achieve
an excellent trade-off between cost and resilience.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the past decade, computer systems have experienced a radical change in the way they
are conceived, as they automatically collect and elaborate data to monitor, optimise and cus-
tomise a physical environment to our needs. In such contexts, frequent human interactions
are expensive and possibly dangerous because of harsh environments, or impractical because of
quick evolutions of the physical phenomena. So, it is usually more convenient to rely on sensor
networks, i.e. networks made of sensor nodes that are able to sense a physical phenomenon and
transmit the sensed values.
Wireless Sensor Networks are flexible, low-cost, and easy-to-deploy infrastructures of wirelessly
connected sensor nodes, to collect data from physical spaces.
The very first deployments of WSNs were motivated by military applications [Ður+12], but they
have now become popular also to monitor critical infrastructures, such as power grids [LLR10],
water networks [Jia+09], and road transport [Boh+08]. An increasing interest in WSNs is also
due to the widespreading Internet of Things (IoT) applications, such as smart cities [ALK10],
smart homes [Sur+15], and monitoring of physiological parameters for healthcare through both
wearable and implantable sensors [Gub+13].
To effectively deliver the applications, sensor nodes need to be cheap, physically small, com-
municate wirelessly, survive in harsh environmental conditions with minimal supervision, and
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flexibly adapt to changes in the topology, such as sensors joining and leaving the network.
These characteristics are also their main limitations. The sensor nodes have limited computa-
tional and power resources, whether to monitor a human body or a large flood plain. They are
subject to wear, due to the effects of the environment, which cause failures. They need to be
resource efficient. Their battery needs to be replaced when the nodes are battery-powered.
WSNs carry several vulnerabilities in the sensor nodes, the wireless medium, and the environ-
ment. The nodes are vulnerable to tampering on the field, since they are often unattended,
physically accessible, and use of tamper-resistant hardware is often too expensive. The sensor
nodes may also be controlled by an attacker at deployment time, since new nodes may join the
network dynamically in some applications. The wireless medium is difficult to secure and can
be compromised at all layers of the protocol stack since cryptographic operations and key man-
agement consume valuable computational and power resources. Finally, the cost of monitoring
the deployments with external surveillance (e.g., CCTV) is generally prohibitive, hence an at-
tacker may access the sensing environment without being noticed. Yet, despite this, WSNs are
increasingly used to monitor critical infrastructures, and human health where malicious attacks
can lead to significant damage and even loss of life.
Faced with the challenge of securing WSNs, new security solutions have been proposed for
these platforms. The literature is rich and includes, among other, secure routing [KW05],
authentication [KA10], cryptography [LN08], and key management [Du+06]. Most studies
focus on proposing solutions against communications-layer and network-layer threats, such as
jamming attacks, attacks against the routing protocols, confidentiality and integrity of the data
in transit, etc. However, these solutions cannot prevent an attacker compromising the nodes
themselves to impair the measurements’ integrity at the time the measurements are taken, or
before they are transmitted, e.g. connecting to their physical interfaces. The measurements
collected are used to analyse the sensed phenomenon, react to it, and deliver a critical service,
hence the correctness of the measurements is a requirement for the fulfilment of the WSN’s
function.
A compromised node could be subject to malicious data injections, consisting of manipulations
3that enable an attacker to solicit an incorrect system’s response, such as concealing the presence
of problems, or raising false alarms. This could cause high economic losses and harm people’s
safety. For instance, in 1979 the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station (Pennsylvania,
USA) suffered a core meltdown [Com14]. The human machine interface was sending ambiguous
signals to the operators, who were not able to immediately handle the accident. This led to one
of the most serious nuclear accidents on US soil. Similar accidents may be deliberately triggered
by attackers by injecting false readings in a nuclear power plant’s radiation monitoring device,
or in any other device advocated to monitor a critical physical phenomenon.
Several security mechanisms have been proposed so far to guarantee measurement integrity
in WSNs, these can be divided into two main categories: proactive and reactive. Proactive
mechanisms aim at preventing integrity violations by strengthening the data collection and
transmission process. Reactive techniques, in contrast, seek to detect attacks after they have
already occurred.
Proactive mechanisms work by securing: 1. The sensor nodes, e.g. with the use of tamper-proof
hardware[Abe+16] 2. The measurements transmission [SLP11; Sim+10] with the use of more
sophisticated devices that run, e.g., cryptographic hash functions. 3. The access to the sensed
environment, e.g. by supporting the main WSN with a video surveillance WSN [Che+08]
on the deployment field. There are two main problems with proactive solutions: 1) They are
expensive and thus against one of the main characteristics that make WSNs attractive. 2) They
do not cover all attacks: e.g., proactive mechanisms would not prevent a sensor node to be
compromised before being introduced in the network, such as when the network is expanded
with new nodes, or a faulty device is replaced.
The main subject of this thesis is the family of techniques known as measurements inspection,
which acquired much interest in literature [RLP08; Lop+10; Jur+11; Xie+11; IL15b]. Measure-
ments inspection is reactive since it operates when the measurements have been already altered
by the attacker, with no assumption on the attack vector. Hence, it can address threats that
are very different in nature, and even if they are unknown. The principle behind measurements
inspection is to detect malicious interference by partitioning the measurements into genuine
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and malicious. This task is done without any knowledge about the malicious measurements, as
only the genuine measurements are characterised.
Rather than characterising the set of genuine measurements under each possible scenario, which
would be impractical, measurements inspection aims to characterise genuine inter-measurements
relationships, referred to as correlations. The idea behind measurements inspection is to test
whether such correlations hold. Measurements inspection has been considered as a method
for counteracting both faults and malicious interference [IL15b]. This has led to assume that
malicious measurements have the same characteristics of randomness, typical of faults. Instead,
in [TH06; CP07; Rez+13], it is shown how the problem gets more complex when the sensor
nodes are assumed to collude, i.e. act in concert according to a common strategy. The collud-
ing nodes may inject data which resemble genuine data to avoid detection, or to make genuine
nodes appear responsible for the degradation in correlation. However, most existing work has
been evaluated for cases not involving collusion.
The principle that allows one to detect malicious interference is that correlations may be dis-
rupted when some of the measurements change under malicious interference, especially if the
malicious measurements noticeably differ from their original counterparts. Unless the system
is in an unstable state, malicious and original measurements generally need to significantly
differ to cause high damage to the WSN system. Even if there is a large difference between
the genuine and the malicious measurement that replaced it, there are three central problems
involved: 1. The genuine value is not observable, hence cannot be compared against the ma-
licious measurement. 2. Many malicious nodes can collude. 3. The measurements correlations
can experience considerable variations due to changes in the physical phenomenon, referred to
as events. Examples of events are earthquakes for seismic sensors which causes high vibrations,
or floods for water level monitoring sensors which would register the surface rise. If the in-
jection process is sophisticated enough, it can exploit such limitations to make malicious data
indistinguishable from genuine data. It is our goal to develop the methodologies and methods
that deal with such sophisticated attackers, and in this thesis we will show that we are able to
either detect the attack or force it to minimise the damage that can be caused whilst staying
undetected.
5In particular, the effects of events on the data will be a central topic of this thesis since most
critical WSN applications are event-based, and thus demand higher security. Related work
does not address detection of malicious data under the possible presence of events, which
distort inter-measurements correlations giving rise to more challenging problems. Moreover,
when malicious data is used to elicit or prevent event detection, they produce two threatening
and difficult to detect attacks, which we denote as event spoofing and masking respectively.
Spoofing attacks may cause severe damage, such as evacuation from a building when no real
emergency is present. Similarly, masking attacks may prevent triggering an alarm in dangerous
conditions, such as the presence of a natural disaster, which would hinder rescue and emergency
management. Although different event detection applications have different tasks, they usually
collect sensor measurements and interpret them to carry out a remedial response. Such response
may have significant consequences and cost. Therefore, the measurements leading to the event
detection become a critical resource to secure.
In event detection WSNs, malicious data injections may be particularly sophisticated. For in-
stance, the characteristics of spoofed events may resemble genuine ones, whilst masked events
may resemble rest conditions. Thus, there is the need for a mechanism, denoted with detec-
tion, which identifies malicious measurements even when the attacker maximises their similarity
with genuine ones. Moreover, if colluding nodes act in concert in the attack, the compromised
sensors are difficult to identify since a spoofed event may look similar to the remainder of a
masked event, or a masked attack may split the genuine event into multiple parts that appear as
spoofed events. A characterisation step is needed to deal with this problem, i.e. characterising
the measurements affected by malicious interference and identifying the sensors responsible for
the attack by reasoning about the possible dynamics that led to the set of observed measure-
ments. Finally, faulty sensors may be confused with malicious sensors, especially when subject
to a common-mode failure, which produces correlated measurements just like in the case of
collusion. The detection step is generally able to detect inconsistencies in the measurements,
but cannot distinguish between genuine and malicious interference. Thus, we devise also a diag-
nosis step to deal also with this problem. We address detection, characterisation and diagnosis
of malicious data injections through different analyses of the measurement data, by extracting
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the information that is shared among multiple sensor nodes. Indeed, the observed phenomena
have some correlation properties, which are connected to physical laws, and such properties are
induced in the measurements collected by sensors.
1.1 Contribution and Outcomes
The contributions and outcomes reported in this thesis are summarised below.
Literature Survey The first achievement of this work has been the identification of benefits
and shortcomings of the current techniques aimed at detecting malicious data injections. The
survey has revealed a large number of algorithms proposed for measurements inspection in
sensor measurements. However, these tackled malicious data injections together with faulty
measurements, as both may introduce anomalies in the data, without considering also the
attacker’s effort to evade detection. Malicious measurements are, by and large, more difficult to
detect than faulty measurements, which instead show evident inconsistencies with genuine data.
This holds true especially when multiple malicious sensors collude and produce measurements
that are consistent with each other. Moreover, this study has suggested that the measurements’
variability in the spatial domain deteriorates the detection performance. More precisely, a
substantial decrease in performance is seen when moving away from a homogeneous space
model, where all sensors perceive similar measurements, to heterogeneous space models, where
measurements are expected to show notable variations in space, such as in the case of events.
Detection of Malicious Data Injections when Single Events Occur We have developed
a first technique to detect malicious data injections in the presence of sophisticated collusion
strategies among a subset of sensor nodes, when a single event occurs at a time. The detection
algorithm exploits the internal measurements correlation and selects only information that
appears reliable by filtering out the individual contributions from the measurements that do not
support the general behaviour. Colluding sensors are not allowed to compensate for each other
in the detection metric whilst still injecting malicious data thanks to an aggregation operator
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that is accurate in the presence of genuine measurements as well as resistant to malicious data.
Since detecting anomalies in measurements is not sufficient to counteract them effectively,
the characterisation of the malicious measurements is also tackled, with a particular focus on
avoiding being deceived by colluding nodes in this task. Since, in different event detection
WSNs, the requirements and the nature of the events is markedly different, we also developed a
methodology to tailor a detection algorithm to a specific application. This is achieved through
customisation of the parameters based on a collection of historical data and information about
the application’s goals and requirements. The methodology for customisation, on the other
hand, can be provided with a generic but well defined procedure. Experiments have been carried
out in three different applications: health-care monitoring, monitoring of volcanic activity and
home fire alarms. The results validated the approach, showing that it achieves high detection
rates without introducing significant overhead in the sensor nodes.
Detection of Malicious Data Injections when Multiple Events Occur Since the pre-
vious approach is based on the use of two models, one used in the presence of events and the
other one in their absence, it cannot cope effectively with events that are highly different in
nature, such as events that affect only a localised area, or manifest with multiple sources. In
such scenarios, each delimited area of a WSN can be subject to zero or more events, hence the
presence of events should be evaluated locally. Moreover, multiple events, provide the oppor-
tunity for new, more complex attack strategies, such as creating false events near legitimate
ones, transforming a widespread event into many narrower events etc. So, the initial approach
has been reviewed and re-developed to cope with such complex scenarios which, in addition to
detecting malicious data injections, also characterises the responsible sensors and can diagnose
anomalies, i.e. infer when the anomaly is most likely malicious or genuine (e.g., caused by
faults). Indeed, detection may also be triggered by genuine faults, as the measurements from
faulty sensors do not correlate with those of healthy ones. This may lead to the wrong con-
clusion that there was an attack, hence the diagnosis step distinguishes malicious interference
from faulty behaviours.
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Evaluation against Sophisticated Attacks The novel method for detecting malicious
data, which is described above, has been validated by testing it with sophisticated collusion-
enabled attacks, produced using novel approaches that we have also designed:
1) A mimicry approach, which achieves event spoofing or masking by mimicking the genuine
characteristics of the sensed phenomenon to minimise the chance of detection. This approach
is used to evaluate the performance of both detection, characterisation, and diagnosis. An
automatic test suite has been designed and implemented which addresses the main problems,
i.e. selection of the genuine data that will be mimicked from an organised historical dataset,
creation of malicious data, and contextualisation to minimise disruptions in correlations with
current genuine data.
2) A worst-case approach, which constrains the attacker to stay undetected and to spoof or
mask events, whilst minimising the attack resources that are needed. The latter are expressed in
terms of sensor nodes that need to be compromised by an attacker, as a function of: application,
deployment area and size, and number of measurements in control of the attacker. This work
required an accurate model for the attacker and a careful design of the solving algorithm, which
deals with an NP-hard problem. The optimisation algorithm has been used for three different
objectives: 1. Estimating the gain in resilience, quantified by the number of malicious sensor
nodes that can be tolerated, offered by a measurements inspection technique. 2. Automatically
retrieving the main vulnerabilities that may be exploited and the attacker’s strategies that
represent the highest risk for the WSN. 3. Providing a security-driven design methodology, i.e.
an automatic tool that designs the WSN deployment to give a guaranteed degree of resilience
to a certain amount of compromised sensors.
Increasing the Integrity of the Measurements through the Integrity of the Sensor
Nodes The vulnerabilities highlighted by the latter study concern especially scenarios where
the compromised area is contiguous and large compared to the typical event spread. Thus,
measurements inspection has been complemented with occasional recourse to a more expensive
technique that is effective also with many colluding sensors, i.e. software attestation. However,
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running many attestations would impair the measurements inspection’s benefits in terms of
power consumption. This has required us to study how to minimise the use of attestation
whist keeping its benefits. The results have shown that malicious nodes can be identified
with high resiliency and low power overhead, which are the main advantages of attestation
and measurements inspection, respectively. The combined technique is suited for a practical
deployment in a real WSN, as it allows a WSN to operate autonomously by healing itself
without frequent in field reconfigurations.
1.2 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows.
Chapter 2 introduces the problem of measurements collection in WSNs and the corresponding
problem of malicious data injections. We introduce the principles behind exploiting correlation,
and introduce a unified notation to facilitate the comparison among different state-of-the-art
approaches and also with our novel methods.
Chapter 3 reviews the related work. We identify the two main families of techniques that
are used for measurements inspection: anomaly detection and trust management. For each of
them, we identify the main techniques that are available in literature, explain how they make
use of measurements correlation, and compare the performance of different techniques, whilst
emphasising the shortcomings and limitations that prevent the deployment in real applications.
Chapter 4 introduces a model for the attacker, in terms of capabilities and possible damage
that they can cause to the system. We show that a genuine subset of sensors is required for
any measurements inspection technique to be applicable, give a formal definition of spoofing
and masking attacks, and study the characteristics and possible effects of collusion.
Chapter 5 presents a solution for the problem of malicious data injections where the attacker
is highly sophisticated and events occur in the monitored phenomenon. In particular one event
at a time is considered, and with predictable pattern. We show that our approach, based on
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robust aggregation of measurements estimate is more reliable compared with techniques that
identify malicious measurements with majority voting. Moreover, we present a novel and more
general methodology to apply the algorithm in different application settings.
Chapter 6 presents a complementary solution, which applies to multiple events that manifest
with unpredictable patterns. We deal with the detection problem with a method based on
the wavelet transform, which can evaluate the events characteristics regardless of their number,
location, and size. We also deal with the characterisation problem, identifying groups of sensors
with common behaviour and reasoning about their conflicts to identify compromised sensors.
Finally we deal with the diagnosis problem by proposing a fault model, which is also based on
the wavelet transform. The measurements are compared against this model to infer whether
they have been compromised by faulty or malicious interference.
Chapter 7 gives two automatic testing tools to validate and evaluate the robustness of measure-
ments inspection to malicious data, with different approaches: mimicry, which is a best-effort
approach, and evasion, which finds the worst-case scenario. The wavelet-based methodology
is evaluated with both approaches to: 1. Evaluate reliability under different sets of attacker
capabilities 2. Test the robustness to attacks whose ability to cause damage whilst staying un-
detected is maximised. 3. Study the main weaknesses of measurements inspection techniques.
4. Provide an assured degree of resilience to a WSN at design time.
Chapter 8 shows how the data-integrity protection given by measurements inspection can
be complemented with the node-integrity protection given by software attestation to obtain a
highly accurate and power-efficient multi-layer integrity verification technique.
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes this thesis by summarising the achievements, the practical impact
on real applications and the future work that may complement the results obtained.
Chapter 2
Problem Definition and Notation
In this chapter, our objectives are characterised in light of the related work. A unified math-
ematical formulation is given for the problem of malicious data injections, which will be used
for the following chapters to:
1. Define the problem unambiguously.
2. Define the measurements’ correlations based on the formulation.
3. Describe and compare the related work with a coherent terminology as the terms used
often differ from one article to another.
4. Describe the novel proposed techniques with the same terminology.
Finally, the ways to extract expectations on the measurements based on internal correlations
are illustrated, making use of the formulation introduced.
2.1 Wireless Sensor Networks and Sensed Measurements
Measurements inspection is a data analysis technique that can be used to detect malicious
measurements. Which is the entity that runs measurements inspection, and which is the data
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that is being analysed are two important questions that affect the detection of malicious mea-
surements. The choices are restricted by the architecture of the WSN and the measurements
collection procedure, which are analysed in this section.
The typical workflow of a WSN starts with measuring a physical phenomenon through sensing
devices connected to a wireless node that propagates the measurements through the network.
The measurements are collected and aggregated by data sinks (e.g., base stations), and can
then be interpreted or transmitted to a remote station. However, data can also be aggregated
in the network by the intermediate transmitting nodes, with many possible variations on where
and how data is aggregated. The choice between the different schemes is based on criteria that
optimise power efficiency, number of devices, coverage of the physical space etc. Finding the
optimal architecture based on such criteria remains an important research challenge.
Early work considered that all raw measurements are collected at the base station, which
performs data fusion and other computations [She02; SWR98]. Later on, especially after the
introduction of the LEACH protocol [HCB02], architectures became increasingly hierarchical.
LEACH applies a one-level hierarchy where sensors are organised in clusters and communicate
with the cluster-head, which, in turn, communicates with the base station, as shown in Fig.
2.1. Cluster-based protocols, and especially those where the clusters change dynamically in
time [HCB02], have proven to be more energy efficient when communication with the base
station requires multi-hop transmissions [HCB02].
Figure 2.1: LEACH measurements collection architecture.
The one-level hierarchy introduced in LEACH can be generalised to tree-based structures as
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described in [Fas+07]. Intermediate tree nodes may simply merge the packets generated by
different sources into a single packet without processing the data, or after applying lossless
compression. Alternatively, the sensor measurements can be processed with lossy aggregation
operators, which prevent us to recover the original measurements. The aggregation can take
place thanks to the cluster head, which could calculate, e.g., the mean, minimum, or maximum
of the cluster’s measurements. Another possibility is to take only a subset of measurements
thanks to compressive sensing techniques [CW08].
Measurements inspection algorithms are often run by data sinks, since they can compare dif-
ferent measurements with each other. However, if the measurements are subject to a lossy
compression whilst being collected, the data sink cannot analyse all the measurements. The
information discarded in lossy compression is considered redundant; nevertheless, this is true
only if all sensors are genuine. On the contrary, when some sensors are malicious, even per-
fectly correlated sets of measurements may be useful. Indeed, if perfect correlation is expected
between the measurements of two sensors and one is malicious, this will be detected as soon as
its measurements change.
Measurements inspection techniques are still applicable if in-network aggregation with size
reduction is in place. For instance, a possible way of keeping lossy measurements compression
without impairing detection of malicious data may be to ascertain part of the discarded data,
e.g. by asking the cluster head for proofs about the individual measurements collected [PSP06].
However, as we will discuss in detail in Section 5.5, the computational advantages given by lossy
aggregation are overcome by the disadvantages of requiring extra-communications and reducing
the ability to detect malicious measurements. For these reasons, the following discussions will
assume that the data sinks in charge of running the measurements inspection algorithm can
access the raw measurements sent by the sensor nodes. Below, we will discuss which are the
objectives that a measurements inspection algorithm seeks to achieve, and how this relates to
the measurements sent by the sensor nodes and to their correlations.
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2.2 The Objectives of Measurements Inspection
The main challenge in detecting malicious data injections is finding sufficient evidence of the
attack. Measurements inspection techniques assume that the attacker aims to cause noticeable
undesired effects and injects measurements that differ in some detectable way from the correct
values that should be reported at that point in time and space. This is the assumption that
enables the use of data analysis to detect malicious data. However, the real value that should
be reported is not observable directly, but can only be characterised from indirect information
which, under genuine circumstances, is correlated with the real value. However, there may
be other different reasons for disruptions in such correlations, including faults, discontinuities
in the sensed environment, or naturally occurring events. Faults refer to any kind of genuine
errors, transient or not, and may be difficult to distinguish from a malicious injection. Events
refer to substantial changes in the sensed phenomenon like a fire, an earthquake etc. We refer to
the problem of distinguishing malicious data injections from faults as diagnosis. In general, also
distinguishing events is a diagnosis task when events are detected through anomaly detection.
However, in this thesis we will consider that events are identified by a separate event-detection
algorithm.
Moreover, changes in correlations that are due to malicious interference are not necessarily
obvious to identify, especially when more than one sensor are compromised. Indeed, if multi-
ple compromised sensors collude, i.e. produce malicious values in a coordinated fashion, the
information coming from genuine nodes may not be sufficient to detect the compromise as the
malicious measurements could endorse each other. Then, we need to model the relationship
between different measurements in a way that is robust to malicious colluding attacks. Below,
we characterise the measurements collection problem, and how it is affected by malicious inter-
ference, to study the robustness of different measurement correlation models to malicious data
injections.
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2.2.1 A Characterisation of the Problem
To characterise the measurements data in WSNs, we consider N sensors, whose locations belong
to the set Ω, which may be two dimensional if the sensors are placed approximately on the same
plane, three-dimensional if they have, e.g., different altitudes, or even six-dimensional if both
their location and their orientation are relevant to the application. Every sensor measures
a physical attribute such as temperature, wind, water quality, power, gas flows etc., which
can be modelled as an ideal function of time and space ϕ. We refer to this function as the
physical attribute function. The sensors’ goal is to sample this function in space and time, i.e.
retrieve the function’s values at a finite set of locations u ∈ Ω and a finite set of time instants
i ∈ 1, ..., T 1. However, this operation introduces a measurement error, leading to the value
xi(u).
xi(u) = ϕ(ti,u) + N(ti,u) + E(ti,u) u ∈ Ω, i ∈ 1, ..., T (2.1)
Where N(ti,u) represents the contribution of usual noise, while E(ti,u) is the contribution of
genuine errors, i.e. those caused by non-malicious faults. Malicious interference, regardless of
its nature, introduces a perturbation, which we refer to as manipulation, and is defined as the
difference between xi(u) and the measurement that is collected at the i-th time instant from
the sensor located at u. The measurement collected is denoted with x˘i(u) and is defined below.
x˘i(u) = xi(u) +mi(u) u ∈ Ω, i ∈ 1, ..., T (2.2)
Where mi(u) is the effect of malicious interference. For instance, if malicious injections take
place through malicious software, the malicious node may receive xi(u) in input from the sensor,
but transmit x˘i(u) to the sink.
The purpose of measurements inspection is to:
1We focus on interpreting the data and abstract from implementation-related issues such as synchronisation
between sensors, and network related issues such as packet loss or delays.
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• Infer if any collected measurement has been corrupted by malicious interference, i.e. there
is a mi(u) 6= 0 component. (Detection)
• Identify the subset {v ∈ Ω : mi(v) 6= 0}. (Characterisation)
However, the collected sensors’ readings x˘i(u) are the only observable quantities. Moreover,
assuming that errors and malicious interference are unpredictable, measurements inspection
can extract only information about the expected behaviour of the physical attribute and noise,
through a modelling process. However, when considering also genuine faults, it is not possible to
state if the observed measurements do not comply with the model because of the manipulation
or the error component. Gathering such information requires further analyses. Thus, the
generic flow of measurements inspection is:
• Infer if any collected measurement has been corrupted by malicious interference, i.e. there
is a mi(u) 6= 0 component. (Detection)
• Identify the subset C := {v ∈ Ω : mi(v) 6= 0 ∨ E(ti,v) 6= 0}. (Characterisation)
• Distinguish mi(v) 6= 0 from E(ti,v) 6= 0 ∀v ∈ C. (Diagnosis)
The role of diagnosis and characterisation is discussed in detail below.
Diagnosis and Characterisation of Malicious Data Injections While detection consists
mainly of identifying measurements that do not comply with a model, finding the cause for
the divergence pertains to the problem of diagnosis. This task, needs to carefully distinguish
among different causes with common effects.
In WSNs two main phenomena can produce similar deviations from expected behaviour: faults
and events of interest. Faults represent generic unintentional errors introduced e.g., by obsta-
cles in the environment, sensors’ battery depletion, pollution, fouling etc. Events of interests
represent environmental conditions that manifest under exceptional circumstances, but are in-
teresting as they can reveal an alarm scenario e.g., heart attacks, fires, volcanic eruptions etc.
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If the measurements model includes also events, i.e. events do not trigger the detection step,
then diagnosis reduces to the distinction between faults and malicious compromise.
Information about the cause of an anomaly or of an untrustworthy sensor can be precious.
With fine-grained knowledge about the nature of the problem, an appropriate response can
be initiated to address it. Unfortunately, the measurements inspection literature lacks an
exhaustive diagnosis phase [IL15b].
Additionally, even when the presence of an attack can be ascertained with confidence, further
information is needed to determine the course of action to be taken. For example, there is
the need to know the attack’s effects and the system area (nodes) affected by the attack. We
refer to this other task as the characterisation of the attack. If detection and diagnosis of
malicious data injections answers the question “Is there an attack?”, characterisation answers
questions such as “Which are the compromised sensors?” and “How is the attack performed?”
This information is valuable since it drives the reaction to the attacks, e.g. it tells the network
operator which devices need to be reconfigured and which vulnerabilities should be covered
with the highest priority.
Detection, characterisation and diagnosis all rely on a data model, which describes the expected
behaviour of the measurements under different circumstances. Note that while we can model
the measurements behaviour under the presence of faults or events, malicious behaviours should
not be modelled to avoid failures of the measurements inspection technique in the presence of
unforeseen attacks. We introduce below the techniques that allow the detection of malicious
data injections without restricting the applicability to a well-known set of attacks.
2.3 Modelling Expected Behaviour
Malicious data injections have been addressed in literature with both anomaly detection tech-
niques (e.g., [TH06; LCC07; Sun+13]) starting from about 2005 ([TH06]) and with trust man-
agement (e.g., [Ata+08; Bao+12; OHC12]) from about 2006 ([ZDL06]). While anomaly detec-
tion defines normal behaviours to infer the presence of anomalies, trust management evaluates
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the confidence level (trustworthiness) that a sensor’s behaviour is normal. Compromised sensors
are expected to get low trust values when some expected behaviour in the data is not respected
in the opinion of the sensors which hear the measurements reported. Although anomaly de-
tection is also based on the definition of expected behaviour –“Anomaly detection refers to
the problem of finding abnormalities in the data that do not conform to expected behaviour”
[CBK09]– the two approaches differ in how deviations are interpreted. In trust management,
the measurements data are analysed with the granularity of a sensor, and each sensor has a
trust value that is incrementally updated in time. Anomaly detection approaches, instead, can
be applied with no restrictions in granularity from the single measurement to the whole system,
and generally work by defining a boundary for expected behaviour such that everything outside
that boundary is abnormal.
In our context, expected behaviour refers to a set of properties characterising the measurements
that are free of malicious injections. In general, describing the unobservable real measurement
in terms of observable properties is a modelling process, that makes assumptions about how
data can be described. The relation that links the problem to a model is a one-to-many relation.
Different models of the same problem are not equivalent and choosing a good model is essential
for good performance. In particular, a good model should be characterised by:
• Accuracy – No model is perfect and every model is in fact an approximation. An accurate
model minimises the approximation error.
• Adaptability – Physical attributes measured by the sensors change in time. As a con-
sequence, models should cope with dynamically changing environments.
• Flexibility – Good models should be applicable in a flexible way, regardless of the appli-
cation. Such models should abstract as many details as possible and capture only those
properties that are needed.
These desirable characteristics conflict with each other: accuracy may be better achieved with
context-specific details, which limit flexibility and compromise adaptability. A particular adapt-
ability requirement which significantly affects accuracy and flexibility is the sensors’ mobility,
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as when sensor nodes migrate to new locations, previous expectations are invalidated. In-
deed sensor migrations may completely change the physical attribute function. Even though
mobility is an aspect that is not directly addressed in the detection of malicious data injec-
tions, some techniques are more suited to support mobile sensors than others. In particular,
anomaly detection techniques that compare the measurements within a neighbourhood without
considering past behaviour (e.g. [Han+75; NLL06; LCC07; Wu+07; GZH09]), can generally
accommodate mobility, since for every time instant, new expectations are extracted. However,
such techniques also need to become aware of topology changes in the presence of mobility.
Trust-management techniques with exchanges of trust information (e.g., [Bao+12; HLT05;
GBS08; MCA08]) are also suited for mobility, since a sensor A which migrates to a new area and
becomes a neighbour of B, can benefit from recommendations from sensors which have been B’s
neighbours in the past [Zah+10]. So far, exchanges of trust information have been considered
without investigating the effects of mobility, therefore sensor A will generally maintain indirect
information about sensor B only if there is interaction between A and B, and A cannot observe
B’s behaviour (e.g., it is not in the wireless communication range). When sensors are mobile
instead, even if A and B never interacted, they may interact in the future if they get closer.
Only at that time, do recommendations for B become of interest to A. Nevertheless, a criterion
to request such recommendations is still missing in literature.
Anomaly detection and trust management define the expected behaviour based on modelling
inter-measurement correlations. There are different choices available in literature concerning
the domain in which correlations are identified and how the are used to build expectations.
2.3.1 Exploiting Correlation
Since the original measurements substituted with fabricated ones cannot be observed directly,
they need to be characterised indirectly with related information. The relationship between
two pieces of information is a correlation, which can be calculated online, with historical data,
or modelled a-priori. In either case, coexistence of genuine and compromised measurements
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may cause disruptions in correlation, assuming that the correlations have not changed between
the moment when they are calculated and the moment when they are used.
We refer here to correlation in a broad sense, meaning that there is some kind of continuous
dependency, as opposed to Pearson’s correlation coefficient, which is the most commonly used
correlation metric. Referring to E, µ and σ as the expected value, the mean and the standard
deviation respectively, the Pearson correlation coefficient ρXY between two random variables
X and Y is given by:
ρXY =
cov(X, Y )
σXσY
=
E[(X − µX)(Y − µY )]
σXσY
(2.3)
Note that this coefficient measures only linear dependency between two variables, while non-
linear dependencies may be missed. Moreover, the expected Pearson correlation may vary in
time as physical phenomena are generally non-stationary.
In Wireless Sensor Networks we can generally consider correlations across three different do-
mains: temporal, spatial and attribute domain [RZM13].
• Temporal correlation is the dependency of a sensor’s reading on its previous readings.
It models the coherence in time of the sensed physical process.
• Spatial correlation is the dependency in readings from different sensors at the same
time. It models the similarities in how the sensed phenomenon is perceived by different
sensors.
• Attribute correlation is the dependency in readings that are related to different physical
processes. It models physical dependencies among heterogeneous physical quantities such
as temperature and relative humidity.
Usually a combination of these different kinds of correlation is used. We now analyse how they
contribute to the definition of expected data.
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2.3.2 Temporal Correlation
Variations in time of the sensed data can be modelled as a random process [Bou09], where the
random variables at different times are correlated. In (2.1) we observe that the variation of
a sensor’s measurements in time depends on both the variations introduced by the physical
attribute and the measurement error. The variation of the physical attribute in time is subject
to constraints, such as the presence of gradual changes, or the alternation of some patterns,
since the phenomenon observed usually follows the laws of physics. So, if the measurements
are gathered with sufficiently high frequency, consecutive measurements would be subject to
similar constraints. This simple observation justifies a procedure that identifies errors (including
malicious injections) when temporal variations do not respect these constraints. However, there
are two main difficulties in applying this observation to assess deviations: the time evolution
of the process is subject to uncertainty and the measurements are subject to noise.
When using Kalman filters [Kal60], these two factors are known respectively as process noise
and measurement noise. The measurement noise is typically modelled as a Gaussian process.
The process noise, instead, comes from the imperfections of the model used to describe the
process dynamics. In [Sun+13], the physical process is modelled as a discrete Markov process,
and a Kalman filter is used to estimate the value at time t1 as:
ϕ(t1,u) = F (ϕ(t0,u)) + w(t0) (2.4)
where F models the expected evolution of the time process and w is the process noise. This
approach is then used for change-point detection to detect attackers that abruptly modify the
measurements time series of a sensor.
Although temporal correlation is useful to detect genuine anomalies, such as sensor failures, it is
not reliable enough to detect malicious interference. Indeed, the temporal domain is completely
under the attacker’s control during the time when the sensor is compromised, so the attacker
can keep temporal correlation consistent by introducing slow enough transitions from genuine
to malicious measurements. Temporal attacks, i.e. on single sensors are well researched in the
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literature [Sub+06; BHL07; Sun+13] and are successful when the attacker is constrained to a
maximum time.
2.3.3 Spatial Correlation
In the presence of sudden events, the dynamics of a physical process can change rapidly. Often
detecting such events, such as a forest fire, a volcanic eruption, a cardiac attack etc., is the very
purpose of the WSN. The occurrence of events increases the complexity of detecting malicious
measurements since events may disrupt temporal correlations, giving rise to false anomalies.
Nevertheless, different sensor nodes generally are affected by the event and produce measure-
ments that are spatially correlated to the event source: as a consequence, the measurements of
different sensors are correlated during the manifestation of the event [Bou09]. This phenomenon
is known as spatial correlation.
The main advantage of spatial correlation is that it requires the attacker to compromise more
sensors to keep correlations consistent. Indeed, if the measurements of any genuine sensor
are expected to be highly correlated with those of another sensor that has been compromised,
significant data manipulations will be detected. Moreover, the compromised sensors are required
to coordinate themselves, i.e. collude, to prevent inconsistencies among the malicious sensors
themselves.
Spatial correlation can be modelled in different ways, with different amount of restrictions about
the coherence of the physical process in space. Therefore we analyse the different models with
a particular focus on their generality, which determines applicability, and on the correlation
extraction procedures.
The most widespread spatial correlation model is also the simplest: it assumes that all sensors
would produce the same measurements in the absence of errors and noise i.e., they measure
the same value, and we refer to this model as spatially homogeneous [ZDL06; NLL06; Wu+07;
LCC07; BHL07]. In terms of the physical attribute ϕ(ti,u), it is considered a function of time
only. Under this assumption, detecting sensors with abnormal readings becomes then a simple
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matter of detecting deviations from the spatial measurements’ distribution and the accuracy of
the distribution estimation increases with the number of sensors.
The homogeneous model is suitable only for regions of space which are small enough and
free of obstacles. However, when the deployment topology and characteristics of the physical
phenomena violate the homogeneity assumption, the spatial propagation rules can still induce
spatial correlations. A first attempt to relax the monotonicity assumption is made in [GZH09],
where spatial variation is considered but it is assumed monotonic. This implies that the values of
the physical attribute at a point in space, should either increase or decrease as the distance from
that point increases. To ascertain whether this property holds, Guo, Zhong, and He [GZH09]
divide the deployment space into sections, called faces. For each face, the authors construct a
“distance sequence”, corresponding to the sequence of sensors ordered by the distance from that
face. While sensing the phenomenon, the sensors readings are sorted to generate the estimated
sequence, which is then compared to all possible distance sequences, as shown in Fig. 2.2. The
Figure 2.2: Detection of measurements which do not comply with the monotonicity assumption,
from [GZH09].
sensors measurements are consistent with the expectation if the estimated sequence corresponds
exactly to one of the distance sequences.
Instead of considering a strict assumption like the monotonicity of the measurements, it is pos-
sible to model correlations between the sensors’ readings as a function of their spatial positions.
An example of such a model is the variogram, defined as the variance of the difference between
values of a physical phenomenon at two locations. In our notation, the variogram between two
locations u1 and u2 is defined as var(||ϕ(ti,u1)− ϕ(ti,u2)||). When the physical phenomenon
is assumed to be isotropic, the variogram is expressed as a function of the distance only. Zhang
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et al. [Zha+12] have applied it to compute an expected measurement as a function of the mea-
surements from other sensors. Note that in the presence of obstacles, the variogram is not only
a function of the distance, but also depends on the absolute positions.
Rather than considering distances between sensors, spatial correlation can be calculated as a
function of the sensor values themselves. This choice caters for sensors at the same distance,
but subject to different noise or obstacles in space. However, it comes at the price of correlation
updates when sensors are mobile. For example, Sharma, Golubchik, and Govindan [SGG10]
express a sensor’s measurement as a linear combination of the measurements from the other
sensors, extract the function’s parameters and derive expected sensor readings. Dereszynski and
Dietterich [DD11] instead, derive expected readings by fitting the joint probability distribution
of the measurements from N sensors, after assuming it is an N -variate Gaussian distribution.
Note that this approach also implicitly assumes a linear model, as the covariance between two
random variables captures linear dependencies (we have mentioned in Sect. 2.3.1 that this
is true for the Pearson correlation coefficient, which is just a normalisation of the covariance
index).
Not infrequently, spatial correlation is used in conjunction with temporal correlation, since they
capture different kinds of deviations. For example, Bettencourt, Hagberg, and Larkey [BHL07],
propose an outlier detection technique based on two kinds of differences: between a sensor’s
reading and its own previous reading (temporal correlation) and between readings of different
sensors at the same time (spatial correlation). A distribution for both differences is used to
check if data samples are statistically significant as related to the temporal domain as well as
to the spatial domain.
2.3.4 Attribute Correlation
In the same WSN, sensors observing different physical attributes such as light, vibrations,
temperature etc., may coexist. Some of these attributes may be correlated because of the
physical relationship between them e.g., temperature and relative humidity. Commonly, at
every deployment location, many sensors in charge of measuring different physical processes
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could be connected to a single sensor node. As described in (2.5), for a fixed point in space and
time we have a set of A physical attributes. We define attribute correlation as the correlation
between them.
ϕa(t,u) a ∈ 1, ..., A (2.5)
Attribute-based expectations are very useful when spatial redundancy is limited. For example,
body sensor networks for healthcare have limited redundancy since it is impractical to cover the
patient with several sensors. We can then still exploit correlation among different physiological
values (the attributes) measured by different sensor nodes. However, in the context of malicious
data injections, attribute correlation is useful only when combined with spatial correlation.
Indeed, if the measurements of two attributes come from the same node (implying a combination
with temporal correlation), the attacker controls both by controlling the node. Instead, if they
come from different nodes (implying a combination with spatial correlation) the attacker needs
to control both nodes to keep attribute correlation consistent.
2.3.5 Overview of Measurements Correlation Types
In the previous sections we have analysed different types of correlations, the information they
capture, and variations in the exploitation of the same correlation type. In Table 2.1 we
summarise this analysis.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have introduced a unified notation for describing the variables involved in
the measurements collection process in WSNs, as well as the components introduced by faults
and malicious data injections.
We used the notation introduced to describe the different kinds of measurements correlations.
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Table 2.1: Correlation Types
Correla-
tion
Type
Information Captured Variations
Temporal corr(ϕa(t1,u), ϕa(t2,u))
• Time-series evolution model
• Time memory (the maximum gap
between two correlated time
instants)
Spatial corr(ϕa(t,u1), ϕa(t,u2))
• Spatial model, e.g. homogeneous,
monotonic, variogram, linear
dependency
• Correlation variational model, e.g.
distance-dependent,
sensors-dependent, fixed
• Neighbourhood selection criterion
Attribute corr(ϕa1(t,u), ϕa2(t,u))
• Correlation extraction process, e.g.
from physical laws,
temporal/spatial analysis etc.
In the following chapters, the same notation will also serve to review the related work and to
present novel techniques as well.
We have considered three different types of correlations: temporal, spatial, and attribute corre-
lation. We have also identified correlation models with remarkably different levels of abstraction,
especially for the spatial domain. As we will see in the next chapter, each model choice will
affect significantly the techniques’ performance and applicability.
We have discussed that spatial correlation is preferable when dealing with malicious interference
because it requires the attacker to compromise more sensors. Temporal correlation can be kept
consistent if the sensor is kept under the attacker’s control for the duration of the attack, hence
it is appropriate only for non-colluding attacks or for genuine anomalies. Attribute correlation,
instead, is generally used to increase the reliability of either temporal or spatial correlation.
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In the next chapter we look in detail at the related work, using the notation introduced here.
We will compare different works in term of approach, performance, applicability, computational
complexity and issues addressed.
Chapter 3
Related Work
The integrity of the sensed data can be verified through measurements inspection techniques,
i.e. techniques that analyse the measurements and are able to infer the presence of malicious
compromise. Existing studies advocate the use of techniques designed for detecting faulty
sensors or faulty data also for malicious data injections. Comparatively, only a small proportion
of papers focuses on the specific problems introduced by malicious data injections. Indeed,
there is a significant difference between faults and maliciously injected data since the latter is
deliberately created in sophisticated ways to be difficult to detect. Therefore, there is a need
to:
1. Analyse the achievements and shortcomings of the work targeted to malicious data injec-
tions.
2. Review the state-of-the art techniques proposed for non-malicious data compromise and
evaluate their suitability to this problem.
We do so in the following and compare studies according to their:
1. Adopted approach.
2. Scope: i.e detecting malicious data injections, faults, or events.
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3. Results and performance.
This chapter is structured in this way: In Section 3.1 we individually review the techniques for
detecting the presence of abnormal measurements, distinguishing the techniques that pertain
to anomaly detection from those pertaining to trust management. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3
we describe the state-of-the-art for the techniques that complement the detection task, i.e.
diagnosis and characterisation respectively. The different techniques are compared in Section
3.4 according to the approach, performance, and overhead. Finally, in Section 3.5, we summarise
the conclusions.
3.1 Detecting Deviations from Expected Data
Measurements inspection techniques define some expected properties for the measurements and
provide a method to evaluate the deviation of the reported measurements from expectation and
detect abnormal behaviours. The detection task has been addressed with anomaly detection
techniques and with trust management, which have a similar way to inspect the measurements,
as both build an expectation of the measurement values, but use different criteria to cope with
abnormal data. Specifically, anomaly detection uses the expectation to discriminate between
anomalous and normal data. Trust management instead, uses a criterion to map the deviation
from expected data to a trust value.
3.1.1 Anomaly Detection Techniques
Anomaly detection is a method to characterise data as normal or anomalous. In contrast to
Rajasegarar, Leckie, and Palaniswami [RLP08] who consider outlier detection and anomaly
detection as equivalent, in the following outlier detection is considered one of the techniques
belonging to the anomaly detection category. The reason for this choice is that outlier detec-
tion identifies the samples that are unlikely to manifest. However, the measurements could
be anomalous with respect to other criteria, that cannot be reduced to the problem of finding
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outliers. To clarify this aspect, we present statistical tests for anomaly detection and highlight
their differences with more traditional outlier detection techniques. Then we delve into tech-
niques for outlier detection, which is still the most commonly adopted technique for anomaly
detection.
Statistical Tests
Techniques based on statistical tests assume a probabilistic data distribution. Real data is
then checked against this distribution to verify its compliance with it. Techniques based on
statistical tests are more general than outlier detection because they check the compliance of
both outliers and non-outliers with the distribution whereas outlier detection focuses on the
classification of single data samples.
For example, Rezvani et al. [Rez+13] use a technique based on statistical tests to detect mali-
cious colluding nodes. They assume spatial homogeneity, i.e. that all sensors should perceive
the same value, and model sensor measurements as a ground-truth value plus some noise.
The ground truth is estimated as a weighted average of measurements, where the weights
are as high as the measurement is close to the weighted average calculated in the previous
iteration. The difference between the estimated value and each measurement is assumed to
be normally distributed. Compliance with the normal distribution is then assessed with the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which quantifies the distance between an empirical distribution (the
errors distribution) and a reference distribution (the normal distribution).
Outlier Detection
Outlier detection methods consider as anomalous data that lies outside of the space where most
data samples lie. This technique can identify malicious data injections reasonably effectively as
long as maliciously injected values are a minority in the dataset and deviate significantly from
the other data.
Historically, outlier detection has been proposed in WSNs for different purposes, sometimes with
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opposing goals: in some cases the techniques aim to filter out outliers, in others the outliers
represent the main interest. For example, outliers are filtered out to increase data accuracy
[JAP06] and for energy saving [Raj+09]. Applications where outliers are the main interest
include fault detection [PH07], event detection [Bah+09; Zha+12] and detection of malicious
data. We describe below different approaches to the outlier detection problem independently
of the application context, but we focus on those techniques that can be applied to detecting
malicious data injections.
Nearest-Neighbour-Based Outlier Detection In nearest-neighbour based outlier detec-
tion, an outlier is a data sample with a narrow neighbourhood, where a neighbourhood com-
prises the data samples within a certain distance. Most nearest-neighbour based techniques in
WSNs are inspired from the well-known LOCI method [Pap+03], which calculates for every
sample, the number of neighbours in a data space characterised by the radius αr, where α is a
parameter used to reduce computational complexity. The relative difference with the average
number of neighbours, i.e. the samples within a radius r in the data space, constitutes the
Multi-Granularity Deviation Factor (MDEF). The MDEF is compared to a threshold equal
to 3 times the MDEF standard deviation to ensure that less than 1% values are above the
threshold when the distances between data samples follow a Gaussian distribution (the per-
centage increases up to 10% for other distributions). Note that this method is applicable to
malicious data injections by considering the sensors’ measurements as the data samples. How-
ever, the research community seems to have somewhat lost interest in approaches based on
nearest-neighbour since they have large computational overheads due to the calculation of the
neighbours for each new data sample.
Clustering-Based Outlier Detection Clustering is another technique often used for out-
lier detection. Here the outliers are the elements distant from the others, after organising close
elements into clusters. For example, Rajasegarar et al. [Raj+06] identify a cluster as anomalous
if its distance to other clusters is more than one standard deviation of the distance of the cluster
elements from the mean. The main drawback of this approach is that an attacker that controls
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multiple colluding measurements can keep the inter-cluster distance low by introducing inter-
mediate clusters, i.e. clusters of malicious measurements that have a low inter-cluster distance,
and that decrease the inter-cluster distance for other clusters of malicious measurements.
PCA-Based Outlier Detection Principal component analysis (PCA) [Mar09] is a common
data analysis technique, that has also been applied to find outliers [CP07]. PCA is based on
a projection of the k-dimensional data space onto another k-dimensional data space, where
the variables describing the data samples are linearly uncorrelated. This transformation is
defined in such a way that the projected variables are sorted with descending variance. The
first p out of k variables are defined as the principal components and can be projected back to
the original data space to obtain a prediction vector ynorm [JM79], also referred to as normal
data [CP07]. The difference between original and normal data constitutes the residual vector
yres. Residual vectors that are large in magnitude (i.e., when the squared prediction error
SPE = ‖yres‖2 of the residual vector is greater than a threshold) are interpreted as deviations
from the predicted (normal) vector and considered as outliers [CP07]. PCA can be applied to
k-dimensional datasets e.g., made up of the measurements time series of k sensors [CP07]. In
this case yres reflects changes in spatial correlation but the same idea can also be applied to
the temporal or attribute domains.
Classification-Based Outlier Detection Traditional classification techniques learn how to
recognise samples from different classes. Anomaly detection considers two classes: anomalous
and normal; however, anomalous data samples are rarely observable compared to the normal
ones. Therefore, classification for anomaly detection is generally reduced to a one-class classi-
fication problem, based on the observation of normal samples only.
Normal and anomalous samples can be viewed as points within two different regions of the
data space. Finding the boundary that separates the two regions may be infeasible, because
the regions overlap and, even when a boundary exists, it may have a complex shape. Support
Vector Machines (SVM) are a classification technique that can overcome this limitation by
projecting the data samples into a higher dimensional space. In the projected data-space, a
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boundary that separates normal from anomalous points may exist even if it does not exist in
the original space, or may have a simpler shape. For example, the normal samples could be
contained within a sphere in the projected data space. When the data space contains only
positive values, this problem reduces to a special type of SVM called one-class quarter-sphere
SVM [Las+04], which is represented in Fig. 3.1. With this approach, the classification problem
Figure 3.1: One-class quarter-sphere support vector machine, from [Raj+09].
reduces to finding the sphere’s radius. Depending on how the WSN dataset is given in input to
quarter-sphere SVM, the classification can be made across its time domain [Raj+09], attribute
domain, or both [SNQ12] .
Bayesian networks have also been applied in WSNs to detect outliers with a classification-
based approach. A Bayesian network defines the relations of conditional independence between
random variables through a network graph. In WSNs, the random variables can be different
values in space and time of the physical attributes.
An example of application of Bayesian networks to WSNs is given by Dereszynski and Dietterich
[DD11]. The physical attribute ϕ(ti,u) is modelled as a random variable, which is correlated
with the previous sample ϕ(ti−1,u) (1st-order Markov relationship) and with values at different
locations ϕ(ti,vv ∈ Ω). The aim is to find the state of a sensor, modelled by a random variable
with two possible values: working and broken. The posterior probability of the measurements,
which depends on both the physical attribute and on the sensor state variable, is maximised
with respect to the state variables to identify faulty nodes. Dereszynski and Dietterich [DD11]
evaluated their approach assuming that faulty sensors have a high increase their measurements’
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variance (by 105), motivated by the observation that the measurements of faulty sensors appear
more noisy. Though reasonable in the case of faults, this assumption does usually not hold for
data injections, where an attacker can choose the measurements distribution arbitrarily and
wishes, in most cases, to remain undetected.
Statistical Outlier Detection Statistical outlier detection identifies outlying data samples
through statistical characterisation of the tail of the samples’ probability distribution, as shown
in Fig. 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Statistical characterisation of the sensed data for outlier detection, from [BHL07].
Note that this approach differs from anomaly detection based on statistical tests, as it does not
test the samples’ compliance to their expected distribution, but only identifies the outliers that
lie on the tails of the distribution. For example, outliers can be defined as samples far from
the mean. Ngai, Liu, and Lyu [NLL06] have applied this idea to measurements from different
sensors, thus exploiting spatial correlation. The spatial sample mean µˆS of measurements from
N different sensors at the i-th time instant is defined as:
µˆSi =
1
N
N∑
j=1
xˆi(uj) (3.1)
Ngai, Liu, and Lyu [NLL06] use it to evaluate the deviation of sensor j from the spatial mean,
compared to the magnitude of the mean itself with the metric: f(j, t) =
√
(xˆi(uj)−µˆSi )
2
µˆSi
.
Similarly Tanachaiwiwat and Helmy [TH06], use the metric t∗ = xˆi(uk−(µ
T
i,j±δ)
STi,j/
√
W
, where µTi,j and
STi,j are respectively j’s temporal mean and sample standard deviation in the time window
[i −W + 1, i] and δ is a priorly known variation between sensor j and k due to the observed
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phenomenon’s spatial propagation. Considering the model in Sect. 2.2.1, a generic sensor j
calculates its temporal sample mean in the W -wide time window [i−W + 1, i] as:
µˆTi,j =
1
W
W−1∑
t=0
xˆi−t(uj) (3.2)
The temporal standard deviation is instead calculated as:
STi,j =
√√√√ 1
W − 1
W−1∑
t=0
(xˆi−t(uj)− µˆTi,j)2 (3.3)
The value of t∗ is then compared with a threshold, that is set to 3 since, in normally distributed
data, this accounts for approximately 99.7% of the population (the percentage decreases to 90%
for other distributions).
In some cases the median is preferred to the mean, since the former has the advantage of
being insensitive to outliers. Indeed, a problem in outlier detection is how to find the general
(non-outlying) trend from data affected by outliers. The mean is sensitive to outliers, since
it is proportional to the magnitude of each operand. The median takes instead one element
to represent all the others. Wu et al. [Wu+07] use the median operator to aggregate sensors
measurements in a neighbourhood. We can refer to it as a spatial median. If we order the N
sensors measurement at the i-th time instant such that xˆi(u1) ≤ xˆi(u2) ≤ ... ≤ xˆi(uN), the
median in the spatial domain is calculated as:
µ˜S =

xˆi(u(N+1)/2) if N is odd
xˆi(uN/2) if N is even
(3.4)
After calculating the difference between the median and each value, there are two possibilities:
comparing each difference to the measurements magnitude, or comparing it to the general
distribution of the differences. Yang et al. [Yan+06] and Wu et al. [Wu+07] detect outliers in
the differences, assuming they are normally distributed. Instead of relying on the assumption
of a Gaussian distribution, the probability distribution can also be estimated from the data
[BHL07].
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When sensing multiple physical attributes, the distribution of the measurements across all
attributes can be considered, rather than a separate distribution for each one. This approach
can potentially detect outliers that a separate approach would fail to detect. Liu, Cheng, and
Chen [LCC07] combine different attributes using the Mahalanobis distance, which is based
on the inter-attribute correlation and defines how the data is statistically distributed in the
attribute space. This scheme is shown in Fig. 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Statistical distribution in the attribute space made up by temperature and humidity.
Points with Mahalanobis distance greater than d are treated as outliers, from [Raj+10].
3.1.2 Trust-Management Based Techniques
Trust-management considers the trustworthiness between two classes of entities: a trustor
and a trustee. The trustor assigns each trustee a trustworthiness value, based on how much
the trustee’s behaviour matches an expectation. Trustworthiness values are usually in the
range [0, 1], decreasing when the trustee exhibits deviations from the expected behaviour and
increasing when the trustee’s behaviour matches the expectation.
Trust-management can be usefully applied in WSNs to reduce the influence of the compro-
mised sensor nodes that inject malicious data. Indeed, if the expected behaviour accurately
characterises genuine nodes, compromised nodes would be assigned a low trustworthiness when
deviating from it. Since trust values are a continuous metric defined inside an interval, there is
no direct classification of compromised and genuine nodes. Instead, the trust values are used
to apply a penalisation proportional to the confidence that the sensor is compromised. Note
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that the influence of the compromised nodes become negligible only when the confidence is suf-
ficiently high. Filtering all the sensors with a trustworthiness under a given threshold [SLD12],
could help mitigate this drawback, but requires a method to set the appropriate threshold.
Event-based techniques
Trust-management in sensed data was originally introduced as a complement to network-level
trust, i.e. the reliability to correctly perform network-level tasks [GBS08; Ray+08; MCA08]
such as communicating routes, participating to the route discovery process, routing incoming
packets etc. The behaviour with respect to each of these tasks can be of two kinds: cooperative
and uncooperative.
The first examples of trust management specifically designed for sensed data use a similar binary
evaluation to build the trustworthiness, defined with respect to an event detection process.
Initially, a decision logic establishes the presence of the event by combining the sensed data
and the trust values. Then, the sensed data is compared to the final decision to measure the
sensor’s cooperativeness and update the trust values. This criterion is based on the assumption
that nearby sensors are expected to agree about the event presence, which is a form of spatial
correlation (see Sect. 2.3.3).
One of the first techniques to adopt this approach is described in [Ata+08]. As shown in Fig.
3.4, the reading of a generic sensor i, Si(t), which can take the values 0 and 1 (absence/presence
of an event), are relayed to a forwarding node. This node computes
∑N
n=1 Wnxˆi(un), where
Wn :n∈1...N denote the trust weights.
Figure 3.4: Trust-weighted aggregation for event detection. FN is a forwarding node, which
collects reports from the sensor nodes SN, from [Ata+08].
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The result is used to decide about the ground truth E. Afterwards, weights are updated with
the following rule:
Wn =

Wn − θrn, if xˆi(un) 6= E
Wn, otherwise
(3.5)
where rn is the ratio of sensors giving different output over the total number of sensors and θ
is a penalty weight that determines a trade-off between the detection time and accuracy. In
summary, the trustworthiness values, which coincide with the weights, are calculated based on
the measurements consistency with the aggregated value. The latter is considered more reliable
than the single readings, since sensors which exhibited inconsistent (e.g. malicious) readings
in the past contribute less to the aggregation process. Finally, malicious nodes are detected
by comparing the weights to a threshold, which the authors heuristically set to 0.4. Note that
the algorithm is vulnerable to the on-off attack : a node that performs well for a time period,
acquires high trustworthiness, then suddenly starts malfunctioning [Sun+07].
To counteract the on-off attack Oh, Hong, and Choi [OHC12] and Lim and Choi [LC13] propose
to penalise xˆi(un) 6= E by a quantity α and reward xˆi(un) = E by a quantity β with β < α.
As α
β
grows bigger, faulty and malicious nodes are filtered out faster. However, sensors with
transient faults are also filtered out, even though they may report correct measurements later
on. To avoid this, the ratio α
β
needs to also consider the probability of transient faults and
their duration distribution. Therefore, this operation just reduces the frequency with which an
attacker can switch between “good” and “bad” behaviour in an on-off attack.
When the sum of all trust weights is equal to 1, the weighted sum of sensors reading corresponds
to a weighted mean. As described in the previous section, the mean has the drawback of being
directly proportional to extreme readings. So in trust-based aggregation as well, the median
could be used as a more robust aggregation operator. A trust weighted median has been applied
by Wang, Ding, and Bi [WDB10] in the context of acoustic target localisation, where the median
allows them to filter out faulty measurements. The advantages of using the weighted median
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increase when an element with high weight has an extreme value. Indeed, while the weighted
mean would be biased towards that value, the weighted median would still filter it out, if the
other values are not extreme and the sum of their weights is bigger than the weight of the
extreme value. This property reduces the efficacy of an on-off attack.
Another aspect to take into account is the uncertainty in the event’s presence. Raya et al.
[Ray+08] deal with this aspect by using a decision logic based on Dempster-Shafer Theory
(DST), which expresses the belief about the event presence as a combination of individual
beliefs from sensor nodes. DST combines the sensors’ information supporting the event with
the information non-refuting the event (the uncertainty margin which may comply with the
event presence).
Anomaly-based techniques
Rather than analysing the compliance with the output of on an event decision logic, other trust-
management techniques look for anomalous behaviours with techniques similar to anomaly
detection ones.
In fact, the output of anomaly detection itself can be used to define a cooperative/uncooperative
behaviour [GBS08], but a more flexible approach, that does not restrict the observations to a
binary value, is to update trust values based on an anomaly score. An example is given by
Bankovic et al. [Ban+10], using self-organizing maps (SOM). SOM are a clustering and data
representation technique, that maps the data space to a discrete 2D neuron lattice. Bankovic
et al. [Ban+10] build two SOM lattices: one in the temporal domain and another in the
spatial domain. The trust values are assigned based on two anomaly scores: the distance
between the measurement and the SOM neuron, and the distance between the neuron to which
the measurement has been assigned and other SOM neurons. The main disadvantage of this
algorithm is its computational time. For better accuracy, SOM require many neurons, but the
computational time increases noticeably [McH03].
Another example is given by Zhang, Das, and Liu [ZDL06], who use a statistical-test approach
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(see Sect. 3.1.1) to assign reputation values to the sensors. The measurements gathered in time
are assumed to approximately follow a normal distribution. The normal and actual measure-
ments’ distributions are compared with Kullback-Leibler divergence Dn, which evaluates the
information lost when a probability distribution is used in lieu of another. The divergence is
then used to update the trust values, with the following expression:
Wn =
1
1 +
√
Dn
(3.6)
Using Second Hand Information
In the trust-management schemes previously analysed, each sensor’s trust values are computed
and updated by the device with the trustor role, typically a forwarding node. However, when
the trustor is not in the transmission range of its trustee i, it may rely on information from its
neighbours Ni to calculate its trustworthiness. Bao et al. [Bao+12] deal with this problem by
introducing two different trust update criteria:
Tij(t) =

(1− α)Tij(t− δt) + αTij(t) if j ∈ Ni
avgk∈Ni{(1− γ)Tkj(t− δt) + γTkj(t)} otherwise
(3.7)
The calculations of the second case represent node j’s recommendation, i.e. the trustworthiness
extracted from relayed information. Eventually, recommendations depend on trustworthiness
from the viewpoint of direct neighbours. However, such trustworthiness can be manipulated by
malicious nodes to bad-mouth or good-mouth other nodes. Bao et al. [Bao+12] mitigate this
problem by controlling the impact of recommendations through parameter γ, set to βTik(t)
1+βTik(t)
.
Thus, if a sensor has little trust compared to the parameter β, the contribution of its recom-
mendation will be small. However, sensors conducting an on-off attack can give false recom-
mendations for a short while and then behave correctly again without being detected.
Even when direct information is available, recommendations can be used as second hand infor-
mation and combined with direct information to obtain a reputation. Second hand information
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speeds up the convergence of trust values but adds network traffic overhead and introduces
new parameters, such as the weighting criterion for recommendations and the recommendation
exchange frequency [HLT05]. Ganeriwal, Balzano, and Srivastava [GBS08] follow this approach
and treat reputation as a probability distribution, updated as a combination of direct and in-
direct reputation. Direct reputation is updated based on a watchdog module, while indirect
reputation is updated with recommendations, i.e. reputation from other nodes. The frame-
work’s scheme is shown in Fig.3.5. Note that such a definition of reputation introduces a loop:
indirect reputations come from reputations given by other sensors, which in turn depend on
indirect reputations. To avoid the information loop, recommendations need to be taken only
from direct observers.
Figure 3.5: Combination of direct information and recommendations, from [GBS08].
Modelling reputation as a single value does not consider the uncertainty that a sensor has
in trusting another sensor. This information is particularly useful with recommendations, as
recommendations from sensors with high uncertainty should contribute less. To consider un-
certainty, reputation can be modelled with a probability distribution whose choice is dictated
mainly by the trust evaluation and update criteria. For example, Ganeriwal, Balzano, and Sri-
vastava [GBS08] use the beta distribution since it is the posterior distribution when the binary
interactions between nodes are modelled with a binomial distribution. Momani, Challa, and
Alhmouz [MCA08] apply a normal distribution to model the differences between the measure-
ments of two sensors (spatial homogeneity is assumed, see Sect. 2.3.3).
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3.2 Diagnosis in Related Work
In the previous section we have analysed how state-of-the-art measurements inspection tech-
niques cater for the detection of malicious data injections. We discuss below the state-of-the-art
in the diagnosis task.
Distinguishing Events from Faults
From the analysis of the work available in literature, we have observed that most of the diag-
nosis efforts aim at diagnosing events as opposed to faults. The general assumption used to
distinguish between them is that faults are likely to be stochastically unrelated, while event
measurements are likely to be spatially correlated [LDH06; SNQ12]. Note that this assumption
excludes common-mode failures from the analyses. Based on this assumption, after detecting
deviations from expected data with temporal [BHL07; SNQ12] or attribute [SNQ12] correla-
tions, it is possible to diagnose whether the deviation was caused by a fault or an event, by
exploiting spatial correlation. When there is a consensus among a set of sensors about the pres-
ence of an event, discording sensors are considered faulty [LDH06; SNQ12; BHL07]. Similarly,
some sensed attributes (e.g. human vital signs, such as glucose level, blood pressure, etc.) can
be assumed heavily correlated in the absence of faults, which instead disrupt attribute corre-
lations. Then, if we further assume that events would cause a minimum number of outlying
attributes, faults can be identified when the minimum is not reached [SLM13].
Fewer advances have been made towards diagnosing malicious interference as opposed to faults
and events – we summarise them in the following sections.
Distinguishing Malicious Interference from Events
In the literature, malicious interference is distinguished from events through an agreement-based
strategy [LCC07; Ata+08; WDB10; OHC12; LC13; Sun+13], i.e. the sensor’s information is
first used to decide about the presence of an event and then sensors which did not support the
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final decision are identified as malicious. This approach is based on the assumption that sensors
are sufficiently spatially correlated to correctly detect events. However, multiple compromised
nodes can also collude in the attack to keep the spatial correlations consistent between them-
selves. This complicates discriminating between genuine events and malicious data injections,
and allows an attacker to fabricate false events or to mask genuine ones. This aspect is discussed
in more detail in Sect 3.3.
Distinguishing Malicious Interference from Faults
Criteria to distinguish malicious data injections from faults are not broadly investigated. Two
main approaches can be identified: delegating the diagnosis to intrusion-detection techniques
and leveraging fault statistics.
Intrusion Detection One of the main challenges in detecting attacks with anomaly-based
techniques, is that such techniques abstract the means through which an attack is conducted.
This choice comes from the objective to detect new attacks with unknown patterns, as opposed
to intrusion detection techniques which are based on recognising known attack signatures. The
framework proposed by Ngai, Liu, and Lyu [NLL06] is a trade-off between an anomaly-detection
technique and an intrusion detection system, since the detection is carried out through anomaly
detection achieving high detection rate, while the diagnosis is carried out with intrusion detec-
tion. Clearly this approach provides diagnosis only for known attacks and cannot distinguish
between an unknown attack and a fault.
Fault Statistics The statistical characterisation of faults can also be used to distinguish
them from malicious interference. Oh, Hong, and Choi [OHC12] and Lim and Choi [LC13] use
the expected frequency of transient faults to avoid excluding from the system sensors subject
to transient faults. Indeed, their trust management algorithm allows such sensors to recover
trustworthiness, by allowing temporary misbehaviour. Only sensors misbehaving with higher
frequency, including malicious sensors and sensors with permanent faults will then be excluded.
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3.3 Characterisation in Related Work
In related work, characterisation is often addressed simultaneously with detection, since the
information characterising the attack can be precious to improve the detection. In particular,
information about spatial correlations can help identifying a malicious sensor with measure-
ments that are not consistent with those in the neighbourhood.
However, when multiple sensors have been compromised and collude in the attack, they can
act in concert to change the measurements whilst evading, if possible, any anomaly detection
applied. Therefore, identifying which sensors are more likely to be genuine and which sensors
are more likely to be compromised becomes an integral part of detecting the attack itself.
In collusion attacks, the compromised sensors follow a joint strategy that reduces the advan-
tages of spatial correlation, since the compromised nodes co-operate to form credible spatially
correlated data [TH06]. In the presence of collusion, diagnosis is also significantly more com-
plex. Tanachaiwiwat and Helmy [TH06] point out that when a genuine outlier (for example
related to an event) occurs, extreme readings from the colluding nodes could be hidden. The
problem becomes increasingly difficult as the percentage of (colluding) compromised sensors
increases. Ultimately, when the number of colluding sensors increases to the point of exceeding
genuine sensors, the attack may still be detectable, but it may be impossible to distinguish
which nodes are genuine and which nodes are compromised. Tanachaiwiwat and Helmy [TH06]
evaluate their anomaly detection algorithm against colluding nodes and find that performance
noticeably decreases when more than 30% nodes are colluding. A similar result is reported by
Chatzigiannakis and Papavassiliou [CP07].
Bertino, Ignatovic, and Jha [BIJ14] describe a new attack scenario applicable when the trust-
worthiness is calculated through an iterative filtering algorithm. While in generic (non-iterative)
trust-evaluation techniques, trust weights are updated based on data from the current time in-
stant and the weights calculated at the previous time instant, in iterative filtering the weights
are iteratively updated with data of the same time instant until a convergence criterion is sat-
isfied. In this context the authors introduce a new attack scenario where all colluding nodes
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but one, produce noticeable deviations in their readings. The remaining compromised node
reports, instead, values close to the aggregated value of all the readings (including malicious
ones). Eventually, this node acquires a high trust value, while all the others acquire low trust
values. The aggregated value, in turn, quickly converges to a value far from that of the genuine
nodes. The authors show that this attack is successful when the sensors are assigned equal
initial trustworthiness. They therefore propose to calculate the initial trustworthiness as a
function that decreases as the error variance increases. The error is defined as the distance
from an estimated physical attribute value ϕ(t), and is the same for all the sensors.
In [Rez+13] the same authors proposed another technique that detects collusion rather than
counteracting it. This technique is based on the assumption that deviations from the aggregated
values are normally distributed for genuine nodes. This assumption comes from the observation
that the deviations of non-compromised nodes, even if large, come from a large number of
independent factors, and thus must roughly have a Gaussian distribution. For colluding nodes
instead, they assume that this condition does not hold. Then, by running the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test to check compliance to the normal distribution, they discriminate colluding nodes
from genuine nodes.
In summary, while many studies propose propose new anomaly detection algorithms to cater for
a broad range of scenarios, comparatively fewer address specifically malicious data injections in
a way that can cater for more sophisticated attacks involving collusion between sensors. Such
scenarios need to be explored further and constitute one of the main problems covered in this
thesis.
3.4 Discussion
In the previous sections we have seen how different techniques can be applied to detect malicious
data injections, how they leverage measurements’ correlations, and the assumptions on which
such correlations are based. We have examined the different detection techniques and how
they find deviations from the expected behaviour. We have highlighted the importance of
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distinguishing between different sources of deviations and presented the main directions of
work towards this objective so far.
We now combine these analyses by building direct comparison tables, which summarise their
main characteristics. A summary of the results reported by each of the techniques mentioned
is provided in the following section.
3.4.1 Comparison of Approaches
We divide our comparison of the approaches analysed so far into Tables 3.1 and 3.2, containing
the anomaly detection and trust management techniques respectively. The content of the
columns from left to right is: technique name and reference; correlation used to define expected
data; assumptions about the spatial model if any; detection criterion used; possible sources
of anomalies (as mentioned in their paper) and for which of them diagnosis criteria are given,
e.g. {Event},{Malicious or Faulty} means that the authors give a criterion to discern between
anomalies arising from events and from malicious or faulty sensors.
We observe that spatial correlation is most often exploited, and frequently under the assump-
tion of a homogeneous space. The situation is particularly evident for papers considering the
presence of malicious data injections and is probably a consequence of the fact that only a mi-
nor subset of sensors is assumed to be compromised. Therefore, in the spatial domain there is
always a significant set of genuine measurements that can be exploited to detect the malicious
ones.
Assuming spatial homogeneity makes the calculations significantly simpler, since the sensors are
considered to measure the same value. However, it also significantly restricts the applicability
of the techniques in real cases. When the physical phenomenon is observed with low precision,
e.g. overall temperature across a large open space area, this assumption is still valid if the
spatial variations are small enough to treat them as noise. However, this allows an attacker to
introduce malicious data that are within the noise bounds yet still deviate significantly from
the real values. While this assumption is generally appropriate in small areas, small areas also
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typically include fewer sensors which have higher risk of an attacker compromising them all.
When multiple types of correlation are considered, temporal correlations are generally exploited
along with spatial ones. Use of attribute correlations is rather infrequent, probably due to the
fact that understanding them requires knowledge about their physical significance and this is
application specific. The tables highlight even more the lack of diagnosis and characterisation
(see Sect. 6.7). Few papers consider specifically malicious injections with collusion and even
fewer papers deal with the problem of distinguishing them from other causes of deviations.
While distinguishing events from faults is the kind of diagnosis more frequently considered,
distinguishing attacks from faults is undoubtedly more challenging and still rather rare.
Table 3.1: Anomaly detection techniques
Work Correlation Spatial Detection method Classes Inter-class
exploited model considered discrimination
EKF,
CUSUM
GLR
[Sun+13]
Temporal None Change in the distri-
bution of error from
estimate
Event, Mali-
cious, Faulty
{Event}, {Mali-
cious or faulty}
MGDD
[Sub+06]
Temporal None Measurement proba-
bility
Event, Fault None
[NLL06] Spatial Homogeneous Difference with
neighbours
Suspicious
of Sinkhole
attack
None
[Wu+07] Spatial Homogeneous Difference with
neighbours
Event None
FIND
[GZH09]
Spatial Monotonic
WRT event
source
Spatial monotonicity
disruptions
Fault None
[SLM13] Attribute-
temporal
None Energy of fluctua-
tions
Event, Fault {Event} {Faulty}
STIOD
[Zha+12]
Spatio-
temporal
Variogram Difference with esti-
mate
Event, Error {Event} {Error}
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MAP+HBST
[NP12]
Spatio-
temporal
Linear spatial
trend
Difference with esti-
mate
Fault None
[LCC07] Spatial Homogeneous Difference with
neighbours
Malicious,
Event
{Malicious},
{Event}
ART
[TH06]
Spatial Homogeneous Difference with
neighbours
Compromised,
Uncalibrated
Sybil
{Compromised or
Faulty}, {Uncali-
brated}, {Sybil}
[Raj+09] Spatio-
temporal
Homogeneous Values outside a
quarter-sphere
None None
STA-
QS-SVM
[SNQ12]
Spatio-
temporal
and Spatio-
attribute
Homogeneous Values outside a
quarter-sphere
None None
[CP07] Spatial High Pearson
correlation
Changes in correla-
tion
Fault, Mali-
cious
{Point failure or
malicious node},
{Group failure or
Collusion}
[BHL07] Spatio-
temporal
Homogeneous Distribution of tem-
poral and spatial dif-
ferences
Event, Fault {Event}, {Point
failure}
[Han+75] Spatial Linear combi-
nation of state
variables
Difference with esti-
mate
Fault None
Robust IF
[Rez+13]
Spatial Homogeneous Distribution of dis-
tance from estima-
tion
Fault, Mali-
cious
None
3.4.2 Comparing Reported Evaluation Results
In the previous sections, we have considered techniques that could be applied to the problem of
detecting, diagnosing and characterising malicious data injections. For those techniques that
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Table 3.2: Trust based detection techniques
Work Correlation
exploited
Spatial model Detection method Classes consid-
ered
Inter-class dis-
crimination
[ZDL06] Spatio-
temporal
Homogeneous Distance from mean
of top-trust sensors
Malicious None
WTE
[Ata+08]
Spatial Homogeneous Trust under a thresh-
old
Malicious None
[MCA08] Spatial Homogeneous Trust under a thresh-
old
Faulty, Mali-
cious
None
[WDB10] Spatial Homogeneous Difference with ag-
gregated value
Faulty, Event {Faulty},
{Event}
[Ban+10] Spatio-
Temporal
Heterogeneous Difference with
learnt pattern
Malicious None
Trust-
based IDS
[Bao+12]
Spatial Homogeneous Trust under a thresh-
old
Malicious,
Event
{Malicious},
{Event}
DWE
[OHC12]
Spatial Homogeneous Trust under a thresh-
old
Malicious,
Permanent
Fault, Tran-
sient Fault,
Event
{Malicious or Per-
manent Fault},
{Event}
Dual
thresh-
old [LC13]
Spatial Homogeneous Trust under a thresh-
old
Malicious,
Permanent
Fault, Tran-
sient Fault,
Event
{Malicious or Per-
manent Fault},
{Event}
focus specifically on malicious data injections we now present the experimental evaluation set-
up used by the authors and compare the reported results. None of these techniques has been
tested on real attack scenarios. This is not surprising as finding real attack data in existing WSN
deployments is difficult. In fact, two approaches have been broadly adopted to evaluate the
algorithms for detection of malicious data injections: simulation [Sun+13; LCC07; Rez+13;
Ata+08; Ban+10; OHC12; Bao+12; LC13] and injection of attacks in real datasets [TH06;
CP07].
Table 3.3 summarises all the results achieved, together with all the relevant simulation param-
eters. The last three columns express the False Positive Rate (FPR) when the True Positive
Rate (TPR) is respectively 0.90, 0.95 and 0.99. TPR is, by definition, the number of attack
instances that are correctly detected, divided by the total number of attack instances. We want
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Table 3.3: Detection performances, independent attacks
Work Dataset size
Dataset
malicious
percentage
Input size
for each
algorithm
execution
FPR for
TPR=0.90
FPR for
TPR=0.95
FPR for
TPR=0.99
EKF
[Sun+13] 10000 samples
50% samples,
same node 6 0.22 0.42 0.7
[LCC07] 4096 nodes 10-25% nodes 10 0.01 0.01 0.07
ART
[TH06] 100 nodes
30-50%
samples,
random
selection of
malicious
nodes
100 0.25 0.22 0.21
[CP07] 40 nodes 10% nodes 40 0.67 0.69 0.7
[CP07] 40 nodes 40% nodes 40 0.48 0.5 0.6
WTE
[Ata+08]
100 nodes *
200 samples 0-25% nodes 100 0.03 0.41 0.78
WTE
[Ata+08]
400 nodes *
200 samples 0-25% nodes 400 0.10 0.44 0.78
[Ban+10]
2000 nodes *
2500 samples
(1000 are used
for training)
5% nodes 2000 0.5 0.5 0.5
Trust-
based
IDS
[Bao+12]
900 nodes N/A N/A 0.001 0.05 N/A
DWE
[OHC12] 200 samples 20% nodes 20 0.01 0.01 0.02
Dual
threshold
[LC13]
100 samples 10% nodes 12 N/A N/A 0.001
Dual
threshold
[LC13]
100 samples 20% nodes 12 0.18 0.14 0.10
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Table 3.4: Detection performances, colluding attacks
Work Dataset size Colludingpercentage
Input size
for each
algorithm
execution
FPR for
TPR=0.90
FPR for
TPR=0.95
FPR for
TPR=0.99
ART
[TH06] 100 nodes
30-50%
samples 100 0.25 0.22 0.21
[CP07] 40 nodes 10% nodes 40 0.67 0.69 0.7
[CP07] 40 nodes 40% nodes 40 0.76 0.78 0.8
Robust
IF
[Rez+13]
20 nodes per
400 samples 40% nodes 20 N/A 0.021 0.021
this value to be high as undetected attacks may cause severe damage, thus we report the results
for TPR greater than 0.90. FPR is, by definition, the number of times normal data instances
are misclassified as attacks, divided by the total number of normal data instances. This value
needs to be close to 0, as a high frequency of false alarms makes the method impractical. The
actual value that can be tolerated depends on the application as well as on the time between
two executions of the measurements inspection algorithm. Nevertheless, values above 0.10 are
generally impractical in most cases.
The relationship between TPR and FPR is known as the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC). Column 2 reports information about the size of the dataset used in the experiments.
Column 3 reports the percentage of either malicious nodes or malicious measurements. Column
4 reports the input size for the algorithm; for example in an experiment with 100 nodes, where
the nodes are clustered in groups of 10 and the algorithm is run on clusters, the algorithm input
size is 10.
Generally, in each paper, the tests are conducted in scenarios with different assumptions. For
instance, Liu, Cheng, and Chen [LCC07] generate data with a normal distribution for normal
sensors and another normal distribution for malicious sensors. The results are excellent, but
depend a lot on the difference between the two distributions. Another important assumption,
which has noticeable impact on the results, is the spatial model. As pointed out in Sect. 2.3.3,
most papers assume that the sensors’ readings are homogeneous in the space; in other words
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the measurements are expected to be equal to each other, apart from noise and errors. The
consequence of this assumption is that, by increasing the number of sensors, the information
redundancy also increases and the number of sensors taken into account is decisive. Recall
from Sect. 2.3.3 that the sensing space can be approximately homogeneous only if we consider
a small portion of space where there are no obstacles. In works like [CP07] and [Ban+10], where
this assumption is not present, the FPR is higher, but the algorithm has wider applicability.
Tanachaiwiwat and Helmy [TH06] rely on the spatial homogeneity assumption, and apply their
technique to a large neighbourhood (100 nodes). The FPR is better but still not negligible
(more than 20%). Atakli et al. [Ata+08] also rely on this assumption and apply their algorithm
on very large neighbourhoods. With 100 nodes the FPR is 0.03 for TPR=0.90, but it increases
by an order of magnitude for TPR=0.95 and TPR=0.99. In contrast, [OHC12; Bao+12; LC13],
are successful in keeping the FPR low even for high TPR. Note that with a larger number of
nodes the FPR of the technique described in [Ata+08] increases. This result contrasts with
the consideration that we made about the spatial homogeneity assumption. The reason behind
that, lies probably in the inaccuracy of the empirical ROC curve calculation. Another possible
cause is that the algorithm is sensitive to the absolute number of compromised nodes rather
than to its ratio to total nodes. For example 80 out of 400 compromised nodes may be harder
to detect than 20 out of 100, event though the percentage of malicious nodes is 20% in both
cases.
In Table 3.4, we report the results for the cases considering collusion. The results reported in
[CP07] show non negligible FPR values (above 60%). The results reported in [TH06] have a
better FPR (around 20%). Rezvani et al. [Rez+13] instead, achieve FPR as low as 5%. Never-
theless, recall that this technique is applicable only when the spatial homogeneity assumption
among the 20 sensors is reasonable. In scenarios where the sensors readings cannot be assumed
to share the same physical attribute function, the results may degrade substantially. This is
the case for physical attributes like vibration, light, wind etc., where the correlation of the
attribute measured at different locations rapidly decreases with the event propagation.
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Table 3.5: Techniques overhead
Class Work ComputationalOverhead
Communication
Overhead
Anomaly Detection
ART [TH06] O(W ∗Nn) O(1)
[LCC07] O(N2n) O(Nn)
[CP07] O(WN2n +N3n) 0
EKF [Sun+13] O(1) O(Nn)
Robust IF [Rez+13] O(WN2) 0
Trust management
WTE [Ata+08] O(Nn) 0
[Ban+10] O(N2n) +O(W 2) 0
Trust-based IDS [Bao+12] O(Nn) O(Nn)
DWE [OHC12] O(Nn) 0
Dual threshold [LC13] O(Nn) 0
3.4.3 Comparing Techniques Overhead
The applicability of a technique to a real WSN does not only depend on the relationship
between true positive rate and false positive rate, but also on the overhead introduced. We
analyse computational and communication overhead for the techniques discussed in the previous
section, and summarise their asymptotic complexity in table 3.5. As usual, N is the number
of sensors, while Nn is the average number of neighbours and W is the temporal memory, i.e.
the number of past samples used.
From table 3.5, we note that anomaly detection techniques generally introduce more compu-
tational overhead than trust management techniques. The reason behind this result is that
trust management iteratively refines its confidence about a sensor’s trustworthiness, whereas
anomaly detection builds such confidence from scratch at each iteration. On the other hand,
this is also the main reason why trust-management algorithms are vulnerable to on-off attacks
(see Sect. 3.1.2).
Another noticeable result is that communication overhead is always kept lower than computa-
tional overhead – this result is to be expected since network communication is more expensive
in terms of energy and leads to faster battery depletion. In anomaly detection techniques, the
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communication overhead comes from the execution of consensus-like protocols which decide
about the maliciousness of nodes after anomalies are detected. Trust management techniques
instead, delegate such decisions to the nodes that are higher in a WSN hierarchy (e.g. the
forwarding nodes, cluster heads, base station). Thus communication overhead is introduced in
trust management techniques only when recommendations are enabled (such as in [Bao+12]).
3.5 Conclusions
Malicious data injections are a considerable threat for WSNs. We reviewed state-of-the-art
techniques that can detect malicious data injections by defining an expected behaviour and then
detecting deviations from it. We classified these approaches into two main families: anomaly
detection and trust management. They differ in the assessment of an anomalous condition,
but both rely on the definition of an expected behaviour. We analysed and compared the
techniques by their definition of expected behaviour and noted that expectations can come
from correlations: a) in time: different time, same sensor, same attribute; b) in space: same
time, different sensors, same attribute; c) across different physical attributes: same time, same
sensor, different attributes; or d) their combination.
While many techniques can be applied, comparatively few studies target explicitly malicious
data injections, especially when collusion between compromised sensors is considered. Most
techniques aim to detect erroneous measurements, either to improve the quality of the measuring
process (e.g. [Sub+06; BHL07]), or to reduce the power associated with the transmission of
the measurements (e.g. [WDB10; SLM13].
Work aimed at detecting malicious data injections, generally uses spatial correlation in con-
structing the expectations (e.g. [ZDL06; LCC07; CP07]), in keeping with a general assumption
that only a subset of sensors has been compromised. In this case, a non-void set of genuine mea-
surements is always present in the spatial domain. In the rest of this thesis, we will always take
this result in consideration, and tie the discrimination of genuine and malicious measurements
to the spatial domain.
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We discussed the different assumptions that characterise the spatial domain, and analysed
how they impact the performance of the detection algorithms. More precisely, we observed
a substantial decrease in performance when moving away from a homogeneous space model,
where all sensors perceive similar measurements, to heterogeneous space models, where different
measurements are expected at different locations. This result is visible, for example, in the
difference between the results achieved in [TH06] and [Rez+13], who assume a homogeneous
space, and those achieved by [CP07], who only assume some degree of correlation between the
sensors. The results, in the latter case, show noticeable higher false positive rates. We conclude
that when the spatial domain is heterogeneous, the state-of-the-art techniques do
not provide a practicable balance between TPR and FPR. In fact, improving the results
in such scenario is one of the first objectives pursued in this thesis.
We explored different approaches to the detection phase, where the deviation from the expected
behaviour is assessed, and noted a clear preference in the literature for outlier-detection tech-
niques (e.g. [NLL06; LCC07; Sun+13]). In this case, the expectation of a measurement is
compliant with a generalisation of the measurements behaviour. This approach is independent
of the context and is preferred to more context-specific techniques based on model checking (e.g.
[Han+75]). This advantage is valid also for other anomaly detection techniques which differ
from outlier-detection. This is the reason why we will develop anomaly detection techniques,
but we have clarified that these do not need to look necessarily for outliers.
Finally, to complete the detection of malicious data injections, we identified two main aspects
that need to be addressed: diagnosis and characterisation.
Diagnosis consists of identifying the cause of the detected anomaly which, besides malicious
data injections, may lie in faults or events of interest. Both these phenomena may produce
deviations from expected behaviour similar to malicious injections. In particular, events will
cause deviations from expected behaviours if the event-related measurements are not properly
modelled. Whilst partial diagnosis is investigated in, e.g., [TH06; BHL07; CP07; OHC12], an
exhaustive diagnosis phase is still lacking. Fault-related anomalies may be handled separately
from malicious data injections, as fault models are relatively well categorised and understood.
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However, event-related anomalies cannot be considered separately (like in [LCC07]), since an
attacker may inject malicious measurements that depict a fabricated event or conceal a real
event. Therefore, in WSNs that monitor the occurrence of events, malicious injections and
events should be addressed together, to produce a compromise-resistant detection and charac-
terisation of events. Diagnosis has been insufficiently studied in the literature, so we cater for
it in Chapter 6. We discern between malicious and faulty interference by learning the events
patterns and incorporating them in the model. Instead, we distinguish faults by looking for
typical fault characteristics, such as singular measurements that are clearly unrelated to the
rest.
Similarly, further investigation of the attack characterisation, is needed, in particular to iden-
tify the compromised sensors. This has been done within homogeneous spatial models (e.g.
[Rez+13]) or when the spatial model is heterogeneous but the malicious sensors do not collude
(e.g. [CP07]). The problem of detecting colluding sensors when their inconsistencies are not
evident because of natural variations in the spatial domain is challenging and has not been
dealt with before.
In fact, neither has the detection part been addressed when malicious nodes collude in spaces
that need to be modelled as heterogeneous. This is one goal of this thesis and is tackled by
identifying and characterising the sources of heterogeneousness, referred to as spatial events,
and contextualising the measurements in such events. Furthermore, we first focus our attention
on the scenarios where there is one source of heterogeneousness, i.e. one event, in Chapter 5,
and then generalise to multiple events in Chapter 6.
Before dwelling on the techniques that deal with the problem, we present in the next chapter the
adversarial model, which can vary highly in the degree of control over the single measurements
and in the way collusion is enabled. We also introduce the information that we aim to preserve,
namely the ability to correctly detect any event of interest, and the challenges involved.
Chapter 4
Adversarial Model
When detection of malicious data injections is carried out, the attacker must strike a trade off
between the potential damage it can introduce and the risk of being detected: higher potential
damage is more likely to cause evident disruptions and, in turn, trigger detection.
The previous chapter has shown that collusion attacks are more difficult to detect, yet not all
collusion attacks are equally effective because the attacker’s capabilities need to be considered as
well. Moreover, the concept of attack effectiveness is ambiguous unless the impact of alterations
to the WSN measurements is well defined.
In this chapter, we first discuss the attacker’s capabilities in terms of control on the WSN
measurements. Then, we select a set of resources that enable the attacker to cause high damage
without introducing obvious disruptions in correlation that are easy to identify. We define the
integrity violations that need to be defended against, which indirectly define the integrity
requirements. Finally, we convey how the attacker can leverage its capabilities, including
complete control over sensor nodes that can collude between themselves to construct attacks
on the measurements’ integrity.
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4.1 Attacker’s Capabilities
Understanding the most important resources that can be exploited by an attacker, in terms of
control on the measurements, is a necessary preliminary step to define the adversarial model.
An important resource which may affect the attacker’s capability is the attack time. Indeed,
because of the trade off between staying undetected and causing damage, the measurements
need to be manipulated with a sophisticated strategy, which may require significant time to
define (e.g. for executing a software that builds the attack). So, if the attack needs to be
completed in a limited time, the strategy’s search time may be constrained to satisfy that limit.
However, relying on the attacker’s time constraints on the defence side is a risky approach, since
the latter can be reduced with improvements in the technology of the devices and algorithms.
Instead, we will assume that the attacker does not have time constraints in running
the attack. This assumption means that the attacker is free to stay inactive for an indefinite
time whilst deciding about the malicious measurements to inject, but that does not mean that
time constraints, e.g. imposed by the protocols, can be overlooked.
Another important resource for the attacker is information about the measurements, since the
detection algorithm discerns genuine from malicious measurements by contextualising them in
a measurements subset. To maximise the potential damage, we assume that the attacker
has full knowledge of the past measurements transmitted by all sensors. Anomaly
detection considers normal a measurement that is coherent with the most recent measurements
and with those of neighbouring sensors, so this assumption implies that the attacker can access
the same data processed by the anomaly detection algorithm. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that the measurements of all sensors are known, even if they are not neighbours of a
compromised sensor; however, they will not be used for the attack.
The attacker’s control on the measurements needs also to be defined quantitatively and qualita-
tively. We assume that the attacker controls the measurements time series of a subset
of sensors of its choice, and has full control over them. In other words, the attacker
can freely choose which sensors are compromised and, for each compromised sensor, can freely
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decide the values of the measurements.
In summary, we assume attackers that:
1) Have infinite time for the attack.
2) Observe the measurements of all sensors.
3) Have full control of the measurements of C out of N sensors of their choice.
Assumption 3 implies that the spatial domain is not completely under the control of the attacker.
We have already witnessed a preference for applying measurements inspection in the spatial
domain in Chapter 3. Assuming that some sensors are not compromised is reasonable as long
as the attacker’s cost, which may be both a financial cost and the cost for risking detection,
increases with the number of sensors that need to be compromised. This is the case if the
attacker exploits physical access to tamper with sensor nodes, where the longer duration of the
physical presence, the higher risk of being noticed.
If the measurements’ integrity is compromised through the network layer, the attacker may
compromise more measurements by controlling a sensor on a multi-hop path. However, here
we consider attacks that affect only the end-points. The problem of network-layer integrity
in forwarding nodes is better addressed with ad-hoc techniques, such as cryptographic hash
functions [CPS06; Zhu+07; HST10] and intrusion detection [OM05; Sil+05; RZL06], which are
beyond the scope of this thesis.
Other attack vectors, such as malware, may exploit some properties that are common to more
sensors, thus gaining control over multiple sensors in a row. However, in practice sensors are
not all identical (e.g., different generations) even when they measure the same values; some
sensors may be physically hard to reach whilst others are easier; some sensors will be subject
to maintenance e.g. because of fouling. A scenario where all the nodes are compromised
is therefore extreme. If that is the case, the attacker can depict any arbitrary state of the
physical phenomenon whilst staying undetected. This aspect is formally shown below. It is
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proved that without assumption 3, the capabilities 1 and 2 prevent genuine and compromised
sets of measurements from being distinguished.
4.1.1 Need for Genuine Subset of Measurements
Before the time when malicious measurements start to be injected, the WSN system is assumed
to be in a genuine state, i.e. all the measurements are genuine and so are their correlations.
Hence, we need to clarify why an attacker who starts to control all the measurements after that
time is always able to move the system into another arbitrary state, entirely made of malicious
measurements and correlations, without any chance of being detected.
We address this problem by defining which data is under the control of the attacker, which data
is valid and which is not. So, based on such definitions, we aim to prove that an attacker with the
capabilities listed in the previous Section is able to inject undetected any set of measurements
that represent a plausible scenario (but different from the real one). Since control over all
the sensors corresponds to a control on the spatial domain, we start by refining the notation
introduced in Section 2.2.1 to group the measurements in such domain. In this way, the
measurements are organised as a time series of process snapshots, which are defined below.
Definition 4.1. A process snapshot is a set of spatial samples of the measured process at
the same time instant, denoted with Xti = {xti(u) : u ∈ Ω}.
Measurements inspection may detect compromised process snapshots, i.e. corrupted by faults
or malicious interference. So, we introduce the definition of valid process snapshot.
Definition 4.2. Xti is a valid process snapshot if a time instant t∗ exists such that Xt∗ ≈ Xti,
Xt∗ is observed at time t∗, and neither faults nor malicious interference occur at t∗.
Validity is defined on the snapshot’s value, so Xti is valid even if it cannot be observed at
time ti, as long as a close snapshot Xt∗ can be observed at time t∗. In general, a snapshot can
be approximated with another one if the difference between them is within the noise range.
Note that a snapshot that is not corrupted by faults and malicious interference is valid, but
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a valid snapshot is not necessarily free of faults and malicious interference. By definition, as
long as a snapshot that is corrupted by faults or malicious interference coincides with another
one which can be observed under genuine circumstances, validity holds. This choice reflects the
limitations of a measurements inspection algorithm: it can learn the structure of genuine data,
but there is no way to detect malicious data when it is close to genuine data.
Since the measurements are contextualised in a time evolution of the physical process, validity
needs to hold also for other snapshots at contiguous time instants, which constitute a snapshot
sequence.
Definition 4.3. A snapshot sequence is a set of time-ordered process snapshots [Xt0 ,Xt1 , ...,Xtl ],
denoted with Xtlt0 with tl ≥ t0.
Definition 4.4. A snapshot sequence Xtlt0 is valid if a sequence X
tm+l
tm = X
tl
t0 exists such that
all the Xti : i ∈ [m,m+ l]) are valid.
With such definitions we are able to introduce the returning property of physical processes.
Definition 4.5. A physical process is returning if, given any pair of valid snapshot sequences
X
t1+l
t1 and X
t2+n
t2 , a valid snapshot sequence X
t2
t1+l
exists such that the concatenation Xt1+lt1 ∪
Xt2t1+l ∪Xt2+nt2 is a valid snapshot sequence.
Dealing with returning physical processes implies the following theorem, which is just the
property that we aimed at proving.
Theorem 4.1. If the attacker controls all the spatial samples of a returning physical process
since time tc, any valid snapshot sequence can be injected at a time ta∗ ≥ tc without compro-
mising validity.
Proof. The control of the attacker over all the spatial samples starting from time tc translates
into control over all the measurements, then the process snapshots Xti : ti ≥ tc are under full
control of the attacker. In particular, the attacker can inject any valid snapshot sequence Xtlta
with ta ≥ tc. Moreover, if a sequence Xtati is valid, since the physical process is returning, there
always exists a time ta∗ ≥ ta such that Xta∗+l−ata∗ = Xtlta and Xtati ∪Xta∗ta ∪X
ta∗+l−a
ta∗ is valid.
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When all the snapshot sequences are valid, there is no distinction between genuine and com-
promised snapshot sequences. Note that injecting measurements that create valid snapshot
sequences may require highly sophisticated attackers, which are the main concern of this work.
In the following, we will assume that:
Hypothesis 1. The WSN monitors returning phenomena.
This assumption fits well all the applications where the physical phenomenon can manifest in
similar ways multiple times. If this assumption does not hold, e.g. if the physical phenomenon
compromises the environment broadly and for a long time (e.g. an entire forest is burnt by a
wildfire), some valid snapshots become invalid. Yet Hypothesis 1 is not restrictive as long as
the measurements inspection algorithm is not able to invalidate these snapshots or the attacker
does not inject invalidated snapshots.
4.2 Event Spoofing and Masking
The goal of measurements inspection is to detect malicious measurements that could cause
some damage to the system. Yet the definition of damage is ambiguous, as long as the WSN’s
mission is not well defined.
In event detection WSNs, the main mission is to identify conditions of interest of the monitored
phenomenon that can be observed with noticeable changes in the measurements. For instance,
an earthquake is an event for seismic sensors which causes high vibrations, or a flood is an
event for water level monitoring sensors which would register the surface rise. The mission of
such systems fails either if an event condition is not detected when there are events or if an
event condition is detected when no such event occurs. Hence, the damage that an attacker
can bring into such systems is spoofing event detection to detect false conditions of interest or
masking real conditions of interest.
In general, the event detection algorithm is a function applied to W -long snapshot sequences
to verify the presence of typical event properties, such as changes in time of the measurements’
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average or variance, changes in the spatial distribution etc. So, we model the goal of the
attacker as the will to transition from a non-event state to an event state or vice versa. We
formalise this in reference to the notation given so far. To do that, we preliminary define the
event detection function.
Definition 4.6. A event detection function is a function {IRW×IRN} 7→ {0, 1} whose input
is a W -long snapshot sequence. The 0 value indicates no event while the 1 value indicates one
or more events.
Now the spoofing and masking can be unambiguously defined.
Definition 4.7. A spoofing attack is successful if the snapshot sequence Xta∗+Wta , is replaced
with X˘ta∗+Wta , and both e(X˘
ta∗+W
ta∗ ) = 1 and e(X
ta∗+W
ta∗ ) = 0 hold, where e is the event detection
function.
And dually:
Definition 4.8. A masking attack is successful if the snapshot sequence Xta∗+Wta , is replaced
with X˘ta∗+Wta , and both e(X˘
ta∗+W
ta∗ ) = 0 and e(X
ta∗+W
ta∗ ) = 1 hold, where e is the event detection
function.
We have defined spoofing and masking attacks successful independently from the detection
carried out by the measurements inspection algorithm. This is to separate the concept of
subverting the event detection algorithm from that of staying undetected. In that case we refer
to the attack as an undetected successful (spoofing or masking) attack.
Note that distinguishing spoofing from masking attacks is generally a more complex task than
detection. For example, in the scenario shown in Fig. 4.1, two main behaviours can be identified:
some sensors indicate the presence of an event (light blue/green), while some others do not
perceive it (dark blue/violet). In particular, the event measurements are located in the centre-
left and the centre-right. Assuming that malicious data injections have been detected, we
may be in a masking scenario, where the two events have been masked (originally it may
have been even one single event that has been split by the masking sensors); we may also be
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Figure 4.1: Seismic measurements with malicious data. The attack is difficult to characterise
as spoofing or masking.
in an spoofing scenario where one, or even both events may have been spoofed. The problem
becomes increasingly complex as the number of malicious sensors increases. When the attacker’s
capabilities are sufficiently high, the attacker may correctly reproduce genuine events without
triggering detection or make malicious sensors be identified as genuine, and genuine sensors
as malicious. In the next section we introduce our methodology designed to cope with such
sophisticated malicious data injections.
4.3 Collusion
In Section 4.1.1 we concluded that an attacker with full control on the measurements from
all sensors can eventually inject any valid sequence of measurements without compromising
validity, and in Section 4.2 we have introduced the concept of event spoofing and masking.
Since event-detection WSNs, by definition should detect events if and only if they are present,
there are always at least two valid behaviours: one that detect events and the other that
does not. In virtue of Theorem 4.1, we deduce that an attacker controlling the measurements
from all sensors can eventually spoof or mask an event without compromising validity. This is
summarised in the Corollary below.
Corollary 1. If the attacker controls all the spatial samples of a returning physical process
since time tc, any event can be spoofed or masked at a time ta∗ ≥ tc without compromising
validity.
In practice an attacker can achieve such degree of control only if the modifications to the process
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snapshots are coordinated. Otherwise, since the underlying physical process is correlated, the
attack is likely to generate invalid snapshots, or snapshot sequences. We refer to the principle
of orchestrating the malicious measurements from different compromised sensors according to
a unified strategy as collusion.
There are are different ways to introduce collusion, which depend on the particular attack
vectors used. For instance, if the nodes’ software is tampered with, it may contain a routine
that identifies a unique snapshot sequence to inject, based on previous snapshot sequences that
have been observed (in virtue of the capability 2 reported in Section 4.1).
If the measurements injections occur through environment manipulation, instead, the attacker
may trigger its actions simultaneously to obtain a collusion effect. For instance, multiple smoke
pot widgets may be simultaneously activated to obscures some light sensors.
Since there are potentially highly sophisticated ways to run collusion attacks, in this thesis we
will not limit the attacker’s collusion methods. Indeed, we will assume an attacker that is able
to control all the compromised measurement in a coordinated way. Instead, we will focus on
the point 3 of the adversarial model in Section 4.1, which limits the number of sensors that
are in control of the attackers, to build a method that detects malicious measurements under
partial compromise.
The collusion strategy, from the attacker perspective, needs to be optimised considering that
there is only a partial control over the spatial domain. This constraint, if the measurements
inspection algorithm is well designed, will establish a trade-off between the alteration of the
event detection algorithm output and avoiding detection from the measurements inspection
algorithm. If the measurements inspection algorithm is accurate enough in separating valid and
invalid sequences, and if the density of genuine sensors is high enough, spoofing and masking
may not be achieved whilst staying undetected because there is no valid snapshot sequence that
introduces a spoofed event or hides the presence of genuine events. Nevertheless, an invalid
snapshot sequence may exist such that distinguishing which measurements are malicious inside
the snapshots is impossible, i.e. collusion may also be exploited to make the characterisation
task fail.
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4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have introduced the adversarial model, by identifying the knowledge and
control the attacker has on the malicious data, and how this affects the chance of success
for measurements inspection. We have concluded that we can assume an attacker with full
knowledge and control, but we need to impose the presence of a subset of sensors that produce
genuine measurements.
We have formally defined the attacker’s threats in a generic way that is pertinent to the main
mission of an event-detection WSN, i.e. spoof events if there are none, and mask events when
there are one or more. We have also defined a threat that affects the characterisation when a
detection triggers, i.e. making genuine measurements be classified as malicious and malicious
measurements be classified as genuine.
We have defined collusion as the capability for the attacker to coordinate the malicious mea-
surements and we have anticipated that for the rest of this thesis we will assume the attacker
capable of adopting any collusion-based strategy, aimed at disrupting event-detection whilst
staying undetected. The high sophistication of the attacker, together with the powerful set of
attack resources and capabilities that we are assuming, make the problem difficult to solve.
In the following, the measurements inspection algorithm will be designed considering that
the attacker may exploit collusion to impair the algorithm’s output. Protecting the event
detection task in such circumstances is challenging since it reduces to the capability of accurately
delimiting the domain of the valid measurements sets. The measurements domain is a high-
dimensional one, spreading across time and space, and is partially unknown because it is not
possible to know all the possible ways in which the physical process can evolve, and how that
would affect the sensed measurements.
These challenges have not been tackled together before, as discussed in Chapter 3, as the
attacks are either unsophisticated, e.g. random biases are added to the measurements, or the
measurements distribution is over-simplified and, in fact, finds no application in event detection
WSNs, where the distribution can change significantly with the manifestation of events. The
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problem is more and more complex as such changes are considerable. Thus, rather than tackling
the problem directly in its worst-case scenario, i.e. where the variability is unpredictable and
irregular in space, we first solve the problem where one event can manifest at a time, and
induces a predictable pattern in the measurements’ spatial correlations. This assumption is
also a reasonable one for some applications, such as volcanic eruptions and healthcare, and in
fact offers higher performance compared with a general approach that is suitable for all kinds
of measurements variability.
Chapter 5
Securing Single Events with Regular
Patterns
In this chapter, we aim to give a first solution to the problem of malicious data injections
under the assumption of highly capable attackers given in the previous chapter. In summary,
such capabilities give the attacker full freedom to control C out of N sensors, from a certain
point in time and for an unlimited time, plus the knowledge of all the measurements that were
transmitted in the past. We also assume that the attacker is able to exploit sophisticated
collusion-enabled strategies, i.e. the malicious measurements can be produced according to a
unique plan that maximises the damage and minimises the chance of being detected.
Collusion attacks have been considered in a few works, [TH06; CP07; Rez+13]; however the
context has been restricted to those in which the measurements distribution does not exhibit
significant changes. This assumption prevents the application to WSNs where events manifest.
Event-detection applications include military surveillance [He+04], health [Ott+05], and envi-
ronment (e.g., volcano) monitoring [WA+06a]. For such applications the security requirements
are particularly critical and so is the integrity of the event detection task.
When events occur, the measurements distribution can abruptly change, hence common tech-
niques such as outlier detection trigger because of the mismatch in the distributions before and
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after the event. In contrast, we assume here that the measurement distribution can change in
the presence of events, but only one event at a time manifests. This requires us to understand
if the measurements are still genuine when they may be affected by events.
To detect malicious data injections in event detection WSNs, we aim to reconstruct the measure-
ments that would be observed in genuine circumstances. Each non-compromised measurement
is an unknown variable, so it needs to be characterised through observable properties, which in
turn are not compromised. In particular, we will consider different measurements other than
those being analysed. When no attacks occur, all measurements are correlated, in different
degrees, since they are affected by the same set of physical phenomena that manifest in the
WSN space. Compromised measurements, instead, may disrupt such correlations, especially
when they incorrectly represent the physical phenomena, which is the case where detection is
most important.
The presence of correlations indicates that the measurements contain redundant information.
In some cases, redundancy is present by design. Since the main goal of a WSN is to sample
a process to run analyses or react to it, the density of the samples should be high enough to
gather sufficient information under all possible scenarios. For instance, an access restricted area
may be equipped with a number of cameras which cover each path to its entrance at least once
and that take pictures with a period less than the time needed to overpass the cameras.
However, since the attacker may seek to reproduce the scenarios where correlation is minimum,
the degree of redundancy that is present by design may need to be increased to detect malicious
measurements. This holds true especially when the attacker controls more measurements: if the
subset of genuine sensors is too small with respect to the measurements correlation, the attack
may be undetectable or, even if detectable, there may be insufficient information to determine
which sensors are compromised and which are genuine.
The algorithm presented in this chapter characterises the relationships between the sensors’
measurements arising from the spatial correlations present in the physical phenomenon. Even
though correlation-based analyses may easily spot a single malicious measurement, the problem
becomes more difficult in the presence of multiple malicious measurements, originating from
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colluding sensors. Indeed, the attacker can judiciously select the sensors to compromise to
maximise the correlation among compromised sensors and keep consistent with genuine sensors.
To ensure the detection is resistant to collusion, novel ways of aggregating measurements are
introduced that are aimed to discard malicious contributions under attack and minimise the
false positives under genuine circumstances as well. Even though the approach is based on
simple and solid techniques (e.g., linear regression, weighted median, Pearson correlation) it
can detect sophisticated collusion attacks that have not been considered before. Furthermore,
the low computational complexity of such techniques makes the overall approach suitable for
extensive analysis of online data.
The algorithm is presented together with a novel more general methodology to apply the algo-
rithm in different application settings. In particular, the algorithm parameters can be derived
from tests and knowledge that are pertinent to the deployment and application of the WSN,
such as the event detection criterion used. Indeed, many prior studies (e.g., [TH06; LCC07;
Rez+13; Sun+13]), propose algorithms that are evaluated in a single deployment or application
setting, or even on a single simulated dataset. Would the same algorithm work in a different
setting? For many reasons, this is not likely. In contrast, this work is applicable across three dif-
ferent application domains: health-care monitoring, monitoring of volcanic activity, and home
fire alarms, each with different challenges. The approach is tested against realistic attacks that
undermine the core objective of each application and minimise the chance of detection.
5.1 Methodology
To cope with the presence of events, we first extend the assumption made in [GBS08; TH06;
LCC07; Raj+09; Ray+08; Rez+13; Sun+13] where the value of the sensed phenomenon is
required to be the same within a neighbourhood and measurements differ only because of
noise. This assumption allows to easily estimate the ground truth and label the measurements
as outlying through e.g., one-class quarter sphere support vector machines (SVM) [Raj+09].
However, this assumption is generally valid only for very small neighbourhoods, where collusion
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attacks can be successful by compromising all the sensors. To resist collusion, it is necessary
to broaden neighbourhoods and cope with measurements that are significantly different. But
in the absence of a common ground truth, what should a sensor’s collected measurement be
compared against? Previous studies, such as [CP07; Raj+10; SGG10], have proposed to detect
inconsistencies in the correlation within a neighbourhood by extracting a unique overall con-
sistency metric, to which every neighbour contributes. This, however, allows colluding sensors
to compensate for each other and reduce the overall inconsistency, whilst still disrupting the
collected values [LNR11].
In our approach, each sensor exploits spatial correlation to produce an estimate for the mea-
surements of other sensors. Hence, this method is applicable even if the measurements follow
different – but still correlated – distributions. Then, we aggregate the estimates from differ-
ent sensors with a collusion-resistant operator that produces a final reliable estimate, which is
compared with the actual reported measurement. An approach similarly based on aggregation
of individual sensors’ information is majority voting [LCC07; ZYN08; Hin09; Sun+13], where
each sensor votes for a neighbour’s maliciousness and the votes are aggregated by majority.
The vote is normally the output of one of the anomaly detection algorithms, which we have
analysed in Section 3.1.1. Similarly, trust-management frameworks aggregate individual beliefs
about a sensor’s behaviour [GBS08; Ray+08; ZDL06; Bao+12]. As we have described in Sec-
tion 3.1.2, a sensor’s behaviour is mapped to a trust value by all its neighbours, and then the
sensor’s trustworthiness is obtained, e.g., by averaging the trust values [Bao+12]. However,
the main drawback of both majority voting and trust management is that they introduce an
additional variable - the vote, or trust value - about which an attacker can lie with or with-
out lying about the measurements at the same time. Detecting such attacks incurs additional
computation and communication costs. In contrast, we extend voting-based and trust-based
frameworks by aggregating measurements estimates rather than votes or trust values. Such a
choice does not introduce additional variables, since the estimates are directly calculated from
the raw measurements.
The potential of estimation-based frameworks are analysed by studying the limitations that
arise in the voting scenarios among the sensors in Fig.5.1. Consider at first nodes A, B, and C
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Figure 5.1: Example WSN topology. Nodes represent sensors and edges indicate a neighbour
relationship.
to be compromised. In this case A is free to inject arbitrary malicious data if B and C collude
to not report on it and act genuinely to avoid reports from D, E, F. If estimates were available,
the measurements of B and C would look consistent with those of D, E, F (the reason why
they don’t report), but not consistent with those of A. Alternatively, consider nodes D, E, F to
be compromised. Here nodes D and E can inject any kind of measurements, although C may
report on them. Indeed, node F can avoid reporting on them and report on C instead. Then,
with a simple majority voting approach [Hin09], node C would appear as the compromised
node. Through the estimates instead, it is possible to detect that there is no valid reason for
sensor F to endorse D and E and report on C, uncovering the collusion attempt. A majority
voting approach will always fail when more than 50% of sensors are compromised. However,
such upper bound considers the best case scenario, where all the genuine nodes report correct
votes without uncertainty. The estimation-based framework instead, considers the degree of
uncertainty, which becomes the only bounding factor. Indeed, the experiments in Sect. 5.6
show tolerance against up to 88% compromised nodes.
Our novel estimation-based framework, which iteratively extracts and aggregates measurements
estimates, is at the core of the detection mechanism. For each new measurement we iteratively
compute an estimate and then run a similarity check, which compares the estimate and the
actual value as shown in Fig. 5.2. When the similarity check fails, we also run the characteri-
sation step – an extensive analysis that identifies the likely compromised sensors. The models
used to build the estimates are learnt during an initialisation, which serves to customise the
techniques to the specific WSN deployment, and whose output is the estimation models.
During the initialisation, the network is assumed to be free of compromise. The estimation
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Figure 5.2: Measurements Inspection Workflow.
models are extracted with a learning step, which is shown in Fig. 5.3a: a) We first pre-process
the data to eliminate faulty readings, alleviate noise and transform the data to extract the
parameters of interest. b) We check whether the estimation models show significant changes in
the presence of events, and if so we build a separate set of estimation models for each modality,
i.e. distribution of measurements, of the physical phenomenon. c) We analyse the data to test
if the correlation detected allows us to build a linear model to perform the estimation. Linear
models describe accurately the correlation among different sensors, even when the physical
phenomenon does not propagate with a linear law. Moreover it is lightweight as we need to
store only two parameters for each model. d) We quantify the validity of a linear relationship for
each pair of sensors and, based on that, we identify the neighbourhood of a sensor as the set of
sensors with which there is a strong linear relationship, e) Finally we calculate the parameters
that fit the estimation models.
The similarity check also needs to be customised to the sensor deployment during the initiali-
sation, according to the steps shown in Fig. 5.3b. Since the final goal of the detection scheme
is securing the event detection, the similarity metric should check the integrity of observable
properties that characterise the event. Such properties can be derived from the event detec-
tion criterion, i.e. the algorithm that is run on the measurements to detect the presence of
events. Two main properties characterise most event detection criteria: the magnitude and the
shape of the measurements signal, based on which, respective tests are built. Therefore, during
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the customisation step we: a) choose a similarity check based on such tests, b) tailor the test
to the application according to the event detection criterion, c) tune a dissimilarity tolerance
parameter to reach an objective false positive rate (FPR).
Pre-processing
Modality assumption selection
Linear model validity
Neighbours selection
Estimation models calculation
(a) Learning estimation models
Similarity check choice
Test tailoring
to the application
Tolerance
tuning
(b) Similarity check
Figure 5.3: Methodology Scheme for Application Tailoring
The tasks pertinent to each step can be assigned to different devices. However, in estimation-
based frameworks, as in voting-based or trust-based frameworks, the final detection decision
should be taken by an entity that is not compromised, typically the base station. The decision
is taken based on the values (votes, trust, measurements) received from the sensors. In some
cases, the deciding entity cannot perform such aggregation alone e.g., when measurements are
aggregated while being collected in the network. In such cases the base station can delegate
the detection tasks to the aggregating nodes but must also, additionally, verify the validity of
the aggregation. Techniques to detect injections in aggregated reports have been proposed in
[PSP06; GBS08; Roy+14] among others and are complementary to the work presented here,
which focuses on the analysis of the raw sensor data.
5.2 Estimation
In Sect. 2.2.1 we introduced a unified notation for the sensing problem in WSNs, which is
briefly summarised below to introduce also the estimation problem. We consider a set of N
deployment locations Ω. The measurement observed by sensor j (j ∈ 1, ..., N) placed at the
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locations uj ∈ Ω, at time instant ti is referred to as xti(uj), while the measurement collected to
the base station (or data sink), is denoted by x˘ti(uj). We assume that each measurement can
be traced back to the sensor that collected it, e.g. thanks to an authentication scheme.
We now introduce the estimate of each measurement, denoted with xˆti(uj), which is a function
of the measurements given by N(j), i.e. the set of j’s neighbours. For the moment, all the other
sensors are considered as neighbours but we will review the selection of neighbours in Sect. 5.2.1.
This aggregated estimate allows us to detect if the sensor has reported a measurement that
differs significantly from it. Note that compromised neighbours could collude, as mentioned in
Sect. 5.1, to bias the estimate and make it more consistent with the collected measurement.
To avoid this problem, separate (pairwise) estimates are obtained from each neighbour. In
a second step, the estimates are aggregated by an operator that is resistant to compromised
estimates.
5.2.1 Pairwise Estimation
The measurements of two sensors are related, and in particular spatially correlated, because the
sensed physical phenomena affect and propagate across the environment in which the sensors are
placed. Ideally, the relationship could be characterised in a mathematically precise way, given
by the laws of the physical phenomenon and its propagation. In reality, environmental changes,
noise, interactions with other phenomena etc., constrain us to work with approximations and
more specifically inferred correlations that can be established with a certain margin of error.
Though exploiting spatial correlations, in event detection WSNs a temporal parameter needs
also to be accounted for, which is the propagation delay of the event. The latter introduces the
inter-sensor delay δlm, which is defined as the time it takes for the event to propagate from ul to
um. This quantity is estimated as the value that maximises the Pearson correlation coefficient
and use it to align the measurements in time. δlm is assumed small enough to perform the
alignment within the timeliness requirements of the event detection. Note that the calculation
of the inter-sensor delay absorbs any synchronisation errors, so the method does not require
clock synchronisation. δlm can change with the value of the measurements, so ideally, would
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need to be estimated for each new measurement. This choice is cumbersome (calculation of
the Pearson correlation is expensive), and an attacker can also try to subvert this calculation.
Thus, the calculation is made only once for each new estimation model, by optimising the
average Pearson correlation coefficient. For the remainder of this chapter, the notations x(ui)
and x(uj) refer to two temporal samples collected at the respective location, aligned by the
calculated inter-sensor delay, for instance xl(ui) and xl+δlm(uj).
At this point, we calculate xˆj(ui), which is an estimate of x(ui) based on x˘(uj). This quantity, is
approximated with a linear combination of x˘(uj) plus a residual noise random variable jui . Noise
is modelled with a normal distribution, after removing obvious outliers; when this condition
cannot be satisfied, robust regression should be preferred [GH06]. A linear relationship makes
the estimation lightweight both in time and space complexity (see Sect. 5.5). Its validity can
also be tested statistically, and the neighbourhood of a sensor is defined as the set of sensors for
which this relationship holds. When this linear relationship holds less, the estimate is weighted
to have a smaller influence on the final result (as shown in Sect. 5.2.2). The equation that
approximates x with a function of x˘(uj) is referred to as the estimation model described below.
Each estimation model is extracted through linear regression, which calculates the coefficients
ajui and b
j
ui
in:
xˆj(ui) = a
j
ui
x˘(uj) + b
j
ui
(5.1)
Thus, an estimation model is defined just by the pair (ajui , b
j
ui
), which is calculated as shown
in Algorithm 1, so this approach is not burdensome in terms of memory requirements and
enables a sensor to store the models for many of its neighbours. In the absence of an a-priori
characterisation of the random variables x(ui) and x˘(uj), sample mean, sample variance and
sample covariance are used respectively, estimated on real data.
Regression schemes for anomaly detection in WSN have been previously proposed in [SLD12;
SGG10; Zha+12]. However, [SLD12] and [Zha+12] apply regression in the temporal rather than
the spatial domain i.e., they estimate correlations between measurements of a single sensor. In
[SGG10] the spatial domain is also considered with multiple linear regression; however, this
technique is sensitive to outliers, especially when they are correlated because of collusion.
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Algorithm 1 Estimation models calculation
Require: x˘(u) ∀u ∈ Ω
Ensure: (ajui , b
j
ui
)∀i 6= j
1: {Initialisation: align the measurements with the inter-sensor delay}
2: for all i ∈ S do
3: for all j ∈ N(i) do {N(i) indicates i’s neighbours}
4: ajui =
cov(x˘(ui),x˘(uj))
var(x˘(ui))
5: bjui = E[x˘(ui)]− ajuiE[x˘(uj)]
6: store (ajui , b
j
ui
)
7: end for
8: end for
Since an attacker can always introduce measurement deviations gradually enough to make
them appear consistent, the spatial domain is the only one which has an uncorrupted portion
thanks to the presence of genuine sensors.
The Validity of the Estimation Models
In event detection applications, the estimation models need to be valid also when events man-
ifest, otherwise it is likely to detect false anomalies when genuine events manifest. However,
an event may induce different relationships between sensors than those present in non-event
conditions. This is confirmed by the data sets that have been examined. We address this
problem by considering different modalities in which the network operates, each corresponding
to a set of estimation models. We consider three possible modality assumptions :
1. Unique modality. The same relationships between sensors hold in event or non-event
conditions.
2. One modality in event conditions, a different one at rest. This occurs when events induce
a different spatial pattern, but all events have similar patterns.
3. Infinite or unknown number of modalities. In the most general case.
This chapter caters for assumption 1) and also for 2) since it is a straightforward extension of
1). Two different sets of estimation models are computed: one in event conditions, the other
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in non-event conditions. The estimation models learnt in event conditions apply when the
detection criterion is satisfied while those learnt in restful conditions are used when no event is
detected. Considering different modalities complicates detection, so different modalities should
be used only when different behaviours in the relationships between sensors can be identified.
A higher number of modalities can similarly be catered for under assumption 3). This is
necessary when multiple events can manifest at once. This problem is dealt with in the next
chapter since it requires a different approach, which still relies on measurements estimation,
but based on the current context rather than pre-learnt models.
Building Estimations from Sources with Different Accuracy
The accuracy of the estimates is influenced by several factors including the accuracy of the
linear relationships, noise, faults, and the informative content of the measurements. Noise is
a common source of inaccuracy, especially for sensors in harsh environments. Generally, noise
signals can be removed or reduced with standard filters. Another common cause for wrong
estimates is the presence of faults. The algorithm alone cannot discern if the wrong estimate
was intentional (malicious) or unintentional (faulty), but both will be detected to enable a
proper reaction. We assume that a dedicated fault-detection module runs in parallel, and when
an anomalous measurements are detected we infer malicious interference if fault-detection does
not trigger.
To increase accuracy, the analysis must be applied to the data containing the information of
interest, which may not be the raw measurements but information derived from them. For ex-
ample, the heart voltage measured by electrocardiography is less informative than its frequency.
Another example, regarding the use of infrasound sensors for monitoring volcanic eruptions,
is shown in Section 5.6.3. In such cases pre-processing the raw signals improves the accuracy
significantly.
The accuracy of the estimation models also depends on the existence of a linear relationship
between the sensors measurements. Previous work (e.g., [GBS08; TH06; LCC07; Rez+13;
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Sun+13]) has considered a stronger assumption that does not allow spatial variations between
the sensors, i.e. the measurements are assumed to be so close that their expected value is the
same. The technique we present here can be applied to a broader set of applications since it
assumes a linear relationship between the measurements. For some WSN applications such
as target tracking, linear relationships can be seen only at very close points, and if the WSN
deployment is not dense enough there may be no pair of sensors for which such a relationship
holds. Therefore, we check the validity of the linearity assumption beforehand with the squared
Pearson correlation, which is a goodness of fit metric for linear regression. In some cases,
the approach can also be applied when linear relationships cannot be found, by applying a
non-linear transformation to achieve linearity [Lar06]. After the transformation, an increasing
Pearson correlation coefficient indicates whether the transformation is convenient.
The goodness of fit allows us also to measure the goodness of the neighbours contribution and
weigh it accordingly. Thus, even when considering all the other sensors as neighbours, uncorre-
lated neighbours will not degrade the result. However, the complexity of the detection algorithm
increases with the neighbourhood size (see Section 5.5). Then, a network-wide neighbourhood
is realistic only in small scale deployments while in large deployments, the neighbourhoods
should be restricted. The principle for selecting the best neighbourhoods is selecting the first
sensors in a list sorted by descending goodness of fit: this choice is more robust than distance
based criteria since, e.g., in the presence of obstacles, two sensors may be very close but show
poor correlation.
Restricting the neighbourhoods does not ensure that all the neighbours are equally correlated,
hence the goodness of fit should still be used to weigh the neighbours’ contributions. This is done
through the prior weight (wj−ui ), which is the goodness of fit normalised across a neighbourhood,
and captures the relative a-priori confidence in the pairwise estimation model between a sensor
and one of its neighbours. By weighting the neighbours appropriately, the accuracy increases
with the neighbourhood size.
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5.2.2 Robust Aggregation of Pairwise Information
From the previous steps, we have a set of pairwise estimates, calculated with linear regression
models. For every new measurement collected by a sensor, we now need to aggregate the
pairwise estimates into a final estimate xˆ(ui) that approximates x(ui) and allows us to detect the
presence of malicious data injections. To achieve this, xˆ(ui) must aggregate estimates in a way
that is both accurate and minimally corrupted by malicious estimates. In particular, the second
requirement demands us not to trust the relationships between different estimates. Indeed,
different estimates for the same measurements share some mutual information, or in other
words the information brought in by an estimate is reduced by knowledge of other estimates.
Nevertheless, such property holds only in the absence of malicious interference. With respect to
malicious data injections instead, even two estimates that are expected to be perfectly correlated
bring in independent information, since independent probabilities of compromise are assumed
for different nodes. For this reason, we will not consider inter-estimate correlation.
Two candidates to aggregate pairwise estimates are weighted mean and the weighted median:
both take as input a set of estimates and their prior weights and return an aggregated value.
The weighted mean can achieve a smaller error than those of the single estimates. However,
it is highly sensitive to compromise, since the final result is proportional to the input values:
even one compromised (outlier) estimate can introduce an arbitrary deviation in the result. In
contrast, the weighted median [WDB10] is more resistant to compromise. It first sorts the values
ascendingly, then arranges the weights with the same order, transforms them into substrings
with a length proportional to the weight and picks the element at the half-length of the resulting
string. Its drawback is that by picking one among all estimates, the error cannot be reduced
further.
Since there is a trade-off between accuracy and compromise resistance, the two operators are
combined with the following heuristic: first, the weighted median operator is applied; then the
weighted mean is calculated with new weights, the posterior weights (wj+ui ), obtained as the
prior weights times a function which penalises values distant from the result of the first step.
Such function is the complementary cumulative distribution function of the estimation error,
5.2. Estimation 81
where the latter is calculated as the difference between the pairwise estimates and the result of
the weighted median.
pjui(xˆ
′(ui), xˆj(ui)) = P (|jui | > |xˆ′(ui)− xˆj(ui)|)
= 1− erf( |xˆ′(ui)−xˆj(ui)|√
2std(jui )
)
(5.2)
Where xˆ′(ui) is the result of the weighted median for sensor i, xˆj(ui) is the estimate given by
sensor j, a generic neighbour of sensor i, erf is the error function and std(jui) is the residual
standard deviation [GH06], calculated together with the respective estimation model. The
overall procedure is detailed in Algorithm 2 below, where xˆ(ui)N(i) are the estimates for i’s
observed measurement from its neighbours and w−iN(i) are their respective prior weights.
Algorithm 2 Calculation of the aggregated estimation
Require: w−iN(i), xˆ(ui)N(i)
Ensure: xˆ(ui)
1: xˆ′(ui) = weightedMedian(w−iN(i), xˆ(ui)N(i))
2: for all j ∈ N(i) do {Calculate the posterior weights}
3: wj+ui = w
j−
ui
· pjui(xˆ′(ui), xˆj(ui))
4: w+iN(i).append(w
j+
ui
)
5: end for
6: w+iN(i) =
w+
iN(i)∑
j∈N(i) w
j+
ui
7: xˆ(ui) = weightedMean(w+iN(i), xˆ(ui)N(i))
8: return xˆ(ui)
The novel algorithm gives a collusion-resistant and accurate aggregation. It differs from robust
aggregators, such as the Orthogonalized Gnanadesikan-Kettenring (OGK) operator [LCC07],
since it takes also the prior weights as input to cater for the general case where the values
are not equally pertinent to the aggregate. As a consequence, the accuracy of the aggregate
always increases when adding more values if the prior weights are correct, while the accuracy of
OGK decreases with the introduction of less accurate values. Moreover, the operator exploits
the residual standard deviation std(jui) to quantify how much a weight should be penalised;
OGK instead penalises all values equally, without considering their specific uncertainty. The
penalty applied by OGK depends on the data variability measured with the median absolute
deviation. This is disadvantageous for collusion resistance, as an attacker may seek to increase
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the estimates’ variability to be penalised less.
To control the aggregation result, an attacker must ensure that the weighted median is one of
the compromised estimates and thus that the sum of the weights of compromised estimates is
> 0.5. This condition enables non-detectable injections into a single sensor but is not sufficient
to keep the attack undetected. The attacker also needs to control the estimations for the
other compromised sensors. The total number of sensors needed to keep all compromised
sensors undetected depends on the strength of the pairwise correlations. Instead, the number
of sensors needed to mask or elicit an event depends on the event detection criterion. The
empirical evaluations show that although a few sensors are generally required to subvert the
event detection, a substantial additional number of sensors is required to avoid detection.
5.3 Testing the Deviation from Measurements Estimates
From the estimate aggregation step, introduced in Section 5.2.2, each collected measurement
x(ui) has an estimate xˆ(ui) of the observed value. To detect data injections in x(ui), the
two are compared using a similarity metric that must be consistent with the event detection
criterion. So, two signals that are similar according to the metric must also have similar effects
on the event detection and vice-versa. We therefore introduce two different tests:
1. The magnitude test, which verifies that collected measurements are close in magnitude to
their estimates.
2. The shape test, which verifies that the estimate and collected signal have a similar shape.
The choice of the most appropriate test, or a combination of the two should be made at design
time based on the event detection criterion.
5.3. Testing the Deviation from Measurements Estimates 83
5.3.1 Similarity Test 1: Magnitude
In some WSNs, events are triggered when measurements are higher or lower than a reference
value. For example, fire alarms trigger when the temperature is above a threshold. An attacker
must therefore inject measurements, which differ in magnitude with the observed ones. In such
cases we use M(ui) = (xˆ(ui)− x(ui)) – the difference between the collected measurement and
its estimate – to build a magnitude test, which checks that the difference is small enough.
The regression residual, i.e. the error between a value and its estimate, is assumed zero-mean
and normally distributed. Even if xˆ(ui) is the result of the aggregation described in Section
5.2.2, the error i = (xˆ(ui) − x(ui)) can still be assumed to be normally distributed. Indeed,
the aggregate is a weighted mean of pairwise estimates, so it equals the true value plus the
weighted mean of the pairwise residuals as shown below, where jui denotes the residual in the
regression of sensor i’s measurement based on sensor j’s.
xˆ(ui) =
∑
j∈N(i) w
j+
ui
xˆj(ui) =
∑
j∈N(i) w
j+
ui
(x(ui) + 
j
ui
)
= x(ui) +
∑
j∈N(i) w
j+
ui
jui
(5.3)
Assuming that neighbours have independent residuals (e.g., because of independent noise),
i is a linear combination of independent normally distributed samples, and is thus normally
distributed too [Bry95]. Its mean is still zero, and its variance is:
var(i) =
∑
j∈N(i)
wj+ui
2
var(jui) (5.4)
This equation has an important characteristic: the variance of the estimate is a combination
of the variances given by each neighbour. Therefore, if a sensor joins or leaves the network, it
is sufficient that all its new/old neighbours recompute the variance instead of learning a new
one. Since i
std(i)
follows the standard normal distribution, also M˜i = Mistd(i) does when the
measurements are genuine. M˜i is referred to as the magnitude deviation.
Related studies (e.g., [Pap+03; TH06]) have defined the normal samples with a confidence
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interval, characterised by the condition |M˜i| < θ. The threshold θ determines the trade-off
between false positives and false negatives, and has been usually set to θ = 3: in this case
only 0.3% samples are expected to be beyond the interval. Though 0.3% may seem a small
percentage, it needs to be compared with the measurements’ sampling period. For instance,
with a sampling period of 1 second, each genuine sensor will generate a false positive about
every 5.5 minutes. This may trigger the shutdown of the sensor, reconfiguration and/or restart,
which can be so expensive that the cost of detection may be prohibitive.
Increasing the threshold reduces false positives, but decreases the detection rate. However, in
event detection WSNs the false positives can be partly reduced without losing the detection
rate by elaborating magnitude deviations in the same way as the event detection criterion
elaborates the measurements. Specifically, if events are detected by applying a function to the
measurements in a WE-long time window, the same function can be applied to the magnitude
deviations in the same time window. Consecutive magnitude deviations are unlikely to cause
genuine anomalies with a long duration, unless there is a permanent fault that the fault-
detection module should detect. Anomalies due to compromise, instead, have a longer duration
as the attacker aims to subvert the event detection result. The final step consists of comparing
the elaborated magnitude deviation to the threshold TM . In the presented experiments, the
algorithm was run on genuine historical data with different values of TM and selected the lowest
value of TM that achieves a reasonable false alarm rate (calculated as sampling frequency over
FPR) for that application.
5.3.2 Similarity Test 2: Shape
Some event detection algorithms trigger based on changes in the time evolution of measurements
such as changes in trend or of frequency. These are characteristics of the shape of the signal
rather than its magnitude.
A metric that measures similarity in the shapes of two signals is the Pearson correlation co-
efficient. Since the purpose is to check the shape of the measurements used for event de-
tection, this coefficient is calculated within a moving time window of size WE: the event
5.3. Testing the Deviation from Measurements Estimates 85
detection time window. Calculating Pearson correlation for all sensor pairs in a neighbour-
hood would have a computational complexity of O(N2NWE), with NN being the neighbour-
hood size. In contrast, we evaluate the Pearson correlation coefficient of a sensor’s mea-
surements with its estimates, achieving a complexity of O(N2N + WENN). Indeed, we cal-
culate the coefficient Rx(ui),xˆ(ui), between WE consecutive values of x(ui) and xˆ(ui), and com-
pare it against the distribution of Rx(ui),xˆ(uj). Specifically, if the coefficient is below the me-
dian1, the test checks if at least 100 − CR% samples are expected to be so low by testing
R˜x(ui),xˆ(ui) =
Rx(ui),xˆ(ui)−MED(Rx(ui),xˆ(ui))
DRi
> 1, where DRi is the CR-th percentile of Rx(ui),xˆ(ui).
To eliminate the need for the distribution ofRx(ui),xˆ(ui), we approximate the quantitiesMED(Rx(ui),xˆ(ui))
and DRi with ̂MED(Rx(ui),xˆ(ui)) and DˆRi respectively. These are calculated with a heuristic
described in Algorithm 3 for a generic sensor i. The best neighbour j∗, for which the median
Pearson correlation coefficient is maximum, is chosen. ThenMED(Rx(ui),xˆ(ui)) is approximated
with its median and DRi with its respective distance to the CR-th percentile.
Algorithm 3 Characterisation of the distribution of Rx(ui),xˆ(ui)
Require: Rij:j∈N(i)(r), CR
Ensure: ̂MED(Rx(ui),xˆ(ui)), DˆRi
1: for all j ∈ N(i) do
2: MEDRjui
= MED(Rjui(r))
3: MED
R
j
ui
.append(MEDRjui )
4: rLOW = {r : r < MEDRjui}
5: DRjui
= percentile(MEDRjui −R
j
ui
(rLOW ), CR)
6: D
R
j
ui
.append(DRjui )
7: end for
8: j∗ = argmaxj∈N(i)(MEDRjui )
9: ̂MED(Rx(ui),xˆ(ui)) = MEDRjui [j
∗]
10: DˆRi = DRjui
[j∗]
11: return ( ̂MED(Rx(ui),xˆ(ui)), DˆRi)
In the absence of the distributions, Rij∈N(i)(r), MEDRjui and DRjui are estimated on historical
data. Note that MED(Rx(ui),xˆ(ui)) and DRi could be estimated empirically, by running the
whole algorithm on an ad-hoc dataset. However, the latter must be disjoint from the data used
1The samples below the median are characterised since the injected measurements are supposed to have a
low correlation with the real values.
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to learn the estimation models, otherwise the results could be biased by overfitting [Bis06].
Moreover, the parameters would only be valid for the configuration of sensors in the ad-hoc
dataset. Instead, the heuristic removes the need for an ad-hoc dataset and automatically adapts
when sensors join or leave the network.
For genuine sensors x˘(ui) = x(ui), then R˜x(ui),xˆ(ui) ≤ 1 for CR% genuine samples. R˜x(ui),xˆ(ui) is
defined as the shape deviation. CR is calculated as the lowest value that achieves a reasonable
false-alarms frequency. The false positives due to short term anomalies can be reduced in a
similar way to that used in the magnitude test i.e., by computing the median ofWSm consecutive
correlation coefficients calculated on overlapping time windows. WSm should never exceed WE,
otherwise the information from disjoint time windows would be merged.
5.4 Characterisation
When the similarity check fails for a measurement, the sensor that reported it may have been
compromised. However, in some cases the similarity check could also fail on the measurements
from genuine sensors, because the wrong modality was chosen (e.g., a non-event modality rather
than an event modality) or because the estimation was disturbed by compromised sensors.
The latter scenario may occur when several nearby sensors collude in providing malicious esti-
mates. However, to bias the estimates for genuine sensors by a certain quantity and increase
their deviation, compromised nodes need to inject measurements that have even larger devi-
ations (indeed their contribution has weight that cannot be higher than 1). Therefore, we
implement the characterisation step by removing the sensors with the highest deviation, one
by one, and recomputing the similarity check on the remaining sensors in the neighbourhood.
Each time a sensor is removed, presumably compromised, the genuine sensors gain in consis-
tency with their estimate whereas colluding sensors lose the benefits of the removed sensor’s
estimates. The procedure stops when all the remaining sensors pass the similarity check. The
overall characterisation algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4, where SCheck is the similarity
check and Di is the generic deviation (coming from the magnitude/shape tests) calculated for
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the similarity check.
Algorithm 4 Characterisation algorithm
Require: Di ∀i ∈ S
Ensure: compromisedSet
1: compromisedSet={}
2: residualSet=S
3: while ORi∈residualSet(SCheck(Di)fails) do
4: s∗ = argmaxi∈residualSetDi
5: compromisedSet.append(s∗)
6: residualSet.remove(s∗)
7: for all j ∈ S : s∗ ∈ N(j) do
8: N(j) = N(j) \ s∗
9: recompute Dj
10: end for
11: end while
12: return compromisedSet
Another factor to consider when the similarity check fails is the modality assumption (Sect.
5.2.1). When different modalities are used in event conditions and non-event conditions, there
is some uncertainty about which modality to use because malicious data may have compromised
the event detection output. In this case, the wrong estimation model may be used and genuine
sensors may fail it. Since the event detection algorithm is designed to detect events in genuine
scenarios, it may be particularly sensitive to malicious interference. So, the best solution is to
not rely on the event detection output, but evaluate both hypotheses, i.e. run Algorithm 4 in
both modalities when the similarity check fails. Then, the most likely scenario can be selected.
The likelihood of each scenario can be evaluated by considering that the attack costs increase
with the number of sensors that need to be controlled. Hence, the maximum-likelihood criterion
chooses the modality in which the smallest compromised set is returned. Note that this is
different from event detection with majority voting, since the measurements are not required
to trigger in majority, but the majority of them is required to correctly describe an event or a
rest condition, i.e. without disrupting correlations.
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5.5 Complexity analysis
Our approach relies on computations on raw measurements, which are carried out by a trust-
worthy node. When the base station collects all the measurements, it is a good candidate for
this role as it has a global view, which is useful to deal with collusion of compromised nodes
[ZYN08]: this scenario is referred to as centralised. This is also the case when the measure-
ments are collected through intermediate aggregators but the aggregation is lossless. When the
intermediate aggregators perform a lossy aggregation, the base station can instead delegate the
detection task to the aggregators rather than forcing delivery of all raw data. In this case, which
is referred to as distributed, the base station must also assess the integrity of the processing
at the aggregators. The centralised and distributed solutions have different computational and
communication overheads, analysed below.
For the WSN nodes that do not act as aggregators, the estimation-based framework adds
no overhead, because no additional software is run on the sensor nodes to manage votes or
trust values like in [GBS08]. For the base station and aggregators, the most computationally
expensive operation of the approach is the calculation of the estimation models. When this
operation is done one-off, powerful devices may be used oﬄine, but when this is not possible,
for instance because there is not enough historical data, the models need to be estimated in
real time. In this case, using external devices may be infeasible, and an efficient calculation is
required to estimate the models with the sensor nodes. This problem can be dealt with using
incremental regression, which updates the model through D new samples with a complexity
O(D) [SL08]. The overall complexity in the distributed case is thus O(DNANN) for each
aggregator, where NA is the number of sensors managed by the aggregator and NN is the
average number of neighbours used for the estimations. Similarly, in the centralised approach,
the complexity is O(DNNN). This complexity is generally low for a base station, but may be
high for an aggregator: in this case, random sampling and neighbourhood size reduction reduce
D and NN respectively. Note that new sensors joining the network require the computation of
further regression problems, 2NN on average, so the total overhead for a new node joining is
O(DNN).
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Besides the calculation of the estimation models, the estimations calculation and the similarity
check have a computational overhead. Each aggregated estimation requires NN multiplications
and sums, while the similarity check has a complexity O(WE) (for the shape test it is the
complexity of Pearson correlation and for the magnitude test it is the complexity of the operators
commonly used, such as mean, median, etc.). Since these operations need to be repeated for
each sensor, the overall time complexity is then O(N2N +WENN) and O(NNN+WENN) for the
centralised and distributed case respectively. Note that the neighbourhood size is the parameter
to reduce in large WSNs, e.g., if neighbourhoods are structured into a tree, the complexity can
be reduced to O(Nlog(N)+WENN) and O(log2(N)+WENN) in the centralised and distributed
cases respectively.
Regarding the communication overheads, since in the centralised solution the data needs to be
conveyed to the base station anyway, the framework does not introduce additional overhead as
no additional packets are transmitted, in contrast with [ZYN08]. In the distributed scenario,
instead, the base station needs to assess the integrity of the aggregation at each aggregator. For
this task, solutions have been proposed with a communication overhead sublinear in N , such
as the aggregate-commit-prove approach [PSP06]. This technique is based on three steps. First
the aggregator collects the measurements and aggregates them. Then, it reports the result to
the base station together with a commitment value. The base station challenges the aggregator
by requiring some of the measurements and additional information to verify the commitment
value. Based on such information, the base station proves with a certain probability that the
committed measurements are authentic and have not been changed during the challenge. Note
that the overhead of verifying the integrity of the processing done by the aggregators nulli-
fies the advantages of distributing the processing on the measurements. Additionally, since
the detection is only performed within a cluster, an adversary may be able to compromise a
significant number, or even all, of the sensors in a cluster. In Chapter 7.3, we show that the
minimum number of sensors that an attacker needs to compromise to make any undetected
and dangerous attack decreases when fewer measurements are available. In conclusion, lossy
aggregation may be a convenient approach when the integrity of the measurements can be vio-
lated by the aggregators only. Instead, when the measurements are compromised before being
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transmitted to the aggregators, e.g. because of compromised sensor nodes, the advantages of
distributed computations are overcome by the disadvantages of requiring extra-communications
and reducing the ability of detecting malicious measurements.
5.6 Experiments
Different WSN applications sense different processes, have different semantics and different
deployments. It would be cumbersome to design new data injection detection algorithms for
each new set of circumstances. Yet few, if any, algorithms proposed in the literature have been
shown to work in different scenarios or identify how they can be tailored to them.
We evaluated the algorithms and methodology in three very different contexts: Monitoring
health parameters (Sect. 5.6.1), detecting volcanic eruptions (Sect. 5.6.2) and home fire alarms
(Sect. 5.6.3). In each case, the data is divided into two datasets: A historical dataset, from
which the estimation models and other parameters are learnt, and a test set, which represents
the online measurements and is used for evaluation.
Ideally, the datasets should include both genuine measurements and malicious data injections in
order to calculate the False Positive Rate (FPR) and the False Negative Rate (FNR). However,
real malicious data injections are not common yet, so the attacks need to be simulated in each
case to study the algorithm’s behaviour. Since it is reasonable to assume that the test sets
used in the experiments are free from malicious injections, the FPR estimates are still reliable.
However, FNR estimates are not, so they are omitted.
Attacks are considered where non-existent events are elicited and where real events are masked.
The attacker model is the one presented in Chapter 4. In summary we assume attackers that:
1. Can target the best C out N sensors (i.e., those that can mislead the event detection
algorithm with maximum chance of remaining undetected).
2. Have infinite time for the attack.
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3. Can overhear the measurements of the other sensors.
The attacks are simulated by injecting measurements describing normal circumstances (i.e. ab-
sence of faults and compromise) but that subvert the event detection result, i.e. elicit a non
existent event, or mask a real event. In some cases, the attacker may need to inject mea-
surements substantially different from the observed ones, but this will not be easily noticeable
because the data describes wrong but still normal circumstances. Moreover, the measurements
injected from different compromised sensors collude to be perfectly adherent to the expected
correlation, thus estimates from two compromised sensors will always support each other. Note
that such sophisticated attacks require a sound and well-planned strategy, and thus are difficult
to automate. The purpose of the following experiments is indeed to show that, even with a
sophisticated collusion strategy, the algorithm is capable of detecting the attack and, under
certain conditions, to correctly characterise the compromised sensors. Even though experi-
ments based on naive principles, such as random increases in the measurements magnitude or
amplification of noise power, lead to experiments that are easier to automate and to results
that are easier to interpret, they do not give any information about the ability to detect attacks
in real scenarios.
All the experiments are compared with a majority voting framework, since it includes a large
amount of related work, e.g. [LCC07; ZYN08; Hin09; Sun+13]. In addition, majority-voting is
a generic framework, so we can study the benefits of our estimation-based framework by using
the same algorithms proposed in this chapter, to make the comparison as fair as possible. So,
we will use a local version of the magnitude test for majority voting, where the votes are the
pairwise magnitude tests below:
jui
std(jui)
< TM (5.5)
Moreover, we will use a local version of the shape test, where the votes are the pairwise shape
tests below:
Rx(ui),x(ui) −MED(Rx(ui),x(uj))
Djui
< TS (5.6)
The threshold TM or TS are set to achieve the same FPR achieved by the algorithm and
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classify as compromised the nodes for which at least 50% votes are collected. When introducing
collusion, the compromised nodes are assumed to not report on themselves, while they report
on the genuine nodes.
5.6.1 PhysioNet Dataset
The PhysioNet MIMIC II Waveform Database [Phy] contains thousands of recordings collected
from bedside patient monitors in adult and neonatal intensive care units. The parameters
considered are: blood and pulmonary arterial pressure (mean, systolic, and diastolic), heart
rate, pulse, and respiration. Note that the sensors measuring different physical phenomena
are considered; however, the algorithm is still applicable since it abstracts from the physical
meaning of the measurements and only requires that there is correlation between them. The
event detection algorithm that is used is the one described in [Sal+14] and tested on the
PhysioNet MIMIC Database, a predecessor of PhysioNet MIMIC II Waveform Database. An
event is triggered when there are high temporal variations in the measurements of the sensors
within a time window, which in the experiments is 40 samples long. Table 5.1 summarises the
experimental setup.
Table 5.1: PhysioNet experiment setup
PhysioNet
Content Health-related parameters
Sampling period 1 minute
Data Number of sensors 8
Historical data size 6282 samples per sensor
Test set size 3412 samples per sensor
Event Detection Criterion Described in [Sal+14], based
on temporal variations
Time window size 40
Similarity check Shape test
Similarity check param-
eters
WSm = 10, CR = 99.7
Algorithm Modality assumption Unique modality for event
presence and absence
FPR 0.002
Expected false positive
frequency
1 in 8 hours
5.6. Experiments 93
(a) Alarms with genuine data (b) Alarms with compromised data (c) Shape deviation
Figure 5.4: PhysioNet Dataset: masking attack. Alarm conditions are present and the com-
promised sensors mask them all. The shape test fails on 2 compromised sensors and also on a
genuine one, because of collusion.
Fig. 5.4a shows the original measurements from the dataset and the events detected. To
simulate malicious data injections, the attacker is simulated to control 3 sensors and inject
measurements registered by the same sensors while monitoring healthy patients. If the attacker
chose uncorrelated sensors, well correlated neighbours would detect the attack. Instead, 3
correlated sensors are chosen to inject correlated values from the same sensors in non-event
conditions that also show the best correlation with the remaining sensors: the sensors for
mean, systolic, and diastolic blood pressure. As shown in Fig. 5.4b, no event is detected after
the attack, although the patient is subject to a life-threatening condition.
To apply the algorithm, the similarity check needs to be specified first. Since the event detection
triggers on fast increasing or decreasing measurements, regardless of their magnitude, the shape
test is more appropriate. The shape deviation for the data after the malicious data injections is
shown in Fig. 5.4c. Note that one of the genuine sensors also fails the shape test in the last part;
this is due to the collusion effects explained in Sect. 5.4. Nevertheless, the characterisation
algorithm described in Sect. 5.4 correctly returns the set of compromised sensors, and does not
include any genuine sensor.
The experiments were run with other sets of compromised nodes. The attacker needs to com-
promise at least one more sensor to become undetected – the one closest to those already
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compromised (Fig. 5.4b). When this sensor is also compromised, each compromised sensor has
4 genuine neighbours and 3 compromised ones, but there is not enough information to deter-
mine if the estimates of the genuine neighbours disagree because of errors or because the other
sensors are malicious. Nevertheless, in this scenario an attacker needs to compromise 50% (4
out of 8) sensors to remain undetected.
With majority voting, no detection was achieved at all when 1 or 2 compromised sensors were
injecting malicious measurements. In the case of Fig. 5.4b, with 3 compromised sensors, it did
not identify any malicious sensor but also misclassified 2 genuine sensors as compromised.
5.6.2 Home Fire Alarm Dataset
The second dataset originates from a WSN conceived for monitoring homes to generate fire
alarms. It is available from the NIST website [Nis] as part of the Home Smoke Alarm Tests
project (see NIST Technical Note 1455 [Bukowski]). The data has been collected by three
groups of temperature sensors in three adjacent rooms, each group made up of 5 sensors placed
on a wall at different distances from the ceiling. Table 5.2 summarises the experiment setup.
In this case, the second modality assumption (Sec. 5.2.1) was used, where different relations
between sensors are present in event and non-event conditions. Intuitively, in the absence of a
fire, temperatures are broadly uniform but a fire introduces spatial patterns across the rooms
that are significantly different. Linear relationships are therefore derived for both modalities,
the event detection algorithm defines which modality applies, and finally the estimates are
calculated according to that modality.
The synthetic attack consists of eliciting a false fire alarm. Here, an event is detected when a
fixed temperature is reached, in compliance with the detection algorithm for fixed temperature
heat detectors [Bukowski]. Such devices generally trigger at temperatures between 47 ◦C and
58 ◦C, so 50 ◦C is used in the experiment. To make the signals more credible 3 compromised
sensors that collude in reporting high temperatures have been simulated. These progressively
increase the measurements of 3 sensors as shown in Fig. 5.5a, eventually triggering a false fire
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Table 5.2: Home Fire Alarm experiment setup
Home Fire Alarm
Content Temperature readings in a
room at different distance
from the ceiling
Sampling period 2 seconds
Data Number of sensors 15
Historical data size 14769 samples per sens. at
rest, 800 in event mod.
Test set size 9210 samples per sens. at
rest, 312 in event mod.
Event detection Criterion One sensor observes 3
consecutive measurements
above 50 ◦C
Time window size 3
Similarity check Magnitude test
Similarity check param-
eters
TM = 3
Algorithm Modality assumption One modality for event-
presence, one modality for
event-absence
FPR 0.003 in event mod., 0 at rest
Expected false positive
frequency
1 every 3000 fires
alarm.
Since fire events are detected based on the magnitude of measured values, the magnitude test is
more appropriate for this application. As explained in Sect. 5.3.1, the magnitude test reflects
the event detection criterion, which triggers alarms when the temperature is high. As shown
in Fig. 5.5a, the event is detected around sample 7700, hence, in the first place, the estimation
models learnt under event-conditions apply here. Note that the measurements of the genuine
sensors are not consistent with the presence of the fabricated event, hence the similarity check
fails for most of them as shown in Fig. 5.5b and the characterisation algorithm identifies 12
nodes (10 of which are genuine). Since the check failed, the characterisation algorithm (see
Section 5.4) needs to decide if the event modality is the correct one and it does so by running
the detection again on the same measurements but with the estimation models for the non-
event modality. This time, the characterisation algorithm returns the 3 compromised sensors,
a smaller set than the 12 nodes identified with the event modality, so the non-event modality is
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(a) Alarms with compromised data,
represented with vertical lines
(b) Magnitude deviation in alarm
modality
(c) Magnitude deviation in non-
alarm modality
Figure 5.5: Home Fire Alarm Dataset: eliciting attack. The 3 compromised sensors trigger the
fire alarm. Many sensors fail the check in the wrong modality. In the correct modality, the
compromised sensors can be easily identified.
correctly chosen and the compromised sensors are correctly detected. The magnitude deviation
under the non-event modality is shown in Fig. 5.5c.
The experiments were run with other sets of compromised nodes. The attacker needs to com-
promise at least 7 sensors to remain undetected. In this scenario, 11 sensors are identified in
the non-event modality and 8 sensors (all the genuine ones) in the event modality, therefore
the event modality is wrongly chosen and the genuine sensors are classified as malicious. In
this scenario the attacker needs to compromise at least 47% sensors for a successful undetected
attack.
For this experiment majority voting detected correctly the compromised nodes when 1 sensor
was compromised. Detection succeeds with 2 compromised nodes but misclassifies 2 genuine
sensors. In the case shown in Fig. 5.5a with 3 compromised sensors, detection fails and 4
genuine nodes are misclassified. Note that the real limit of majority voting here is 13% (2
sensors), which is far below the 50% theoretical limit. Such limit requires correct votes from
the genuine nodes, which are guaranteed only with perfect correlation.
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5.6.3 Reventador Volcano Dataset
Finally a dataset gathered from a WSN of infrasound sensors is considered. The WSN was
deployed at the Reventador volcano by the Harvard Sensor Networks Lab [WA+06b]. The
network consists of 16 sensor nodes deployed every 200-400 metres along a side of the volcano.
The sensors are connected to a remote base station, which waits for the sensors to trigger
the presence of an event (which may reflect earthquakes or eruptions): if at least 30% sensors
trigger, the base station collects the last 60 seconds of data from all the sensors to analyse
the event. The event detection algorithm, given in [WA+06b] is based on temporal changes in
the measurements’ average. Here, the measurements shown in Fig. 5.6a are considered, which
trigger the event detection2. Table 5.3 summarises the experiment setup.
Table 5.3: Reventador experiment setup
Reventador Volcano
Content Infrasound readings along a
side of the volcano
Sampling period 0.01 seconds
Data Number of sensors 8
Historical data size 28471 samples per sensor
Test set size 8398 samples per sensor
Event detection Criterion EWMA [WA+06b], based
on changes in temporal
mean
Time window size 6000 samples
Similarity check Shape test
Similarity check param-
eters
WSm = 1, CR = 99.7
Algorithm Modality assumption Unique modality for event
presence and absence
FPR 0
Expected false positive
frequency
0
Since the infra-sound data is made up of oscillations around zero, applying the algorithm to
the raw data would be inappropriate since the measurements are mostly uncorrelated and
uninformative. In infrasound measurements, the valuable information is mostly contained in
2Note that only 8 sensors are analysed since the remaining 7 sensors were not working during the observed
time.
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the trend of the peak values, which can be captured with a pre-processing step that averages
the measurements’ absolute value in a short time window. From the graphs in 5.6a the peak
values appear generally consistent for about 400 data samples, so a good pre-processing time
window is of 400 samples. The pre-processed measurements are shown in Fig. 5.6b.
(a) Alarms with genuine data (b) Pre-processed genuine data
Figure 5.6: Reventador Dataset. Alarming conditions are present. The measurements are
noticeably more correlated after the transformation.
Table 5.4: Reventador shape deviation. The values that failed the shape test are in boldface
Compromised Sensors Event masked S1 dev. S2 dev. S3 dev. S4 dev. S5 dev. S6 dev. S7 dev. S8 dev. Characterisation output
2 NO 0.03 25.13 0.32 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 -0.07 0.03 2
2,6 NO 0.07 25.27 0.23 -0.05 0.06 8.48 0.03 0.08 2,6
1,2,6 NO 8.12 25.15 4.47 0.01 0.07 8.66 2.52 1.40 2,6,1
5,6,7 NO -0.01 0.31 0.09 -0.05 0.89 8.55 13.36 0.08 7,6
5,6,7,8 NO 2.04 6.50 7.22 -0.05 0.89 8.41 13.17 6.75 7,6,8
1,2,3,5,6,7 YES 4.28 11.72 15.14 0.04 0.48 5.63 8.07 6.94 3,2,7,1,6
1,2,3,5,6,7,8 YES -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 0.40 -0.98 -0.05 -0.14 -0.10 N/A
For this experiment, masking attacks are simulated to silence the event detection by injecting
measurements taken from the same sensors, but in restful conditions, i.e. when there is no
volcanic activity. In the pre-processed data, injected measurements appear as roughly constant
data, i.e. without increasing/decreasing trends. According to the event detection algorithm
described in [WA+06b], an event occurs when 2 or more sensors trigger (30% of 8). The event
is triggered by all the sensors except sensor 4, which is the one with a roughly flat signal in
Fig. 5.6b. So, to mask the event, an attacker needs to compromise at least 6 sensors that
do not include sensor 4. As conveyed in Section 5.3, the similarity check should be tailored
to the event detection algorithm, that in this case is a exponentially-weighted moving average
(EWMA). Since EWMA triggers with variations in the time series, including sudden but small
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variations, the shape test is more appropriate than the magnitude test for the similarity check.
A first experiment simulates a scenario where only sensor 2 is injecting malicious measurements.
The results are shown in Table 5.4. The shape test unequivocally recognises the inconsistency
of the measurements from sensor 2. Sensor 4 is also not triggering, however the similarity
check does not fail on it since its measurements are consistent with the estimation models,
which indirectly captured the characteristic that the sensor may not trigger even if all the
other sensors are triggering.
The number of sensors injecting malicious measurements is progressively increased. Table 5.4
summarises the output from the characterisation algorithm in the order in which sensors are
found. Note that whenever the similarity check fails, the genuine nodes that failed the test
because of the collusion effect are finally classified as genuine. With the exception of sensor 5,
all the compromised sensors are correctly detected by the characterisation algorithm. Sensor 5 is
the sensor in Fig. 5.6b, whose measurements mostly dissociate themselves from the others. The
behaviour of this sensor is therefore less predictable, and a considerable deviation is required
to make the similarity check fail.
When sensors {1,2,3,5,6,7} are all injecting malicious measurements, the masking attack even-
tually succeeds. However, the algorithm still detects the attack, even though 75% of sensors
are reporting malicious measurements, as the colluding sensors did not succeed in making the
measurements credible. The attacker needs to compromise all the triggering sensors (88% of
the total) to carry out an undetected masking attack as shown in the last row of Table 5.4.
In the same settings, majority voting fails with 1 compromised node (13%). With 2 or 3
compromised nodes (25%, 37%), the detection succeeds but 2 genuine nodes are classified
as malicious. With 4 (50%) nodes, it reaches its theoretical limit, so detection clearly fails.
Instead, the algorithm detects the attack without false positives when even 75% sensors are
compromised and reaches its limit at 88%.
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5.6.4 Discussion
The current approach has shown to detect malicious interference also with sophisticated at-
tacks, based on injection of credible measurements. The characterisation algorithm correctly
detects the set of compromised sensors when the number of genuine sensors is low compared to
the expected correlation. Note that, in the approach, the number of compromised sensors that
can be tolerated is correlation-dependent. In one of the experiments, attacks could be detected
whenever fewer than 88% sensors were compromised. Voting-based frameworks instead, cannot
tolerate more than 50% compromised sensors and, when the algorithm tolerated less than 50%
compromised sensors, majority voting tolerated a substantially lower percentage. The reason
behind this result is that the correlation between the sensors used in the experiments is not
high enough to guarantee correct votes from all the genuine sensors and votes become inaccu-
rate. The approach deals with such inaccuracy by merging the contributions from each sensor,
weighting the contributions according to their expected accuracy, and discarding potentially
unreliable contributions.
The attack detection has proved not always sufficient to correctly identify the compromised
nodes, especially when the correlations change dramatically between restful and event condi-
tions. In this case, the presence of a problem can be easily detected but it is not easy to
infer whether the restful or event-related measurements are correct. The presented approach
chooses the most likely condition, but it may be possible to reject the detection when there is
not enough confidence in it. The final decision may be taken otherwise and may require human
intervention.
5.7 Conclusions
The proposed solution improves upon state-of-the-art approaches and provides:
1. A method to run the detection on broad neighbourhoods where the measurements of two
neighbours can significantly differ (but are still correlated).
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2. An extension of voting-based and trust-based frameworks to estimation-based frame-
works.
3. A general methodology to flexibly tailor the technique to WSN applications that detect
different kinds of events.
Contribution 1) consists of extending the assumption of having a unique monitored value,
which is generally valid only for very small neighbourhoods, where collusion attacks can be
successful by compromising all the sensors. To resist collusion, it is necessary to broaden
neighbourhoods and cope with measurements that are significantly different. But in the absence
of a common ground truth, it is not obvious what a sensor’s collected measurement should
be compared against. Previous studies, such as [CP07; Raj+10; SGG10], have proposed to
detect inconsistencies in the correlation within a neighbourhood by extracting a unique overall
consistency metric, to which every neighbour contributes. This, however, allows colluding
sensors to compensate for each other and reduce the overall inconsistency, whilst still disrupting
the collected values [LNR11].
An approach similarly based on aggregation of individual sensors’ information is used in major-
ity voting and trust-management frameworks. However, the main drawback of these techniques
is that they introduce an additional variable - the vote, or trust value - about which an at-
tacker can lie with or without lying about the measurements at the same time. Detecting such
attacks incurs additional computation and communication costs. In contrast, the contribution
2) extends voting-based and trust-based frameworks by aggregating measurements estimates
rather than votes or trust values. Such choice does not introduce additional variables, since the
estimates are directly calculated from the raw measurements.
Since no general methodology has been proposed for systematically tailored to different deploy-
ments and different applications, contribution 3) deals with this aspect. In addition, sophisti-
cated collusion attacks are described that are application-agnostic and therefore can be used
as a generic testing criterion for assessing the robustness of different algorithms.
The proposed algorithm provides detection of malicious data injections in event detection
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WSNs, in particular when collusion between compromised sensors occurs, in a way that can be
customised and used in different applications, and for different kinds of events.
Dealing with collusion and the occurrence of events makes the problem of detecting malicious
data injections significantly more complex because both affect the dynamics of the system and
comparisons between measurements. Furthermore, they interact with each other as collusion
may leverage deviations in sensed values introduced by the event.
Addressing this challenge has exposed several trade-offs in the design of the algorithm. Firstly,
resistance to collusion requires comparison to measurements over a broader set of sensors and
thus introduces additional complexity and computational cost. This trade-off is particularly
visible in the selection of neighbourhoods, which becomes a simple ranking-based choice when
using the pairwise estimation models. Another trade-off arises when merging information with
potentially malicious sources. While information coming from genuine sensors increases the
estimates accuracy, it is important to select only information that appears reliable. Colluding
sensors should not be allowed to compensate for each other in the detection metric whilst still
injecting malicious data. This requires the use of pairwise comparisons and an aggregation op-
erator that is accurate in the presence of genuine measurements as well as resistant to malicious
data.
The methodology applied in three applications, where requirements and the nature of the events
is markedly different, has proved that the development of a general framework to cope with
malicious data injection in event detection WSNs is possible. However, it requires customisation
of the parameters based on a collection of historical data and information about the application’s
goals and requirements. The methodology for customisation, on the other hand, can be provided
with a generic but well defined procedure.
Experimental results validated the choice of structuring the detection on top of simple tech-
niques that, without introducing significant overhead in the sensor nodes, achieve high detection
rates.
Having designed the methodology and algorithms specifically for the scenarios where one event
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manifests, and with a pattern that can be learnt from historical data, we have optimised the
problem solution for a number of applications, such as volcano monitoring, home fire alarms,
and health related parameters. On the other hand, extending the approach to other scenarios,
where events can be multiple and there are so many spatial patterns that it is difficult to learn
them all, requires a certain effort. In particular, the estimates need to be contextualised in the
unpredictable event’s characteristics, and a detection method is needed that copes also with
estimates that are highly affected by malicious interference. These problems are tackled in the
next chapter.
Chapter 6
Securing Multiple Events with Variable
Patterns
In the previous chapter, we have considered events that manifest with recurring patterns, such as
seismic activities on volcanoes, home fires, and physiological conditions. For such applications,
two events differ mainly in their intensity and the way they evolve in time, hence pairwise linear
models can model with sufficient accuracy all events. However, in other applications such as
hazardous gas detection, smart grids, and traffic monitoring among others, multiple events
occur simultaneously, and the number, location, and intensity of these events affect drastically
the event manifestation.
In these contexts, we refer to events as events with unpredictable pattern. When events with
unpredictable patterns occur, more sophisticated attacks are possible. For instance, a real event
can be elicited to appear larger or masked to appear smaller, a spoofed event can be introduced
close to a genuine event to gain credibility, a real event can be split into two or more events,
etc. A prototypical application with such characteristics is that of wildfire monitoring, where
the fire can be modelled as a collection of points where the fire area is wider and propagates to
other locations, with a pattern that is not known a-priori. An example of a spoofed fire next
to a genuine fire is shown in Fig. 6.1. Distinguishing the two fires is a complex task, so the
spoofed event gains credibility.
104
105
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
60
80
100
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
Figure 6.1: Temperatures (in Kelvin) in a wildfire monitoring WSN: axes represent the spatial
location, circles identify the sensors and colours map the measurements space. The spoofed
event centred at (80,40) is difficult to isolate from the genuine event centred at (65,60).
With variable patterns the attacker has more freedom given by the uncertainty regarding the
event-related information. This is the reason why applying techniques designed for events with
variable patterns when events show a regular pattern is not an optimal choice.
Events with variable patterns invalidate the technique presented in the previous chapter, since
the estimation of a sensor’s measurement based on the measurement of just one other sensor
has too much uncertainty to provide meaningful information.
The approach pursued in this chapter is to revert to estimations based on multiple contributions.
Nevertheless, as discussed in the previous chapter, when the estimations are extracted from
multiple contributions, collusion attacks can bias the estimate. Hence, the estimates are not
used to approximate the true value, but rather to identify change trends, which can then be
judged as collusion attempts or genuine changes.
When the event’s pattern can significantly change, the inter-measurements correlations depend
on the event itself. Hence, the relevance of each measurement to the estimate may not be
calculated from historical data as it could change drastically from one event to another. How-
ever, since the monitored phenomena generally have a spatial coherence that decreases with
distance, it can be assumed that close sensors produce measurements that are more likely to
be correlated.
These considerations lead to the construction of a new estimation model, which rather than
learning the correlation between the measurements of two different sensors, evaluates the vari-
ation between them in context. For instance, if the event is located close to one of the two
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sensors but further from the other, we may expect a large variation between the two sensors.
The basis of this new approach is producing measurement estimates as a weighted average of
other measurements, with weights that decrease with distance. This is the idea behind local
regression ([Loa06]), where the expected value of the data to estimate is calculated through a
regression model, with locally defined regression weights. The crucial ability of the new model
is to contextualise the information with respect to the information in a neighbouring area.
6.1 Local Regression of Scale-Specific Trends
Local regression is able to give an estimate for a value, given a subset of neighbouring values.
In particular, a regression model that makes a locally weighted average of the data is the
Nadaraya-Watson estimator. Such an estimator will be used in the following to detect changes in
the measurements’ trends. The weights of this estimator are calculated with a kernel function,
i.e. a symmetric function which integrates (or sums up, if discrete) to one over its domain.
ηs,τ =
k( |v−τ |
s
)∑
u∈Ω k(
|u−τ |
s
)
(6.1)
The Nadaraya-Watson estimator works as a low-pass filter, thanks to the average operators,
where the bandwidth of the filter depends on the variable s. The kernel k determines how
the weights decay as the distance from the centre τ increases. A typical kernel that is used is
the Gaussian kernel e−|v|2 . This kernel smoothly decreases with distance, and after a certain
distance it can be approximated to zero. Moreover, since a Gaussian transforms to a Gaussian
with the Fourier transform, the function applied in the spatial domain is not only space-limited,
but also approximately band-limited, so it gives a precise selection of both spatial and frequency
contributions.
The low-pass filtering of the estimate filters out the dynamic component, i.e. the high frequen-
cies. In such frequencies we find information that is precious to identify malicious compromise:
group-wise (mid-frequencies) and individual (high frequencies) behaviours. To study also higher
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frequencies, a set of band-pass filters is required. In the following section, a mathematical tool
that is equivalent to the application of a set of band-pass filters is presented: the wavelet
transform. The wavelet theory that is important to measurements inspection is first presented.
Then, we show that the Nadaraya-Watson estimator can be used as the basis for a special kind
of wavelet transform.
For the following discussions, we will assume that the original domain of analysis is the temporal
domain, as the wavelet theory was originally developed for temporal signals. Afterwards, we
will transition to the spatial domain, where wavelets still find many applications such as image
processing [CS05]. Similarly to image processing, we will consider the measurements as a spatial
signal with correlated samples. However, whilst images are uniformly spaced, measurements
signals generally are not. Therefore, we will briefly introduce the temporal wavelet transform,
move to the spatial domain, and finally introduce a more recently developed type of wavelet
transform that copes also with non-uniformly spaced samples. Afterwards, we will introduce a
novel data analysis method, which makes use of a state-of-the-art wavelet transform to analyse
the cross-scale information contained in the WSN measurements. This will be the basis for our
new algorithm to tackle malicious data injections in WSNs where multiple events manifest with
unpredictable patterns.
6.2 Wavelet Transform: A Tool for Extracting Changes in
Scale-Specific Trends
The wavelet transform provides analyses at multiple scales (which are linked to the signal’s
frequencies) and also at different translations, i.e. points in time/space (according to the
domain of analysis). Data processing applications involving the wavelet transform include noise
removal, pattern recognition, and data compression. When noise can be modelled as a random
process which is independent and identically distributed in time and space, its contribution
is mainly observable in the lower scales, corresponding to the high frequencies, which may
be filtered out. Pattern recognition is a process that classifies the data, based on recurrent
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characteristics, known as features. Wavelet decomposition is able to separate singularities in
the data from the background. This can be used, for instance, to identify the edges of an object
inside an image, and exploit information about the object’s shape for the pattern recognition
task. Data compression with wavelets consists of discarding some of the lower scales, similarly
to noise filtering. However, some signals are particularly interesting when there are spikes or
discontinuities. In this case, the lower scales cannot be discarded, but thanks to the multi-scale
and multi-location decomposition they can be represented compactly.
Wavelets are a powerful tool for data analysis tasks, since they provide information which may
be more comprehensible than raw data thanks to the multi-scale analysis. For instance, when
analysing the most recent samples of a time series, we may observe a decreasing trend at high
scales and an increasing trend at low scales. In practice, this means that the values of the time
series have decreased in the long-term, but a more recent increase is observable, which may
either be a short-term increase or the change point for a new long-term increase. In summary,
scale isolation gives different views of the same phenomenon at different degrees of granularity.
The characteristics of wavelet transforms are particularly advantageous for detecting malicious
measurements in WSNs, especially when there is no particular source of knowledge to compare
against, such as a set of measurement estimates. Indeed, the multi-scale analysis allows one to
contextualise the low scale information, which includes the information coming from one sensor
or a small group of sensors, within the high scale information, which includes the information
coming from many sensors. The latter includes also the effects of events, so we exploit the high
scale information to characterise the event, and check that it is consistent with the information
provided by the individual sensors. Since the scales are related to the signal’s frequency, the
same problem may be tackled also with the Fourier transform. In fact, the wavelet transform
is often seen as a competitor of Fourier transform. However, wavelets are more suitable for
our problem. In brief, this is because wavelets can localise the spectral information in different
areas of the WSN deployment space, and also because the low scales, i.e. the high frequencies
can be reconstructed more compactly with wavelets. Below we analyse the main differences
between wavelet and Fourier transform in more detail.
6.2. Wavelet Transform: A Tool for Extracting Changes in Scale-Specific Trends 109
Wavelet VS Fourier Transform There are several analogies between wavelet and Fourier
transform. Both approaches decompose the input signal into different components which make
a selection in the frequency domain. While the selection is extremely accurate with the Fourier
transform, the wavelet coefficients act like a band-pass filter, i.e. they select a range of fre-
quencies. In particular, the latter depends on the scale variable s: the higher s, the lower
frequencies.
However, the perfect separation of the frequency components achieved by the Fourier transform
has a downside in the time domain, which is dominated by uncertainty. In other words, given
the Fourier transform of a time signal, whose frequency spectrum evolves in time, it is impossible
to say which frequencies belong to which time.
In our problem, this limitation would prevent us from inferring which sensors generated the
anomaly if any is detected. A possible way to reduce the limitation is to revert to the short
Fourier transform. The idea is to run the Fourier transform in limited time windows to make
sure that the spectral information can be localised into such window. However, the Gabor limit
states that "One cannot simultaneously sharply localize a signal in both the time domain and
frequency domain" [Gab46]. As a consequence, a shorter time window reduces the frequency
resolution and vice versa.
Clearly, the wavelet transform cannot overcome the Gabor limit. Rather, it uses a different
approach which gives higher importance to the time localisation of high frequency and lower
importance to the time localisation of low frequencies. Since high frequencies correspond mainly
to the singularities in the signal, i.e. transitory elements, the resolution error is made propor-
tional to the duration of the component. As a consequence, each value of the original signal has
an influence on a range of wavelet translations which is proportional to the scale of analysis.
This effect is known as Cone Of Influence, since in a graph where the translations are on one
axis and the scales on another axis, each point’s influence area is cone-shaped.
A similar reasoning holds also for spatial signals, where the duration becomes the spatial ex-
tension. With the spatial wavelet transform, we are able to analyse the high scale information
to detect the effects of events on the measurements, but we cannot localise an event with high
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accuracy. For instance, we have an approximated location for the event’s core, which may be,
e.g., the epicentre of an earthquake. On the other hand, we can localise with high accuracy
the low scale information, which is related to small subsets of sensors. So, for instance, we can
well localise spikes in the measurements caused by faults, the edges of an event, singularities
introduced by malicious sensors, or discontinuities between genuine and malicious sensors. We
can conclude that wavelet transform is more suitable than Fourier transform in tackling mali-
cious data injections. However, not all wavelet transforms are equivalent, especially in terms of
applicability to the specific problem. Thus, we analyse the evolution of the wavelet transform
theory, from the first-generation wavelet transform in the time domain, up to the continuous
second-generation wavelet transform, which will be used for our purposes.
First-Generation Wavelet Transform The wavelet transform was first introduced for
continuous-time signal.
Given a generic continuous-time signal x(t), its wavelet transform is defined as:
C(s, τ) =
1√
s
∫ +∞
−∞
ψ(
t− τ
s
)x(t)dt (6.2)
Where s is the scale and τ is the translation. The function ψ(ω) is known as the mother wavelet,
and in (6.2) is present in a dilated and translated form. Indeed, the scale factor s dilates the
mother wavelet when its value increases, i.e. it makes the function ψ(t) wider, and hence with
lower frequency. The translation term τ shifts the mother wavelet in time: a positive τ shifts
it to future time instants, while a negative τ shifts it to past time instants.
The wavelet transform corresponds to a convolution of the original signal with a dilated (because
of s) and flipped version (in a proper convolution τ − t would be in place of t− τ) of the mother
wavelet. Therefore, the wavelet transform is equivalent to the repeated application of the same
type of filter with varying bandwidth. The Fourier transform can also be interpreted as the
filtering with varying frequency, but the filters have a bandwidth that tends to zero. Wavelets,
on the contrary, have a range of frequencies whose modulus tends to zero as the frequency tends
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to infinity. More precisely, the wavelet spectrum needs to satisfy the admissibility condition:
∫ +∞
−∞
|Ψ(ω)|2
|ω| dω < +∞ (6.3)
Which implies also that the wavelet is zero-mean in the time domain.
The wavelet transform can also be applied to uniformly sampled discrete time signals. In this
case the transform is known as discrete-time wavelet transform. Since the sensors in a WSN
perform a sampling of the physical phenomenon, the discrete-time wavelet transform will be
assumed in the following.
If the discrete-time signal is modelled as a continuous-time signal convoluted with an impulse
train δ(t − nTs) (where Ts is the sampling period), the extension of 6.2 to uniformly sampled
signals is straightforward and becomes:
C(a,m) =
1√
a
M−1∑
n=0
ψ(
n−m
a
)xn (6.4)
Where M is the length of the signal, xn = x(nTs), and a and m are the scale and translation
(note that the translation has become and index, the effective temporal translation is mTs).
Second-GenerationWavelet Transform When the signal under analysis is a non-uniformly
sampled discrete signal, which is the case for sensor deployments in the spatial domain, the
translation and dilation of a mother wavelet function is not a suitable approach. Furthermore,
since the samples’ locations are not known a-priori, it may be impossible to fully specify the
transformation.
The second-generation wavelet transform can overcome these limitations, thanks to their ap-
proach of defining the wavelet filters while performing the wavelet transform. Originally, this
approach was exploited to improve the implementation of the discrete wavelet transform and
found its first realisation with the Lifting scheme.
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The Lifting scheme is made of three steps: 1) Deinterleave the input digital stream into even
and odd stream. 2) Predict the odd stream through the even stream. 3) Update the even
sample through the prediction. This step would serve for the next prediction, if any.
The lifting scheme has several advantages compared to the classical implementation of wavelet
transform (i.e., with filters designed in the frequency domain). However, the interest to-
wards second-generation wavelet transform is mainly in its extension to non-uniformly sampled
discrete-time signal. This is possible since the prediction step is compatible with techniques such
as interpolation and regression which do not require the input signal to be uniformly-sampled.
In [JNS01], a nearest-neighbour prediction is used to realise a second-generation discrete wavelet
transform for non-uniformly sampled discrete-time signal. The approach of making predictions
based on a set of nearest neighbours makes the technique also applicable to signals with multi-
dimensional domains.
The wavelet transform in [JNS01] is a discrete wavelet transform1, since the scales and trans-
lations are fixed. For the goal of measurements inspection, however, it is important to analyse
arbitrary scales, e.g. to isolate phenomena that occur at specific scales such as events, and
arbitrary translations, e.g. to identify edges. Hence, a more suitable approach is a second-
generation continuous wavelet transform (SGCWT), which was introduced in [KF06].
Second-Generation ContinuousWavelet Transform In Section 6.1 the Nadaraya-Watson
estimator has been presented as a regression tool that adapts to scenarios where the measure-
ments distribution can highly change, which is the case when events with variable pattern
occur.
It is just this tool that forms the basis of the SGCWT, working similarly to the predict step in
the lifting scheme. Nevertheless, the SGCWT, is not defined through the lifting scheme, which
is intended for the discrete transform, but through a data-dependent wavelet basis function:
1Not to be confused with discrete-time wavelet transform. A discrete-time wavelet transform can be either
discrete or continuous.
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Ψs,τ (t) =
e−(
t−τ
s
)2/2∑
t∈Ωt e
−( t−τ
s
)2/2
− e
−( t−τ
βs
)2/2∑
t∈Ωt e
−( t−τ
βs
)2/2
(6.5)
The result corresponds to a second-generation variant of the “Difference-of-Gaussians” wavelet,
where s acquires the meaning of the wavelet scale and τ becomes the translation term.
The SGCWT is finally obtained with the formula:
(Twavx)(s, τ) =
1
hτ (s)
∑
t∈Ωt
[Ψs,τ (t)x(t)] (6.6)
where
hτ (s) =
√∑
t∈Ωt
[Ψs,τ (t)]2 (6.7)
Compared to the first-generation CWT in 6.4, the SGCWT has an explicit dependence on the
samples’ locations in time, which compose the set Ωt. Moreover, the result of the wavelet-
based filtering is divided by hτ (s) rather than by
√
s. Since hτ (s) varies with each scale and
translation, the SGCWT coincides with the application of a set of band-pass filters, which is
divided by a signal depending on the set of scales and translations.
From this consideration, the asymptotic computational complexity can be quickly derived. If
the number of scales and translations of interest are Ns and Nτ respectively, the computational
complexity is that of applying Ns Nτ -long filters to N -long non-uniform time series. Tackling
the problem with Non-Uniform Fast Fourier Transform, the asymptotic complexity for each
desired scale can be as low as O(Nτ log(Nτ ))−Nln(), where  is the accuracy of the transform
[DS99].
Transition to Space Domains The wavelet transform also has several applications in the
spatial domain. The most widespread application is probably image processing and steganalysis
[CS05; LF06; Sut+07], but more recently it has been applied in other fields, such as geogra-
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phy [Bis14] and biology [KF06]. In the field of measurements analysis in WSNs, the wavelet
transform has been previously applied only in the temporal domain and in its discrete form
[SLM13]. Rather than detecting malicious data injections, the objective in [SLM13] is to build a
fault-resistant event-detection algorithm, based on the observation that the wavelet coefficients
at the lowest scale fluctuate more in the presence of events. Nevertheless, this technique would
not prevent an attacker from injecting malicious data whilst staying undetected. Instead, we
run the wavelet analysis in the spatial domain, that cannot be completely taken over with a
limited number of malicious sensors. In the spatial domain, we learn the relationship between
wavelet coefficients at different spatial scales, which characterises genuine events.
The equation of the mother wavelet, which in time corresponds to (6.5), in the spatial domain
becomes:
Ψs,τ =
e−(
|v−τ |
s
)2/2∑
u∈Ω e
−( |u−τ |
s
)2/2
− e
−( |v−τ |
βs
)2/2∑
u∈Ω e
−( |u−τ |
βs
)2/2
(6.8)
And the equation of the wavelet transform (6.6) becomes:
(Twavxt)(s, τ ) =
1
hτ (s)
∑
v∈Ω
[Ψs,τ (v)xt(v)] (6.9)
where
hτ (s) =
√∑
u∈Ω
[Ψs,τ (u)]2 (6.10)
For β > 1, the second Gaussian is wider and more flat than the first, or in other words,
the first emphasises more τ ’s neighbourhood. Their subtraction emphasises changes in the
measurements that happen around τ and stabilise thereafter. The parameter β controls the
wavelet’s band-pass characteristics and is fixed to 1.87, i.e. the value that makes 1/s the
dominant scale of analysis [KF06].
The term hτ (s) in (6.10) coincides with the standard deviation of the wavelet coefficient
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(Twavxt)(s, τ ) when xt is white Gaussian noise, hence we refer to this term as standardisa-
tion factor. For convenience, we also introduce the non-standardised version of the wavelet
transform, i.e.
(Twavns xt)(s, τ ) =
∑
v∈Ω
[Ψs,τ (x)xt(v)] = (T
wavxt)(s, τ )hτ (s) (6.11)
This is to estimate a signal’s energy at a certain scale. Indeed, division by the standardisation
factor transforms a wavelet coefficient into a Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR), which is scale and
translation independent, but cannot be used for estimating the signal’s energy. The relation-
ship between the low scale coefficients and the energy of the higher scale coefficients of the
measurements signal is the cross-scale relationship that enables the detection of malicious data
injections. Different signals, deployments and environments introduce different relationships,
hence we learn this relationship with the method described in the next section.
6.3 From Pairwise to Cross-Scale Measurements Correla-
tion
The estimate given by the Nadaraya-Watson estimator is not reliable when malicious inter-
ference can occur, which can highly bias it. However, the wavelet transform defined above,
uses such an estimator to extract the changes in the measurements, which may also be due
to malicious interference, and at multiple granularities. Our observation is that the attacker
cannot introduce arbitrary changes in the measurements at two scales at the same time because
there are some cross-scale relationships to respect. In particular considering a low scale and a
set of higher scales, the low scale coefficients, which capture the behaviour of the individual
sensors or small groups of them, need to be acceptable when contextualised in the behaviour
of larger sets of sensors, which is summarised by the higher scale coefficients.
The events’ are the main variable that governs the higher scale coefficients, as the spatial
propagation of the event induces a spatial trend in the measurements. Such a trend is best
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observable at scale se, the scale where (Twavxt)(s, τe) is maximum, with τe being the event’s
central location. The events’ effect is also observable in transitions with small granularity,
corresponding to a scale comparable to the average inter-sensor distance: sl. For instance,
in the case of wildfires, a large high scale coefficient will be observable in the area of the
fire’s breakout point, whereas a set of large low scale coefficients will be observed around the
transitioning points, such as the boundaries of the fire. We observe that the relationship
between coefficients at scales se and sl is altered by malicious data injections, in consequence
of the trade-off between two goals that a sophisticated attacker has: 1) noticeably change the
measurements and 2) staying undetected.
If the attacker puts more effort into the first goal, the signal changes will be more abrupt and
less supported by the malicious sensors’ neighbours. The coefficients at low scale are thus large
compared to higher scales. For example, the high scale coefficients of the spoofed event in Fig.
6.3 are comparable to those of the genuine event in Fig. 6.2, but the coefficients at low scale
are larger in the malicious scenario, because there is a gap between genuine rest measurements
and false event measurements.
(a) Coefficients at scale sl (b) Coefficients at scale 4sl
Figure 6.2: CWT of a genuine event.
(a) Coefficients at scale sl (b) Coefficients at scale 4sl
Figure 6.3: CWT coefficients of a spoofed event with larger low scale coefficients than the
genuine event.
If the attacker puts more effort into the second goal, the gap between genuine and malicious
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measurements is reduced, and so are the low scale coefficients in turn. However, as shown in
Fig. 6.4, a spoofed event with low scale coefficients as small as the genuine event in Fig. 6.2,
also has smaller high scale coefficients than the same genuine event.
(a) Coefficients at scale sl (b) Coefficients at scale 4sl
Figure 6.4: CWT coefficients of a spoofed event with smaller high scale coefficients than the
genuine event.
Ultimately, the chance of staying undetected needs to be traded with significant changes in the
measurements if the cross-scale relationship is guaranteed.
6.4 Methodology
The methodology of the previous chapter was focused at making a set of application-specific
choices which tailored the main algorithms to the specific context, e.g., calculation of the
expected degree of correlation, choice of how the events affect correlations, adjustments in the
anomaly detection test etc. In the new methodology, whose full flow chart is summarised in Fig.
6.5, it is the algorithms themselves which contextualise the information with the application,
thus the initialisation part now only calculates the models that quantify the ranges of low scale
coefficients that can be accepted for a given set of high scale coefficients. Moreover, the new
methodology adds a group-wise analysis for characterisation, and the new diagnosis step. In
the remainder of this section we analyse each step in detail.
The first step is the detection of anomalies in the measurements. We divide the measurements
into groups, characterised by a common behaviour (e.g. caused by the same underlying event).
Therefore, we compute for each group an anomaly score based on the deviation from the cross-
scale relationship that was learnt. This step is based on application of the wavelet transform
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and analysis of the relationship between the coefficients at different scales (Sect. 6.4.1).
Detecting an anomaly is generally not sufficient to identify the anomalous sensors. The second
step, which we refer to as characterisation, identifies the anomalous sensors and determines if
they have ELICITED or MASKED events. Identification of anomalous sensors is complex in the
presence of collusion because malicious measurements can correlate well between themselves.
Hence, we first identify groups of sensors with highly correlated measurements (Sect. 6.6.1).
Then, measurement anomalies are translated into group anomaly scores, which are used to
identify anomalous groups (Sect. 6.6.2). The general behaviour of the measurements in the
anomalous group unveils if the anomalous measurements have elicited or masked events (Sect.
6.6.3). This, in turn, enables us to link back the group-wise anomaly to the individual sensors
(Sect. 6.6.4).
The presence of anomalies does not imply the presence of malicious data injections since anoma-
lies may be caused by other phenomena, such as genuine faults. For this reason, we further
evaluate the properties of the measurements to distinguish, among other, faulty and maliciously
compromised sensors. We refer to the task of ascribing the detected anomaly to a particular
category as diagnosis (Sect. 6.7).
In the remaining of this chapter, we present the novel methods that deal with the tasks described
above. We start from the preliminary analysis that enables the detection task, i.e. learning the
cross-scale correlation models, then we move to the detection task itself, to the characterisation
of compromised sensors, and finally to the diagnosis of faulty or malicious interference.
6.4.1 Learning The Events’ Spatial Cross-Scale Relationships
To detect anomalous cross-scale relationships in the measurements, we learn their normal char-
acteristics from historical data, which corresponds to learning the diffusion patterns of the
underlying physical phenomenon. A possible alternative is to modelled the cross-scale relation-
ships a priori, but this would be hindered by the effects of noise and environment, which are
difficult to quantify. Moreover, the requirement of a model for each WSN application compli-
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Calculate anomaly score.
Compute maximum
1st step: Detection
Compare maximum anomaly
score to threshold Pass
≤ Threshold
Group all locations into areas.
Calculate group anomaly score.
Identify anomalous groups
2nd step: Characterisation > Threshold
For each anomalous group
Decide effect of anomaly:
ELICITED or MASKED
Identify anomalous sensors
Classify anomalous sensors
as malicious or faulty
3rd step: Diagnosis
Figure 6.5: Methodology scheme.
cates the technique’s deployment and introduces an additional point of failure: the accuracy of
the model.
A requirement for learning the cross-scale relationship is that the historical data is a good
representation of the measurement distribution. In particular the spatial frequencies that can
be observed in the physical phenomenon need to be present in the historical data, especially
under the presence of events. In some cases historical data may be difficult to observe, e.g.
when events are particularly rare, so we may revert to simulations of the effect of events on
the measurements to build a synthetic historical dataset. Moreover, the cross-scale relationship
varies in time, under the most general scenario. In this case the learning phase may be ad-
dressed with incremental updates. However, a high confidence should be be guaranteed in the
genuineness of the data used for the updates (e.g. by manually inspecting the data), otherwise
an attacker may seek to bias the cross-scale correlation model to take advantage of it.
Since cross-scale relationships arise from spatial correlation, the historical data should consist
of snapshots in time of the measurements reported by each sensor. Such snapshots should arise
from different event scenarios, hence we split the measurements time series into time windows
120 Chapter 6. Securing Multiple Events with Variable Patterns
where there are no events, one event, two events, etc. Afterwards, we take one representative
time sample from that window, which is the sample where events are most noticeable if any,
or a random sample if there is no event. We refer to a specific time snapshot selected with
this criterion as historical signal. Historical signals are transformed through the CWT and the
relationship between low scale and high scale coefficients is learnt with Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 Cross-scale relationship fitting
Require: historicalSignals, sensors
Ensure: xScaleModel
1: lst=[] {low scale term}
2: hst=[] {high scale term}
3: for all Xt ∈ historicalSignals do
4: (TwavXt) = CWT(Xt)
5: for all τ ∈ T do
6: Eτ =
∑
s∈Hs
∑
τCOI∈COIs,τ [(T
wav
ns Xt)(s, τCOI)]
2
7: hst.append(Eτ )
8: lst.append((TwavXt)(sl, τ ))
9: end for
10: end for
11: maxLs=modelFit(hst,lst)
12: return maxLs
Each historical signal is transformed with the CWT (line 4), and the contribution of higher
scale coefficients is calculated by the quantity Eτ (line 6), reported below.
Eτ =
∑
s∈Hs
∑
τCOI∈COIs,τ
[(Twavns Xt)(s, τCOI)]
2 (6.12)
We refer to such term as energy index, since it is related to the energy of the signal after
isolating it in both space and frequency.
Spatial isolation is achieved by considering a set of spatial locations τ ∈ T , where T is a multi-
dimensional grid. The distance between two consecutive translations equals the average distance
between a sensor and its closest neighbour, in order to approximate the non-uniformly spaced
WSN with its closest uniformly spaced correspondent. The choice of a grid for the translations
allows us to make the energy index spatially consistent. Indeed, the energy index is calculated
at line 6 as the sum of the contributions at the higher scale within the wavelet coefficient’s
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Cone Of Influence (COI), defined as the area with a distance from τ less than the one where
the boundary effects of the wavelet basis function start to be noticeable. Specifically for the
wavelet transform defined in (6.9), the COI is centered in τ and has a radius of approximately
s spatial units [KF06].
Frequency isolation of the energy index is achieved by summing only a set of higher scales Hs,
which are higher than sl. The value chosen for sl is half of the average inter-sensor distance,
corresponding to the highest observable frequency in the space of translations T . The higher
scales, instead, are selected to have little overlap with the low scale sl, i.e. the function in (6.8)
for s = sl should have a frequency spectrum which is approximately disjoint from that of the
functions with s ∈ Hs.
The function maxLs is learnt with a model fitting technique. We divide the energy indices into
consecutive intervals, filter out obvious outliers, and return the maximum among the low scale
coefficients in such interval. The intervals are individuated with a simple and effective criterion,
which sorts the data by ascending energy index, and iteratively produces a new interval as soon
as a new maximum is found. Note that different models are learnt for positive and negative low
scale coefficients, since they generally have different distributions as the wavelet basis function
is not symmetric with respect to the origin. With the models available, the measurements can
be tested for anomalies, as explained in the next section.
6.5 Detection
The models calculated with the steps described enable the comparison of low scale coefficients
with high scale coefficients. We define the ratio between a low scale coefficient and its maximum
acceptable value as anomaly score (A), calculated as:
A(τ ) = |(TwavXt)(sl, τ )|/maxLs(E) (6.13)
Where τ is the location of sensor x. Algorithm 6.13 shows that the model relating low scale
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and high scale coefficients needs to return the maximum acceptable low scale coefficient, given
the input high scale coefficients’ energy. The final step of detection consists in checking:
MAXτ∈TA(τ ) > Td (6.14)
If this condition holds, anomalies are present. The threshold Td should be set according to the
acceptable false positives. If the measurements used to learn the cross-scale relationship are
a good representation of the whole measurements distribution, Td = 1 ensures a false positive
rate equal to zero (if outliers were filtered out during model fitting, it will be equal to the
outlier rate). The real false positive rate may be higher if the dataset does not represent the
data distribution well. In this case, a reliable false positive rate can be estimated empirically
as shown in Sect. 7.2.5 to select the threshold that gives the most appropriate TPR/FPR
combination. Such procedure may be repeated when new data, that does not comply with
the current data distribution, is collected. At this point, the anomalous sensors need to be
identified through the characterisation step shown in Sect. 6.6.
6.5.1 Computational complexity
In WSNs, the computational complexity is important as the sensor nodes have low computa-
tional capabilities and highly demanding calculations cause battery depletion.
Nevertheless, the algorithm that we introduced may be run from the system that analyses the
measurements and takes appropriate reactions, e.g. the base station or a remote server. Such
devices generally have less computational constraints as they are in charge of complex tasks.
Beyond the computational burden, reacting promptly to malicious data is also important. Note
that the detection test in (6.14) is always run, while the characterisation and diagnosis comes
into play only when detection triggers. Hence, we report below the analysis of the asymptotic
computational complexity for the detection step:
• Merging the measurements from N sensors in a time window with size W : O(WN)
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• Calculating the wavelet coefficients at Ns scales and Nτ translations: O(SNτ log(Nτ ) −
SNln2()), where  is the desired accuracy for the wavelet coefficients [DS99].
• Estimating the energy of the high scale coefficients: O(SNτ log(N)) , i.e. the complexity
of a convolution of the coefficients at a specific scale and the COI mask.
• Calculating the maximum admissible low scale coefficients: O(Nτ )
• Testing the admissibility of each low scale coefficient: O(Nτ )
The total cost of detection is then O(WN + SNτ log(Nτ )− SNln2()).
6.6 Characterisation of Anomalies: Effects and Responsi-
ble Sensors
When detection triggers, we know that there are anomalies in the measurements but, at this
stage, the responsible sensors are unknown. Without an accurate analysis, it is likely that we
will confuse malicious sensors with genuine sensors and vice versa. For instance, if a set of
malicious sensors collude and surround a genuine sensor, they can make it look responsible for
the anomaly introduced.
Moreover, the points where the cross-scale relationship is not respected do not necessarily
characterise the area where the malicious sensors lie. Indeed, these points testify only of a
disruption in the cross-scale relationship, but either the low scale, or the high scale coefficients,
or both, may have been altered. Tracing back the anomalous measurements requires further
analyses, which constitute the characterisation phase.
Our approach to this problem is to make a group-wise analysis of conflicts between sensors,
where sensors belong to the same group if their measurements are correlated. In this way, a
genuine sensor is not judged individually and making it look responsible for the anomaly is
harder for colluding sensors. The first requirement is thus to identify groups of sensors with
correlated measurements, and then move from sensor-wise to group-wise anomaly analysis.
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6.6.1 Sensor Grouping
When malicious measurements are correlated because of collusion, an anomaly may be evident
only where malicious sensors are close to genuine ones. However, when a sensor’s measurement
disrupts correlations, the responsibility is shared among the sensors with the same behaviour,
which is defined with respect to the events being sensed.
Events can be identified thanks to the wavelet coefficients: wherever there is an event, there is a
peak in the wavelet coefficients at scale se and translation τ , which respectively characterise the
spread of the event, and its centre (akin to the centre of mass and not necessarily its geometrical
centre). Algorithm 6 identifies events peaks with a ridge lines-based peak detection algorithm
(lines 1-3). It is a variant of the algorithm described in [DKL06], which in addition considers
2-dimensional spaces and extracts the peak scale, defined as the scale with the maximum
coefficient in the ridge line. At such a scale the main characteristics of the event can be
captured, for instance if it has an increasing or decreasing trend.
Ridge lines are sets of n-dimensional points that are local maxima with respect to at least one
dimension. In [DKL06] the dimensions considered are the wavelet scale and translation and
ridge lines connect local maxima translations across consecutive scales. Local maxima are, by
nature, not well defined since they depend on the degree of "locality". In our case, the smallest
degree of locality is the distance between neighbouring sensors. To consider also higher degrees
of locality, at line 7 we merge together two of such maxima that are within a certain distance
(maxd) and instead assign the points to different ridge lines if such distance is overcome.
If a point is associated with a long ridge line, i.e. it is a local maximum at many scales, it is
more likely to be a true peak compared with a point within a short ridge line. Indeed, being
a local maximum with respect to more scales indicates that the increase around that point is
not transitory. For this reason, ridge lines shorter than minl are filtered out by the function
filterRidgeLines at line 14.
The parameters maxd and minl respectively represent the maximum distance between local
maxima and the minimum length of ridge lines. There are well known heuristics for choosing
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Algorithm 6 getEventsPeaks
Require: (TwavXt)(s, τ ), maxd
Ensure: eventsPeaks
1: for all s ∈ sl, ..., sm do {sm is the maximum distance between two sensors}
2: relExtrema[s]={ τ : (T
wavXt)(s, τ ) > (T
wavXt)(s, τi)
∀τi : ||τ − τi|| = minj(||τj − τi||) }
3: end for
ridgeLines=relExtrema[smax]
4: for all s ∈ sm − 1, ..., sl do
5: for all rE ∈ relExtrema[s] do
6: closestRidgeLine=findClosest(ridgeLines, rE)
7: if distance(closestRidgeLine,rE)< maxd then
8: closestRidgeLine.append(rE)
9: else
10: ridgeLines.append(rE)
11: end if
12: end for
13: end for
14: filteredRidgeLines = filterRidgeLines(ridgeLines,minl)
15: for all rL ∈ filteredRidgeLines do
16: peakIndex = argmax(rL)
17: eventPeak.s=s(rL(peakIndex))
18: eventPeak.loc=τ (rL(peakIndex))
19: eventsPeaks.append(eventPeak)
20: end for
21: return eventsPeaks
such parameters [DKL06], which have proven to give satisfactory results in our experiments.
After detecting peaks, each sensor is assigned to a group with Algorithm 7. For each identified
peak, a sensor is assigned to the closest group where the sign of the coefficients at the peak and
sensor’s location coincide (line 8). Indeed, if the sign is discordant, the sensor’s measurements
do not follow the event trend. Finally, the groups are labelled (line 15): in this phase, contiguous
sets of sensors belonging to the same group are given a common label. An example of the result
of the grouping procedure is shown in Fig. 6.6.
6.6.2 Identification of Conflicts Between Groups
The locations where the anomaly score is high indicate the presence of a conflict between sensors
in that area. A conflict arises when the measurements from different sensors originate from
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Algorithm 7 getSensorsGroups
Require: (TwavXt)(s, τ ), eventsPeaks
Ensure: sensorsGroups
1: GroupsMap(τ ) = 0 ∀τ ∈ T
2: for all τ : τ ∈ T do
3: sortedEPindices=argsort(distance(eventsPeaks,τ ))
4: grouped = False
5: peakIndex=1
6: while not(grouped) and peakIndex ≤ length(eventsPeaks) do
7: eP=eventsPeaks(sortedEPindices)(peakIndex)
8: if (TwavXt)(eP.s, eP.loc) · (TwavXt)(eP.s, τ ) > 0 then
9: GroupsMap[τ ]=peakIndex
10: grouped=True
11: end if
12: peakIndex= peakIndex+1
13: end while
14: end for
15: sensorsGroups=label(GroupsMap)
16: return sensorsGroups
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Figure 6.6: Grouping Effect Example. Sensors are sorted into five groups; in particular the
green group contains a genuine event, while the brown group a spoofed event. A white "A"
represents the condition A(τ )> Tc.
incompatible factors, for instance a real event and a spoofed event.
The remaining task for characterisation is to identify conflicting groups, and thereby the sensors
that caused the conflicts. Since high anomaly scores indicate the presence of disruptions in
correlation, a conflict is registered for the two areas that are the closest to each anomalous
location. This step is summarised in lines 2-9 of Algorithm 8.
During characterisation, the anomaly score is compared to the threshold Tc, which differs from
the detection threshold Td to find the trade off between the costs of acquiring malicious data
and of losing genuine sensors. The value of Tc should decrease with the former and increase
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Algorithm 8 findAnomalousGroups
Require: groups, A(x),Tc
Ensure: Ag {Anomalous groups}
1: Conflicts(g1,g2) = 0 ∀ g1,g2 ∈ groups {Initialise group conflicts}
2: for all τ : τ ∈ sensors do
3: if A(τ )> Tc then
4: g1= argming∈groups(dist(τ , g))
5: g2= argming∈groups,g 6=g1(dist(τ , g))
6: Conflicts(g1,g2) = Conflicts(g1,g2)+1
7: Conflicts(g2,g1) = Conflicts(g2,g1)+1
8: end if
9: end for
10: Ag={}
11: GA(g)=0 ∀g ∈ groups {Initialise group anomaly score}
12: while
∑
gi∈groups
∑
gj∈groupsConflicts(gi, gj) > 0 do
13: for all gi ∈ groups do
14: GA(gi) =
∑
gj∈groups |gj|Conflicts(gi, gj)
15: end for
16: ag = g: GA(g) = MAX(GA)
17: Ag.append(ag)
18: Conflicts(ag,g) = Conflicts(g,ag) = 0 ∀g ∈ groups
19: end while
20: return Ag
with the latter and its choice, like for Td, can be done experimentally as shown in section Sect.
7.2.5. In Figure 6.6b, the locations where A(τ )> Tc are marked with an "A". Since in both
cases the closest groups are the green and the brown group, two conflicts are registered between
these two groups.
The next step, corresponding to lines 13-15, makes a transition from location-wise to group-wise
anomalies. Each group is assigned an anomaly score equal to the sum of conflicts multiplied by
the size of the conflicting groups. The sum reflects the confidence increase in the incompatibility
between the two groups when more conflicts are observed. Instead, the multiplication by the
conflicting group size ensures the selection of the most likely scenario, under the assumption
that the prior probability of having C anomalous sensors decreases as C increases. This is a
consequence of the increase in attack’s cost with the number of sensors to compromise. In the
example of Fig. 6.6b, the brown group would correctly be blamed for the anomalies since it
has fewer sensors than the green group with which is conflicting.
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Finally, the group with the maximum anomaly score is added to the collection of anomalous
groups and the procedure is reiterated until all conflicts disappear. Indeed, the malicious sensors
may be divided into several groups, since they could act according to different behaviours.
6.6.3 Identification of the Effects of Anomalies
Having collected the anomalous groups, the first characterisation task can be completed, i.e.
identification of the effects of anomalies. We characterise each anomalous group as an eliciting
or a masking group if the measurements have been likely increased or decreased respectively.
This information can be extracted through the wavelet transform. Indeed, the transformed co-
efficients are positive or negative corresponding to increases and decreases of the measurements
values respectively. Note that this information is scale-specific. So, for instance, transitory
decreases within general increases produce negative coefficients at lower scales and positive
coefficients at higher scales.
Since the sign of the local maximum associated with the group indicates the generic trend of
the sensors within the group, the measurements were elicited or masked if the sign of the local
maximum is positive or negative respectively.
6.6.4 Identification of anomalous sensors
The last step of characterisation is moving from anomalous groups to anomalous sensors with
the steps described in Algorithm 9. This consists of a filtering operation that keeps only the
group locations where the low scale coefficients are positive/negative if the group was marked
as ELICITED, or MASKED respectively.
Indeed, given an anomalous group of sensors that is marked as ELICITED, the sensors that
are most likely responsible for the anomaly are those whose measurements increase is more
remarkable, i.e. those where the low scale coefficients are positive and high. Instead, the
sensors where the low scale coefficients are negative and low may be genuine sensors that at
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Algorithm 9 characteriseAnomalousSensors
Require: Ag
Ensure: As
1: As = {}
2: for all ag ∈ Ag do
3: for all τ ∈ ag do
4: if group.effect = ELICITED then
5: Asg = {τ : τ ∈ ag, (TwavXt)(sl, τ ) > 0}
6: else {group.effect = MASKED}
7: Asg = {τ : τ ∈ ag, (TwavXt)(sl, τ ) < 0}
8: end if
9: As = As ∪ Asg
10: end for
11: end for
higher scale appear as eliciting just because of the effect of their anomalous neighbours. A dual
reasoning holds when a group is marked as MASKED.
6.7 Diagnosis of Anomalies: Faulty or Malicious?
After the characterisation step, each sensor is classified as anomalous or normal. However,
anomalies could be explained by either: 1. Single-point failures 2. Common-mode failures 3.Ma-
licious data injections.
Since the characteristics of malicious data injections are arbitrary and cannot be modelled, the
means by which anomalies can be linked to malicious interference is by exclusion: the char-
acteristics of both single-point failures and common-mode failures are modelled and inspected
as described below. If they match the data being analysed, then a diagnosis of single fault or
group fault is inferred.
If both can be excluded, then we are most likely in the case of malicious interference. In the
following, we describe the procedures to diagnose faulty behaviours.
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6.7.1 Single faults
By single faults, we mean the presence of genuine alterations in the measurements that trigger
a single-point failure, i.e. impair the measurements of one particular sensor.
Single-point failures are characterised by large low-scale coefficients, since the measurements of
a faulty sensor and its neighbours broadly differ. However, just as for malicious data, this is not
matched by adequate high scale trends. Differently from colluding malicious measurements2,
faulty measurements are independent from those of other sensors. For instance, in the presence
of an event, the measurements of a faulty sensor may not be affected.
To detect measurements arising from a different distribution, we use the median absolute devia-
tion (MAD) outlier detection, which is known as an outlier-resistant outlier detection technique
[AH15], since the centre of the distribution is estimated with the median (which is not affected
by extreme values) and the variation of the distribution is estimated with the median distance
from the median (which is not affected by extreme variations). The single fault diagnosis
procedure is summarised in Algorithm 10.
The method is based on the modified z-score [Cro94]: a robust variant of the z-score, which
instead quantifies the distance from the mean, normalised by the standard deviation. Similarly,
the modified z-score identifies as outliers the samples with a low probability of occurrence. The
threshold Tsf regulates the cutoff probability. In [Cro94], the suggested threshold is 3.5, but a
higher value may be preferred to reduce the false positives further.
Single faults are identified when the threshold is crossed. Afterwards, the characterisation phase
should be repeated to check the presence of also non-faulty anomalies and cope with the case
where faulty sensors coexist with malicious sensors in the same group.
2Note that non-colluding malicious data injections may show such characteristics. In this case, single faults
require more specific analyses, such as fault statistics or fault characterisation (as described in Sect 6.8).
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Algorithm 10 diagnoseSingleFaults
Require: group, Tsf
Ensure: singleFaultsDiagnosis
1: lc = (TwavXt)(sl, τ )
2: for all x ∈ group.sensorsLocations do
3: if A(τ ) > Td then
4: lcτ=(TwavXt)(sl, τ )
5: lcCOI(τ )= (TwavXt)(sl, τy)∀τy ∈ COI(se, τ )
6: l˜cCOI(τ )=median(lcCOI(τ ))
7: ∆lcCOI(τ )=|lcCOI(τ ) − l˜cCOI(τ )|
8: MAD(lcCOI(τ ))=median(∆lcCOI(τ ))
9: z˜(τ )=0.6745 ∆lcCOI(τ)
MAD(lcCOI(τ))
{The factor 0.6745 converts from MAD to standard deviation
when the data are normally distributed.}
10: if z˜(τ ) > Tsf then
11: return True
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
15: return False
6.7.2 Group Faults
Group faults include alterations of the measurements that originate from non-malicious faults,
involve more than one sensor, and introduce a common-mode failure, i.e. the fault’s effect is
similar among all the sensors. The key characteristic for diagnosing common mode failures
relies just in this observation: the anomalous sensors produce similar measurements, without
the typical gradual changes of real events, and of eliciting and masking attempts in turn.
Algorithm 11 summarises the diagnosis of group faults. The similarity of anomalous measure-
ments is evaluated with a statistical operator, known as coefficient of variation (CV), which is
defined as standard deviation divided by sample mean. The act of normalising by the mean
enables us to compute a relative variability, that is not affected by the samples’ magnitude.
Algorithm 11 diagnoseGroupFaults
Require: Asg, S(τ )τ ∈ Asg, Tgf
Ensure: groupFaultDiagnosis
1: cˆv =
std(S(τ )τ∈Asg)
mean(S(τ )τ∈Asg)
2: return |cˆv| < Tgf
The CV is compared to a threshold Tgf which should be set according to the model of common
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mode failures. For instance, if the measurements of sensors subject to common mode failures
are expected to differ only by noise, the threshold should be equal to the relative variation
brought in by noise, i.e. the noise to signal ratio (inverse of SNR).
6.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have focused on detecting malicious data injections in WSNs when one or
more events can occur, causing a loss in correlation that is exploited by colluding compromised
sensors. We have proposed a novel methodology to detect malicious data injections, based on
the measurements cross-scale relationship analysed through the wavelet transform.
Since detecting anomalies in the measurements is not sufficient to effectively counteract them,
we have also provided an approach to characterise malicious colluding nodes, by partitioning
the sensor nodes based on the correlation between their measurements. This approach con-
siders the effects of events, hence it is able to detect groups of sensors that elicit or mask
events. Finally, we provided a novel measurements-based diagnosis technique to distinguish
fault-induced anomalies from malicious anomalies. Indeed, genuine faults may also introduce
anomalies, as the measurements from faulty sensors do not correlate with those of healthy ones.
This may lead to the wrong conclusion that there was an attack, but by classifying the main
characteristics of genuine faults we were able to infer when the anomaly is most likely malicious.
To validate the effectiveness of the new techniques we will follow systematic approaches which
are the state-of-the-art in the field of adversarial machine learning. Indeed, rather than con-
structing by hand ad-hoc attacks, which are not necessarily sophisticated and so cannot be
used as a reliable indicator for the system’s robustness, we build automatic evaluations that
seek to maximise the attacker’s exploitation of its resources towards the goals of subverting
event detection and staying undetected. In the next chapter we introduce the field of adver-
sarial machine learning and two families of attacks belonging to this field, i.e. mimicry and
evasion attacks. Then, we evaluate the techniques presented in this chapter with both ap-
proaches and obtain information about the security level offered, and how this is influenced by
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the application, environment, and deployment.
Chapter 7
Robustness of Measurements Inspection
Detection of malicious data injections in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is difficult to val-
idate since they are not common yet or, at least, they are not easy to retrieve. Even if they
were common and easy to gather, malicious data can be injected in several different ways, with
different degrees of sophistication and different results on the detection algorithm.
For these reasons, most of work available in literature is tested against simulated attacks
[Sun+13; LCC07; Rez+13; Ata+08; Ban+10; OHC12; Bao+12; LC13] and injection of at-
tacks [TH06; CP07], which aim to reproduce some of the expected characteristics of the attack,
e.g. bias or high variance in the measurements. There are two main problems with this kind
of approach:
• Simulations define the attack steps a-priori. However, the attacker is an intelligent agent,
i.e. can observe parts of the WSN system, which may include the measurements inspection
algorithm, and adapt his strategy accordingly.
• Simulations define the attack steps probabilistically, i.e. having defined the steps to build
an attack, the specific attack is chosen at random. Instead the attacker generally seeks
to optimise the attack among all the feasible ones.
In summary, simulations produce attacks that are not significant as they do not model the
attacker as an active entity that seeks to stay undetected, and do not optimise the attack
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from the attacker’s perspective. These problems have been dealt with in adversarial machine
learning, which is briefly introduced below. After that, in this chapter we will evaluate the
wavelet-based algorithms using adversarial machine learning methods. In particular, we will
consider two different approaches which give the attacker a different trade-off between staying
undetected and causing damage to the system. We will refer to these approaches as mimicry
and worst-case attacks, which will be designed, implemented and used to quantitatively and
qualitatively estimate the reliability of measurements inspection against malicious data injec-
tions.
7.1 Adversarial Machine Learning and Exploratory Attacks
The emerging field of adversarial machine learning is concerned with the robustness and security
properties of machine learning algorithms and anomaly detection techniques. As described in
[Hua+11], according to the influence of the attacker, we can classify the attacks against machine
learning systems as causative and exploratory. In the first case, the attacker can modify the
behaviour of the system by injecting malicious points. In exploratory attacks, the attacker
cannot alter the behaviour of the system but attempts to circumvent the learning algorithm
by exploiting weaknesses or blind spots that allow him to craft malicious samples evading
detection.
In this chapter we aim to evaluate the approach described in the previous chapter with ex-
ploratory attacks. The reason for this choice is that the attacker’s influence on the learning
phases of the measurements inspection can be prevented by using only data that has been
thoroughly validated, e.g. with manual inspection. As we will see in the next sections, with the
wavelet-based algorithm it is sufficient to collect a few measurements snapshots under different
scenarios. In particular, Section 7.2.5 shows that with the order of 10 training snapshots the
algorithm is already operational, and with the order of 100 snapshots the results are highly
reliable.
In the context of security, exploratory attacks have been extensively studied for Intrusion
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Detection Systems (IDS) [FL06; GR06; MC03] and spam filtering applications [LM05a; WW04;
LS07; SWB06]. Despite the differences between the two applications, the approaches to evade
the anomaly detector rely on the same principle: exploiting the flaws in the selection of the
features used by the system by crafting malicious samples that add or delete features or by
encrypting malicious functionality so that the system does not recognize them as malicious
features (e.g. by substituting viagra by v1agra to craft a spam email).
In addition to distinguishing causative and exploratory attacks, Huang et al. also distinguish
targeted from indiscriminate attacks, i.e. attacks that seek to introduce an attack vector with
specific characteristics, or from a generic class respectively [Hua+11]. It is at this point that
our approach necessarily diverges from classical adversarial machine learning and extends it.
Indeed, even if we consider attacks that are indiscriminate with respect to the measurements
inspection algorithm, i.e. it is sufficient to stay undetected by any means, there are some
application-specific requirements, i.e. the event detection task needs to be impaired.
As staying undetected and impairing event detection are two conflicting goals, we identify
two different kinds of exploratory attacks: mimicry and evasion attacks. These prioritise
respectively the event impairment and being undetected. Each approach demands different
resources from the attacker and the results offer different kinds of information, as detailed
below.
The goal of mimicry attacks is to consider only significant impairments to the event detection
task, and then minimise the chance of being detected with a best-effort strategy, i.e. the attacker
will leverage all the resources in his control to avoid the detection from the measurements
inspection algorithm. This family of attacks is compatible with an attacker who does not know,
or has partial knowledge about the measurements inspection algorithm. Instead, he knows how
to cause damage to the event detection task, i.e. he knows, or has an estimate, of the effect
of the attack on the WSN system. Mimicry attacks consist of replaying data that has been
observed in the past, possibly after processing it to adapt it to the current context. Studying the
reaction of the system to mimicry attacks gives a measure of performance of the measurements
inspection algorithm. In particular, the results are good if the inter-measurements correlations
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are correctly captured, which is the only discriminant between genuine data collected in the
past and malicious data replayed in the future.
Evasion attacks operate from a dual perspective: they constrain the malicious data to pass the
measurements inspection detection, and optimise the malicious input. In this case, the attacker
needs to know the measurements inspection algorithm. The optimisation of the malicious data
can be intended with respect to both the attacker’s resources and the damage to the event
detection. Indeed, different eliciting or masking attacks cause different damage. However
the degree of damage connected with the spoofed and masked event is difficult to estimate
and is subject to arbitrary considerations. So, in this thesis, we constrain evasion attacks
to make a successful spoofing or masking, independently from their nature, and minimise
the resources needed by the attacker. This analysis evaluates the degree of resilience given
by the measurements inspection algorithm as a function of the application and deployment
configuration.
In the next section, we analyse in detail what is needed to implement mimicry and evasion
attacks. Then, we design the attacks accordingly and implement automatic attack genera-
tion tools. Finally, we analyse the result and obtain a reliable robustness evaluation for both
the wavelet-based measurements inspection algorithm and other state-of-the-art techniques for
comparison.
7.2 Robustness of Measurements Inspection Against Mimicry
Attacks
By mimicking data previously classified as genuine, mimicry attacks aim at threatening the very
structure of the anomaly detection algorithm. Clearly, not all mimicry attacks are threatening,
even if they keep the attack undetected. For instance, keeping the measurements under control
of the attacker unchanged is an edge case of mimicry attack: it stays undetected, unless there
is a false positive, but the measurements are not changed at all. Hence, when constructing
138 Chapter 7. Robustness of Measurements Inspection
meaningful mimicry attacks, it is necessary also to consider the relative risk in terms of potential
damage to the system.
In fact, it is likely that some data that was classified as genuine in the past, may cause significant
damage in the future, because of a change of context. In event detection WSNs, the most
relevant change of context occurs with the manifestation of events. Thus, injecting event
measurements (i.e. measurements that trigger event detection) in a rest condition and injecting
rest measurements (i.e. that do not trigger event detection) when an event is present are the
most threatening scenarios. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, other attacks are
possible such as eliciting an already present event, or partially masking an event to split it into
more events. Although the degree of damage of similar attacks may be lower, they are still
worthy of consideration since they could be easier to achieve. In summary, an attacker may
exploit the mimicry approach to get a wide range of possible attack vectors, which are more or
less difficult to contextualise in the current scenarios.
Since this approach does not imply knowledge about the anomaly detection algorithm, it is
generally not known in advance whether the constructed attack will be detected; however, the
chance of staying undetected will likely increase when reducing the context mismatch between
mimicked and current data. On the other hand, mimicry attacks are generic, i.e. valid for
different algorithms. Furthermore, since they are not tied to the vulnerabilities of the specific
algorithms, they can also be used as a fair benchmark tool.
To implement mimicry attacks, there are different problems to solve, which define how the
attacker may exploit his resources. Consistently with the attacker model introduced in Chapter
4, we assume that the attacker controls the measurements from a subset of sensors of his choice.
So, the choice of such sensors needs to be optimised. We also need to define how the data that
will be mimicked is selected, how it is adapted to the current context, and how the malicious
sensors coordinate themselves in the injection of the malicious data. These problems are covered
in the following sections. In addition, we provide an implementation of a test suite for the
automatic generation of mimicry attacks, apply it on WSN measurements, and conduct tests
and benchmarks on the wavelet-based algorithm.
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7.2.1 Collusion and Sensor Targeting Strategies
One important attacker’s resource, which makes a significant difference in the ability to stay un-
detected, is the capacity of coordinating the compromised sensors in the injection of malicious
measurements, which has been denoted with collusion. Without collusion, the resulting mea-
surements would likely appear anomalous. For example, if malicious seismic sensors are trying
to spoof an earthquake, they need to agree about the kind of earthquake that is being mim-
icked, otherwise they could produce remarkably different information about the earthquake’s
characteristics, e.g. epicentre and magnitude, and an anomaly may be be detected.
Moreover, since some malicious sensors are expected to share higher correlations with the
genuine sensors (e.g., they are closer), their injected measurements can diverge less from the
genuine counterpart. If this information is shared among all malicious sensors, then they could
all collaborate in keeping correlations consistent. Otherwise, if a malicious sensor needs to
solve the problem locally, e.g. keep correlations consistent with neighbouring sensors, even the
expected correlations between malicious sensors might not be respected.
The generic collusion strategy that we seek to implement consists of:
1. Making malicious measurements agree about the scenario to mimic.
2. Use some malicious measurements to mediate with genuine measurements.
Once the mimicked scenario has been agreed on, the malicious sensors will try to replicate it.
This task needs to be addressed with a subset of sensors. Since different subsets have different
expected inter-sensor correlations, a relevant impact on the chances of avoiding detection is
involved. Hence, we propose a sensor targeting strategy that gives priority to the sensors with
high expected correlations between themselves, and with low expected correlations with genuine
sensors. In practice, when genuine sensors have low expected correlations with malicious ones
it means that they do not have enough shared information to state that the scenarios depicted
by the malicious sensors diverge from reality.
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To transform the strategies discussed above into real attacks, there is the need to design and
implement an automatic tool, which we refer to as a test suite. In the next section we give an
outline of the challenges this tools is addressing and present its high-level architecture.
7.2.2 Test Suite Design
Essentially, mimicry attacks involve two problems: the selection of the data to mimic, and the
usage of the mimicked data. Likewise, the test suite will have two main components: one that
facilitates the selection, and another one that helps building the malicious data.
In similar measurements synthesis problems, the selection is uniformly random [ACS17]. Nev-
ertheless, a random selection would not guarantee the introduction of damage to the event
detection task. This problem arises in our particular context because the data distribution
can be seen as a mixture of different distributions, which characterise the measurements in
the presence of events. So it is important to separate the mixtures before applying a random
selection criterion.
So, the first step of our test suite is to classify historical data, as shown in the architecture
scheme in Figure 7.1. The historical data is analysed, organised into time batches, and labelled
as a member of one of the available collections. The labelling criterion reflects the presence and
properties of the events. Even though our architecture can cope with any event property that is
discriminative for the successful outcome of the attacks, we focus on the events’ cardinality. In
general, collection i will refer to measurements that were collected in the presence of i events.
This would be the correct choice when the WSN risk can be modelled as the number of events
that are incorrectly identified. Nevertheless, if other properties determine the risk, such as
the spread of the events, it is sufficient to classify the historical data also with respect to this
property. This step concludes the data structuring of the data to be mimicked. At this point,
the data synthesis phase can draw the basic data from structured historical data, modify it,
and use it to build the malicious data injections.
As we anticipated, the selection criterion for the measurements to mimic is based on the at-
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Mimicry Database
Data Structuring
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Malicious Data
Injections
Data Synthesis
Figure 7.1: Architecture of the algorithm
tacker’s goal, i.e. the number of events that need to be elicited or masked. Hence, the selection
step will draw a random test batch from Collection i where i is the number of events that
the attacker wishes to make detectable (e.g., it may be i=0 if the attack consists of silencing
all alarms, or i = 1 if the attack is to trigger a false event detection). The selected batch of
data cannot be used immediately to produce malicious data injections as multiple problems
are involved. One is the problem that the attacker controls only a subset of sensors, hence the
mapping can only be partial. Moreover, it is likely that the data needs to be relocated in space,
e.g. because producing the same event in the same location where it manifested in the past
may be suspicious, or because sensors are mobile. Finally, the most challenging task of mimicry
attacks is to take data which was collected under some circumstances and contextualise them in
the new circumstances. For example, if the application is that of CCTV, replacing the nightly
video stream of a subset of cameras with a daylight stream would create an evident context
mismatch. The combiner is the component of the synthesis step which addresses these central
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issues.
In the following sections we analyse in detail the problems involved in the data structuring and
synthesis phases and address them to make the test suite ready to be implemented.
7.2.3 Data Structuring
In the previous section, we concluded that, unlike other data mimicry problems, malicious data
injections have specific restrictions about the properties of the data to be mimicked, including
event-related information.
In general, we cannot assume that the attacker knows the event detection algorithm, and even
if that is the case, the event detection algorithm may not give information about the number
and location of the events but only about their presence. A generic algorithm event detection
algorithm will look for gravity points, e.g. areas in which there is an increase in vibrations,
in heart rate, in traffic etc., depending on the sensed phenomenon. This property holds true,
provided a measurements representation that makes the values’ magnitude an indicator of
the event, which is possible through a pre-processing stage, as shown in Section 5.6.3. The
practical implication of this reasoning, is that a generic event detection algorithm can look for
local maxima in space.
In this previous chapter, we concluded that the problem of finding local maxima is similar to
the identification of multi-scale trends. Indeed, a local maximum is a point where an increase
of measurements is observable and is persistent when looking at the data with different degrees
of granularity (otherwise the local maximum may just be the effect of noise). So, we introduced
Algorithm 6, a peak identification algorithm denoted with getEventsPeaks, which operates in
the domain of the wavelet coefficients and gives an array of events peaks as output. The latter
are data structures with two members: the event’s location and the scale where the peak is
most noticeable (related to the main frequency of the event signal).
The event-based classification of the historical data can make use of the getEventsPeaks func-
tion to identify the number of events and their location. However, this algorithm runs on an
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individual measurements snapshots, whereas the purpose of the classification is to collect the
whole event’s time evolution. In other words, we wish to classify a sequence of measurements
snapshots, which were defined as a snapshot sequence in Chapter 4. The event’s lifespan can be
characterised as the time between the point where at least one event manifests, and the point
where at least one event disappears. Hence, there is the need for an algorithm that keeps track
of the events’ evolution in time, detects changes in the events’ presence, and stores the start
and ending time instants of an event, together with the events’ location. Algorithm 12 deals
with these issues.
Algorithm 12 identifyEventBatches
Require: X(ti),∀ti
Ensure: E ,Emeta {Mimicry Database: classified snapshot sequences plus meta-data}
1: oldNEvents = −∞
2: for all ti do
3: (TwavXt)(s, τ )= CWT(Xt) {Continuous Wavelet Transform}
4: ePs = getEventsPeaks((TwavXt)(s, τ ))
5: nEvents=|ePs|
6: if oldNEvents 6= nEvents then
7: if oldNEvents > −∞ then
8: E(oldNEvents).append(Xtits)
9: for all eP ∈ ePs do
10: Emeta(oldNEvents).append(eP.loc) {eP.loc contains the peak’s location}
11: end for
12: end if
13: ts = ti {Initialise the starting instant of the next snapshot sequence}
14: oldNEvents = nEvents
15: end if
16: end for
17: return collections
The algorithm processes each time sample of historical data individually and sequentially. This
assumes that the historical data is made of consecutive time samples. Nevertheless, if this is not
the case it is sufficient to split the data into datasets where the time samples are consecutive.
For each time sample, the getEventsPeaks function applied to the data’s wavelet transform
(lines 3-4) retrieves the event’s related data, in particular their number and location. The
number of events is compared against the previous time instant, and if a change occurred the
current classification is terminated (lines 8-10) and a new event snapshot sequence is initiated
at the current time instant (line 13). The termination of the current classification consists of
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storing both the snapshot sequence – which contains the data relative to all the time instants
where the number of events has kept consistent – and its meta data. We refer to the union of
all classified snapshot sequences and their meta-data as the mimicry database.
In our case, the meta-data coincides with the events’ locations, which will be used during the
data synthesis phase. Algorithm 12 keeps the last location of the event but, in some applications,
the events’ locations may change significantly, so it may be more appropriate to track them at
multiple time instants. Similarly, in the synthesis phase we will use only the events’ locations
for selection of the data to mimic, but other properties may be of interest, such as the events’
scales (available as an output of the getEventsPeaks function), which enables the attacker to
select only the events with a spread that is presumably adequate to the attacker’s resources.
With the application of algorithm 12, the data structuring phase is complete, and the mimicry
attacks are ready to be built with the procedures that are presented in the next section.
7.2.4 Data Synthesis
The data structuring has enabled the automation of the mimicry attacks, since the data has
been organised from the perspective of the attack’s goals. In this way, it is sufficient to query
the mimicry database to retrieve the data to mimic. However, how the data needs to be
manipulated depends not only on the goal but also on the real data. Thus the selector block
in Fig. 7.1, is in charge of combing both the desired outcome and the current context to select
the basic data for the synthesis phase.
Selector
We have considered that the number of elicited and masked events is a fundamental metric
of the attack’s impact. So it is desirable to design mimicry attacks that satisfy a desired
number of elicited and masked attacks, which are denoted with the parameters ne and nm,
respectively. The starting point of the data synthesis is using such parameters to access the
mimicry database.
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In particular, if nm > 0, i.e. there are events to mask, the selector draws a random uniform
sample in the first collection, i.e. the collection where the measurements batches are free of
events. This holds true even if not all events are to be masked, since the measurements of the
events to keep will be left unchanged. If ne > 0, the selector draws a random uniform sample
from the ne-th collection, i.e. the collection where the measurements batches contain exactly
ne events. In some cases, such a collection may be empty, especially if it is unlikely that ne
simultaneous events will be observed. In that case, we run the whole synthesis procedure ne
times and draw the samples from the 1st collection.
In the cases where the attack includes both eliciting and masking, the whole synthesis procedure
will be repeated, giving priority to the masking, to avoid masking an elicited event.
The parameter ng is used to select the test batch from the historical dataset. In particular, the
batch is randomly selected within the collection ng to guarantee that the real number of events
is ng.
The parameters ne and ng operate on the historical dataset to select the injections batch from
a specific collection. If nm > 0, then a random batch of rest measurements is selected. If
ne = 1, a random batch of measurements from collection 1 is selected. If ne > 1 there are
two different possibilities instead: selecting one batch from collection ne or selecting ne batches
from collection 1.
The first solution has the advantage of producing more credible measurements: indeed when
multiple events are present they may interact with each other and produce measurements that
are not the simple juxtaposition of the measurements generated by each event. Compared to
the other solution, it has the constraint that the malicious sensors need to be arranged to match
the relative positioning of events.
Combiner
To validate the robustness of measurements inspection to malicious data injections, we wish to
implement the test suite in Figure 7.1, which reuses historical data. So far, we have addressed
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the problem of gathering the data to reuse, and now the next step is to transform it to make
it adapt for the current context and also maximise the effort in making the data credible for
measurements inspection.
To achieve this goal we need to:
• Select the sensors that will be under the attacker’s control.
• Construct the mimicry measurements data from the data given in output by the Selector.
• Contextualise the mimicked data into the current context.
The combiner is the component which is in charge of solving these central problems. We deal
with each problem below; in particular, we separate the sensor selection problem for eliciting
and masking attacks, which have remarkable differences, while the processes to construct the
mimicry data and the contextualisation are conceptually the same. Since many variables are
involved in this process, we summarise them in Table 7.1.
Sensors Selection For Elicited Events To minimise the chance of detection, eliciting
mimicry attacks will select the best sensors to compromise based on the location at which it is
desirable to elicit the events. For this task, we envisage the need for three different criteria:
1. Attack-related: i.e. an attacker may wish to elicit a false event in a specific area, such as
triggering a false emergency in a critical area.
2. Hiding the elicited events close to genuine events, when there are one or more genuine
events.
3. Random selection, when the other two criteria cannot apply.
The sensors selection problem needs to select the sensors which both elicit the desired event
and reduce the chances of detection. These two goals can be pursued at the same time by
selecting the sensors that are closest to the location of the elicited events. Indeed, the samples
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Table 7.1: Mimicry Combiner Notation Summary
Term Description
ne Number of events to elicit
nm Number of events to mask
C Number of malicious sensor nodes
tc Current time
tm Starting time of the mimicry batch
Ta Attack’s duration
Xtm+Tatm Genuine measurements to mimic, originally collected between times tm and tm + Ta
X˘
tc+Ta
tc Measurements after mimicry attacks, they differ from X
tc+Ta
tc in maximum C locations.
Ωti Set of sensors locations at time ti
µN Mean value of measurements noise
σN Standard deviation of measurements noise
Lc Vector of events locations at current time.
Lm Vector of events locations at the time of the mimicked data.
L˘c Vector of desired events locations for elicited events.
that are closer to the event’s location are usually the most representative of the main event’s
characteristics, which are the basis for the event detection criterion. At the same time, if the
elicited event is detected and there are samples close to its location which do not support
the event because they are genuine, they will most likely introduce detectable anomalies. So,
when the budget of malicious sensors is limited, it is important to prioritise them based on the
closeness to the elicited event’s location.
In Algorithm 13 we implement the strategies discussed above to address the problem of selecting
the locations of the elicited events and the malicious sensors. Line 4 implements the first event
location selection criterion, i.e. when it is an attack’s input. Line 13 implements the third
criterion, i.e. the random uniform selection across the deployment range.
Lines 7-11 implement the second and most complex criterion, which applies when there are
genuine events and the location is not given in input. Line 6 selects the genuine event next
to which the eliciting attack will take place, while lines 7-11 define the exact location, which
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Algorithm 13 Selection of eliciting sensors
Require: C, ne Ωtc , Lc,Lm,L˘c
Ensure: malIndices {Indices of Malicious Sensors}
1: for all e in 1, ..., ne do
2: lm=Lm(e) {Get the location of the event to mimic in its original context}
3: if |L˘c| ≥ e then {If a preference has been give for the location where to elicit the e-th
event, use it}
4: l˘c = L˘c(e)
5: else if |Lc| > 0 then {If there are genuine events, elicit next to them}
6: lc = Lc(MIN(e, |Lc|))
7: for all d ∈ 1, |lc| do
8: blowd = MAXωtc∈Ωtc (lc(d)− ωtc(d))
9: bhighd = MAXωtc∈Ωtc (ωtc(d)− lc(d))
10: l˘c(d) = SkewNormal(lc(d), blowd , b
high
d )
11: end for
12: else {No location is particularly convenient for eliciting}
13: l˘c = Uniform(range(Ωtc))
14: end if
15: closestToElicited = argsort||Ωtc − l˘c|| {Sort the sensors by closeness to the event to elicit}
16: if e < ne then
17: Ce=bC/nec
18: else
19: Ce=bC/nec+ (C − nebC/nec)
20: end if
21: malIndices.append(closestToElicited(1, .., Ce)) {Keep the Ce closest sensors}
22: end for
23: return malIndices
is built with random samples of the Skew Normal distribution [DV04]. This distribution is
chosen because its peaked shape allows us to give high probability to the locations close to the
elicited event. Moreover, since it is skewed, we can spread the locations probability across the
deployment area, whose boundaries have different distances from the genuine event’s location.
Indeed, for each spatial dimension d of the deployment, we calculate blowd and b
high
d , i.e. the
distance from the furthest sensor in one direction at line 8, and in the other direction at line
9. Then, we can sample from a Skew Normal distribution that: is centred in the genuine event
lc(d), and is approximately within the deployment range, i.e. [lc(d)−blowd , lc(d)+bhighd ] (namely,
with probability 0.994).
The role of the SkewNormal function at line 10 is to use these three values to calculate the
three parameters of the Skew Normal Distribution. To make lc(d) the centre of the distribution
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we make it equal to the 50% percentile. To keep the values in the deployment range, we make
blowd and b
high
d equal to the 0.3% and 99.7% percentile respectively. The result is a system of
three equations with three unknowns that are solved numerically1.
At this point, with the location of the elicited event well defined, the malicious sensors are
selected at lines 15-21 as the closest sensors to such location. In particular, we use C/ne for
each event to be elicited (except for the last elicited event which takes all the remaining sensors
if C is not divisible by ne), i.e. we partition the resources equally for each event since the
objective is to make all elicited events undetected. In general, the minimum number of sensors
that make an elicited event undetectable is unknown, so with a fair partitioning we seek to
equally minimise the chance of detection for all of them.
Sensors Selection for Masked Events Similarly to the eliciting scenario, a requirement
for mimicking rest conditions is the selection of the masking sensors. However, since there is
no event to elicit, the sensors selection criterion is just based on the genuine event that needs
to be masked. Algorithm 14 implements this criterion, which is analogous to the last part of
Algorithm 13, with the difference of selecting the closest sensors to the event to mask, rather
than elicit, at line 3. The idea is to remove the most meaningful samples for the event in
order to prevent its detection. At the same time, leaving some event measurements close to the
genuine event unchanged (i.e. with their genuine value) would likely introduce anomalies.
Construct the mimicry measurements At this point, the event to mimic can be mapped
to the malicious measurements, whose locations have been selected with Algorithm 13 or 14, so
they may not match the locations of the mimicked data. Algorithm 15 addresses this problem
by transforming the absolute sensor locations into locations relative to two focus points, one
1The system of equations is
Φ(
qi − ξ
ω
)− 2T (qi − ξ
ω
, α) =

0.003 if i = 1
0.5 if i = 2
0.997 if i = 3
(7.1)
Where ξ, ω and α are the three unknowns. q1, q2, and q3 coincide with lc(d), blowd and b
high
d respectively. Φ is
the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. T is the Owen’s T Function [Owe56].
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Algorithm 14 Selection of masking sensors
Require: C, ne Ωtc , Lc
Ensure: malIndices {Indices of Malicious Sensors}
1: for all e in 1, ..., nm do
2: l˘c = Lc(e)
3: closestToEvent = argsort(||Ωtc− lc|) {Sort the sensors by closeness to the event to mask}
4: if e < nm then
5: Cm=bC/nmc
6: else
7: Cm=bC/nmc+ (C − nmbC/nmc)
8: end if
9: malIndices.append(closestToEvent(1, .., Cm)) {Keep the Cm closest sensors}
10: end for
11: return malIndices
for the mimicked and one for the current data.
In particular, for eliciting attack, the focus point for the current data is the elicited event’s
location, which is subtracted from the current sensors’ locations at line 6. Similarly, the focus
point for the mimicry data is the original event’s location, which is subtracted from the original
sensors’ locations to make them event-relative at line 7.
Instead, for masking attacks, the current locations’ focus point is the event to mask, which is
used at line 9. Since in a rest condition there is no particular point of interest, the mimicked data
uses the centre of the WSN deployment as a focus point, as this choices generally maximises
the density of known data points in the area where the interpolation points lie. When this is
not the case, i.e. the centre of the WSN deployment is not densely populated with sensors, it
is more appropriate to use another point when the density of sensors is higher.
Once the absolute locations are transformed into relative ones, they acquire the same meaning.
Yet there is no obvious match between the sensors’ locations in the original and current context,
so we need a cross-context interpolation (line 15), which becomes a classical interpolation in
the relative locations thanks to the previous step. For this task, an interpolation that works
on non-uniformly spaced samples is needed, such as the Inverse-distance-weighted interpolation
[She68], which will be used in the following experiments.
The interpolation produces the event measurements that could be injected by the malicious
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Algorithm 15 Construct mimicry measurements
Require: elicit, na, Ωtc , Ωtm , Lc L˘c, Lm, Ta, Xtc+Tatc , Xtm+Tatm , µN , σN
Ensure: X˘tc+Tatc
1: for all e in 1, ..., na do
2: lm=Lm(e)
3: l˘c = L˘c(e)
4: lc = Ωtc
5: if elicit then
6: relMalLocs = {ωtc − l˘c ∀ωtc ∈ Ωtc(malIndices) {Locations of malicious sensors relative
to elicited event}
7: relOrigLocs = {ωtm− lm ∀ωtm ∈ Ωtm} {Locations of original sensors relative to original
event}
8: else
9: relMalLocs = {ωtc − lc ∀ωtc ∈ Ωtc(malIndices) {Locations of malicious sensors relative
to masked event}
10: relOrigLocs = {ωtm − centre(Ωm)∀ωtm ∈ Ωtm} {Locations of original sensors relative
to deployment’s centre}
11: end if
12: for all i ∈ 1, ..., Ta do
13: for all malIndex ∈ malIndices do
14: relMalLoc = relMalLocs(malIndex)
15: interp = interpolate(relMalLoc ,relOrigLocs,Xtc+i , Xtm+i)
16: X˘tm+i(malIndex) = timeSmooth(interp,i,Ta,Xtm+i(malIndex))
17: end for
18: spaceSmooth(X˘tm+i , ωtc , malIndices, b)
19: addNoise(X˘tm+i ,µN , σN)
20: end for
21: end for
22: return X˘tc+Tatc
sensors. The sensors have to cover a contiguous area around the elicited or masked event,
to maximise the chance of passing measurements inspection. Nevertheless, the eliciting mea-
surements should be adapted to the current context to avoid obvious anomalies. This task
is handled with temporal smoothing at line 16, which is done individually for each malicious
sensor, a spatial smoothing at line 18, which considers the relationships between genuine and
malicious sensors, and the addition of noise at line 19. These three steps solve the contextual-
isation problem, and are described below.
Contextualising the Mimicked Data The injection of malicious data causes a mismatch
in the temporal and spatial domain due to the presence of malicious measurements, which
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were following the temporal evolution of the physical phenomenon before the attack time, and
respected all its spatial propagation characteristics. The chance of disrupting both the temporal
and spatial characteristics of the physical phenomenon can be minimised by variations that are
sufficiently small.
In the case of the time domain, the genuine temporal dynamics of the physical phenomenon
can be respected by setting the malicious measurements at an intermediate point between the
genuine value and the target value, which has been calculated by the Combiner at the previous
step. If such an intermediate point shifts towards the target value with the dynamic of the
physical phenomenon, we achieved both the target of injecting the desired measurements and
that of making temporal transitions indistinguishable from genuine ones. In fact, this goal can
be achieved with a weighted average of the real and malicious measurement, where the weight
of the latter starts at i
Ta
and becomes equal to one at the end of the attack, i.e. after Ta time
steps.
X˘tm+i(malIndex) = (
i
Ta
)interp + (1− i
Ta
)Xtm+i(malIndex) (7.2)
Note that our attack model, described in Chapter 4, assumes that the attacker has infinite
time for the attack and that this allows them to avoid any kind of anomaly given by temporal
relationships. However, the use of a limited time Ta, which is the time imposed by the length
historical time series, may not be sufficient to achieve this goal; indeed, the role of (7.2) is to
minimise the chance of introducing anomalies in the temporal domain.
Since the temporal domain is completely under the attacker’s control, the malicious contribution
to the measurements time series can be smoothed arbitrarily to appear normal. In the spatial
domain instead, the problem is more complex as the smoothing needs to consider the presence
of genuine measurements, which cannot be controlled. This constraint leads us to an N-nearest
neighbour average where the neighbours also include genuine sensors.
If we let all malicious sensors replace their target measurements with a neighbourhood average,
we would likely miss the goal of causing damage to the event detection task. Thus, we use
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instead only a subset of malicious sensors for these task, and let them mediate between the
genuine sensors and the malicious sensors that are focusing on eliciting or masking events. The
mediating sensors are referred to as blending-in sensors and are selected as the furthest sensors
from the elicited/masked event. Indeed, for the sensor selection criterion, which is by closeness
to the elicited/masked event’s location, the sensors that are closest to the genuine events are
just the furthest from such a location. This operation is similar to the blurring trick used in
image forgery when inserting an extraneous object inside an image [HP05], which smooths the
edges of the extraneous object.
Algorithm 16 spaceSmooth
Require: (X˘tm+i , Ωtc , malIndices, b, Nn)
Ensure: X˘tm+i (with spatially smoothed injections)
1: Ca = |malIndices|
2: ΩCtc = Ωtc(j)∀j ∈ malIndices
3: ΩGtc = Ωtc −ΩCtc
4: X˘btm+i=X˘tm+i {Initialise vector of blended injections}
5: blendingInIndices = argsortωCtc∈ΩCtcMINωGtc inΩGtc ||ω
C
tc − ωGtc ||
6: for all bj ∈ malIndices(blendingInIndices) do
7: ω
bj
tc = Ωtc(bi)
8: N(ωbitc) = argsort(||Ωtc − ωbitc ||) {Nearest neighbours of ωbitc}
9: Nn(ω
bi
tc) = N(ω
bi
tc)(1, ..., Nn) {Nn Nearest neighbours of ω
bi
tc}
10: X˘btm+i(bi) =
1
Nn
∑
j∈Nn(ωbitc )
X˘tm+i(j)
11: end for
12: X˘tm+i(bj) = X˘btm+i(bj) ∀bj ∈ malIndices(blendingInIndices)
13: return X˘tm+i
Algorithm 16 describes the steps: bCa malicious sensors are used as blending-in sensors, where
Ca is the number of malicious sensors used for the mimicry attack and b is a value between 0
and 1 indicating the fraction of blending-in sensors. For each blending-in sensor , the average
among its Nn nearest neighbours is calculated and substituted to the original value. This choice
ensures that with more malicious sensor the value of the blending in sensors still brings in a
high degree of damage. Instead, when many genuine sensors surround the blending in sensor,
the mediation of the blending in sensors is more remarkable.
The value of Nn should be high enough to include the data of the malicious sensors that are
not blending-in, and not too high to avoid including the data of genuine sensors which are not
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expected to be correlated. For this reason, it will be picked in the interval [(1−b)Ca, (2−2b)Ca],
with a preference towards the left bound to increase the chance of causing damage and a
preference towards the right bound to decrease the chance of detection.
A final contextualisation step is needed to reduce the chance that the reuse of historical data
is detected by an ad-hoc system. This task has been partially addressed with the interpolation
of the data into new locations and is completed by the summation of Gaussian noise to the
malicious data obtained so far. The noise component is:
N (µN , σN) (7.3)
That is a Gaussian independent and identically distributed noise component. The average
is an estimation of the sensor’s bias, while the standard deviation is an estimation of the
device sensing precision, for which an estimate is generally given by the sensor’s vendor, and
alternatively can be estimated from the historical data (e.g., through a Kalman filter [Kal60]).
7.2.5 Experiments
The test suite presented in the previous Section for the production of mimicry attacks is an
automatic tool for testing the robustness of generic measurements inspection algorithms for
generic WSNs. In this section we build mimicry attacks which we submit to the inspection of
the wavelet-based approach. Moreover, we feed a state-of-the-art approach with the same data
to compare the results.
As pointed out in Sect. 4.1, we consider an attacker with full capabilities in sensor selection,
attack time, and overhearing measurements. As a consequence, the parameter that mostly de-
termines the attacker’s capabilities in our model is the number of sensors injecting compromised
measurements, denoted with C. We study the impact of such parameters by evaluating the
results of our experiments with different values of C. Note that, on the other hand, detection is
generally easier with a higher number of total sensors N . However, the detection performance
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depends also on the deployment and on the events’ spatial propagation patterns: for instance,
if the attacker compromised all the sensors within the boundary of a generic event, such sensors
are enough to mask the event without even being detected, regardless of N . For this reason, we
fix the deployment distribution to a random uniform distribution of N sensors in a well-defined
space and study the results with different values of C.
Another testing problem arises from events. As they are generally infrequent, measurements
collected in the presence of one or especially multiple events are difficult to retrieve. A possible
solution is to simulate the measurements under event conditions when they are particularly
rare. Despite that, one still wishes to have confidence that the technique is suitable for real
measurements.
In addressing the problems described above, we tested our technique both on synthetic and real
measurements. We prove the applicability of the technique on a few real sets of measurements,
while we evaluate the detection, characterisation and diagnosis performance on several sets of
synthetic measurements.
Synthetic wildfire temperatures dataset
The data measurements being used below are model-generated temperatures perceived by N
sensors randomly scattered in an area of 100 × 100 m2. The random function that generates
the deployment is the "continuous uniform" distribution over the interval [uj −
√
N,uj +
√
N],
where uj is the location where sensor j would be placed if all sensors were placed in a grid.
This choice simulates the effort to put the sensor nodes in a grid, which maximises the WSN
coverage, and also falling back on a pseudo-grid due to the presence of deployment constraints.
We generate 200 samples from the deployment distribution to reproduce the measurements of
as many temperature sensors.
The temperature sensors may observe temperature increases due to the outbreak of fires within
the WSN area and anywhere next to it (hence only part of fire may be observed by the sensors).
The fires are modelled as the result of the radiated power from one or more heat sources placed at
156 Chapter 7. Robustness of Measurements Inspection
different locations, which are modelled as spherical black bodies with temperature Ki (between
573.15 and 1473.15 Kelvin [SEK03; SC92]). Such black bodies have radius ri, centred at ci, and
their power is radiated to each location u ∈ Ω at distance d(ci,u), producing the temperature:
K(u) =
∑
i
(
1
4
Ki
4(
ri
d(ci,u)
)2)
1
4 +N (0, 3) (7.4)
Where N is additive zero-mean Gaussian noise with 3K standard deviation, which simulates
the interference arising from the sensing devices.
Detection We first evaluate the detection of malicious data injections with the receiver op-
erating characteristic (ROC), which shows the relationship between True Positive Rate (TPR)
and False Positive Rate (FPR). To obtain the FPR, we simulated 50 sets of genuine measure-
ments and gathered the frequency of positive detection. To obtain the TPR, we first simulated
50 sets of genuine measurements, then we simulated malicious data injections with the method
described in Sect. 7.2.2, and finally collected the frequency of positive detection. Events are
generated with random locations and peak temperatures (corresponding to parameters ci and
Ti in (7.4)) and with radius ri = 22 metres both for elicited and masked events.
We made an analogous analysis for the algorithm described in [Rez+13], which is an Itera-
tive filtering-based algorithm for detecting malicious colluding sensor nodes. The steps of the
algorithm are: 1. For each time instant, the measurements of all sensors are aggregated with it-
erative filtering. 2. The error time series of each sensor is calculated, i.e. the difference between
a sensor’s measurements time series and the aggregates time series. 3. Errors are collected in
batches, normalised with subtraction of mean and division by standard deviation, and tested
for normality. In the last step, the sensor is classified as malicious if its measurements are
not normally distributed. The normality test is run with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which
quantifies the distance between the errors distribution and the normal distribution. In partic-
ular errors are not normally distributed if such distance is bigger than a threshold TIF . Since
this algorithm performs detection with the granularity of sensors, we assume that the detection
of malicious data injections is positive if at least one sensor fails the test.
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Figure 7.2: Eliciting Detection ROC curves VS number of events. Performance decrease with
more events.
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Figure 7.3: Masking Detection ROC curves VS number of events. Performance increase with
more events.
We split the analysis into eliciting and masking scenarios, shown respectively in Fig. 7.2 and
Fig. 7.3. For both we present the ROC for an increasing number of events. We denoted our
wavelet-based method as WAV, while the iterative-filtering based method is denoted with IF.
The values of the ROC curves from left to right have been obtained with thresholds values
between 0.55 and 1.2 for WAV, and between 0.05 and 0.15 for IF.
As shown in Fig. 7.2a, with no genuine events WAV can achieve TPR=1 with FPR = 0. When
there are many genuine events, the performance slightly decreases. IF, in comparison, cannot
achieve WAV’s TPR without a significant increase in false positives. Furthermore, with one
or more events FPR=1 for any TPR higher than zero: this means that regardless of the IF
parameters, every time there is an event this triggers detection. Overall, IF’s performance
with one or more events is worse than the random classifier. This is due to the lack of a
learning phase in IF, which is present in WAV instead and enables it to extract the properties
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of genuine events. This consideration is confirmed by the fact that IF’s detection improves with
more malicious sensors: indeed the latter can spoof larger events, which look more anomalous
for IF.
Both with WAV and IF, the detection performance generally decreases as the number of events
increases. The reason is that the continuous changes introduced by genuine events sometimes
become valid explanations for the changes brought in by the eliciting sensors.
With masking scenarios there are opposite results compared to eliciting scenarios: the detection
performance increases with the number of genuine events. Indeed the shortage of rest sensors
with more events makes the masking sensors contradict the measurements of more sensors. Fig.
7.3 shows that WAV’s ROC curve are nearly ideal. As in eliciting scenarios, IF is not able to
avoid false positives in masking scenarios when the TPR is higher than zero.
Characterisation We present below the results for the characterisation task, whose perfor-
mance is measured by TPR vs FPR averaged across the 50 measurements time snapshots. This
is done in WAV for values of Tc between 0.1 and 1.0 and in IF for different values of TIF between
0.05 and 0.15. Note that the characterisation algorithm in WAV depends both on the char-
acterisation threshold Tc and on the detection threshold Td, hence we show 3D curves for the
characterisation TPR and FPR for WAV. IF instead, has a unique threshold, hence it produces
2D curves. Note that characterisation is not a classification problem, hence the TPR is not in
a monotonic relationship with the FPR. Indeed a lower threshold Tc may shift the blame from
a malicious group to a genuine group, causing both a decrease in TPR and an increase in FPR.
The result is not a proper ROC curve, therefore we present the TPR and FPR separately.
In Fig. 7.4 and 7.5 we show the characterisation results for the eliciting and masking scenario
respectively, for increasing number of genuine events. Note that the stability of TPR and FPR
for different values of the detection threshold implies that a wrong selection of the detection
threshold has a reduced impact on the characterisation performance.
Like for detection, the characterisation performance with increasing number of events shows a
decrease in eliciting scenarios and an increase for masking scenarios. WAV’s characterisation
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Figure 7.4: Eliciting Characterisation results. WAV achieves characterisation with TPR=0.4
to 0.7 when FPR=0.02.
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Figure 7.5: Masking Characterisation results. WAV achieves characterisation with TPR=0.4
to 0.7 when FPR=0.02.
TPR is quite steady in the area 0.4− 0.6 and the FPR is steady as well in the area 0− 0.1. IF
instead, has a continuous increase of the TPR which is matched with a similar increase in the
FPR. However, keeping a reduced amount of malicious sensors in the network is not a major
concern since they will be likely discovered in the future, consequently to the reduction of their
collusion power. For this reason keeping the FPR to a minimum may be preferred, and in the
areas where the FPR is low, the WAV’s TPR is amply above IF’s.
The reason why WAV’s TPR seems upper bounded around 0.5 is that, as explained in Sect.
7.2.4, the Combiner block of the test suite contextualises the malicious data by using malicious
blending in sensors, i.e. sensors not actively participating in the eliciting/masking attempt, but
acting as accomplices that mediate between genuine and malicious sensors to evade detection.
In our experiments, we used 50% of the C malicious sensors as blending-in sensors, which WAV
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avoids judging as malicious to reduce false positives, as a similar behaviour is observable also
under genuine circumstances.
Diagnosis Diagnosis is the most complex step in our methodology, not only because distin-
guishing faults and malicious interference is a complex problem in nature, but also since the
correctness of diagnosis is conditioned to the correctness of both detection and characterisa-
tion. This characteristic introduces an error propagation problem that is hard to solve without
additional information.
Table 7.2 presents the diagnosis confusion table for the following categories: {1 Genuine Event},
{1 Event Elicited}, {1 Genuine Event Masked}, {1 Single Fault Within Genuine Event}, {Group
Fault of 10 Sensors Within Rest Condition}. The categories on the rows represent the ground
truth, while the categories on the columns represent the output of diagnosis. Each table cell
describes the frequency of times the category on the row is classified as the category on the
column. The values of Td and Tc are fixed for this analysis and equal to 1 and 0.85 respectively,
since they provided a good trade off of TPR vs FPR.
Table 7.2: Diagnosis Confusion Table
C Genuine Elicited Masked Single
Fault
Group
Fault
Genuine 0.98 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Elicited 15 0.00 0.82 0.12 0.00 0.0630 0.00 0.76 0.12 0.00 0.12
45 0.00 0.76 0.14 0.00 0.10
Masked 15 0.00 0.10 0.86 0.00 0.0430 0.02 0.22 0.74 0.00 0.02
45 0.04 0.24 0.62 0.00 0.10
Single
Fault
1 0.02 0.12 0.16 0.70 0.00
Group
Fault
10 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.88
We consider also the genuine event category to analyse also which categories evade detection
most. As we observe in the first row, the main responsibility for a wrong detection are elicited
events, which resemble the genuine events most.
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As the second row summarises, eliciting scenarios are mainly confused with group faults and
masking scenarios, especially when C increases. Indeed, with more malicious sensors, inferring
if the incomplete events have been elicited or are the remainder of a genuine event is more
difficult.
In the third row, we note that masking scenarios are mainly confused with eliciting scenarios,
since masking injections that remove most part of a genuine event make the event appear
incomplete and it is difficult to say if it has been incompletely elicited or incompletely masked.
In the fourth row we note that single faults are equally confused with the eliciting and masking
categories, but not with group faults. Indeed, single faults introduce higher measurements
variation, whereas group faults are identified with a low coefficient of variation.
Group faults are more likely to be confused with malicious data injections, as evident at the
fifth row. Among them, confusion with eliciting injections prevails because the sensors are
simulated to report corrupted measurements that are larger than the real ones.
In general, our diagnosis criteria make a correct classification for a significant portion of samples
(around 75%). This result has been achieved without any hypothesis about the nature of faults,
which would probably improve performance despite reducing the method generality.
Real worldwide seismic vibrations dataset
The dataset retrieved from a real WSN is made up of measurements collected by seismic
networks from around the world [Iric; Iria], and kindly provided by the Incorporated Research
Institutions of Seismology (IRIS) Data Management Center (DMC) [Irib].
The events considered are earthquakes perceived by seismic sensors in: Alaska, Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Michigan, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Dominican Republic. The application
to different sensors and different environments highlights that our technique focuses on proper-
ties of the physical phenomenon and therefore is particularly suited to WSNs where the sensors
enter, leave or migrate across the deployment area.
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To learn the cross-scale relationship we exploit as few as nine earthquakes. We use other two
real earthquakes for testing: one is the Arizona’s earthquake of 1st December 2014, the second
is the California’s earthquake of 30th May 2015, both with a magnitude of 4.7 Richter.
Before testing our techniques on this dataset with the mimicry test-suite, we pre-process the
measurements to satisfy our requirement that the measurements magnitude is proportional
to the event perceived. In particular, we use a time domain processing known as delayed
STA/LTA (DSTALTA) [Wit+98]. The STA/LTA algorithm evaluates the ratio of short to
long-term energy density, and a delay is added between the two to increase the independence
between the two [RH92]. Finally we apply a logarithm for better visualisation.
Through the help of figures, we present a set of measurements with the respective anomaly
score, the sensors given in output by the characterisation step (identified by white crosses), and
the diagnosis output (written on top of the anomaly score map). Since we have few samples to
learn the cross-scale relationships from this case, it is safer to use higher thresholds. Hence, we
used Td = 1.4, and Tc = 1.2.
In the experiments presented below, the number of sensors considered is not fixed but it is
defined such that the earthquakes’ boundaries are well visible. There are about 800 sensors in
the American IRIS networks, but the earthquake is always perceived only by a subset of them.
Fig. 7.6 shows the detection result on the genuine Arizona’s earthquake, which is identified
as genuine as the anomaly score is lower than Td. In this scenario about 25 sensors perceive
mostly the earthquake, while for other 150 the vibrations are close to the noise range [0, 101.5].
As shown in Fig. 7.7, detection is neither triggered on the genuine California’s earthquake:
this is a rare case where two earthquakes are simultaneous (4 p.m. local time) and with close
epicentres (northern and southern California). Fig. 7.8, shows a sophisticated spoofing attack
that is introduced close to a genuine event. The latter is perceived by nearly 30 sensors and
the spoofed event, which is introduced by 20 malicious sensors, looks indistinguishable from it.
Nevertheless, our detection algorithm triggers, and characterisation assigns different events to
different groups (Sect. 6.6.1), and is able to return four out of 20 malicious sensors without
false positives.
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Figure 7.6: A genuine event does not produce anomaly score bigger than Td
.
Figure 7.7: The cross-scale relationship induced by two close genuine events has been correctly
learnt.
Fig. 7.9 simulates an attacker that is trying to replicate the Arizona’s earthquake with the
70 closest sensors to the event peak. Despite the measurements that perceived the event most
are correctly replicated, the genuine sensors, which have lower measurements, raise a conflict
with the malicious measurements. Here, 14 out of 70 malicious sensors are correctly identified
without false positives.
Finally, Fig. 7.10 shows an attempt to mask the Arizona’s earthquake with as many as 120
malicious sensors, whose measurements depict the absence of any event. Note that, as a result,
the original event is split into two smaller events, which may be confused with elicited events.
Nevertheless, our characterisation algorithm successfully identifies the presence of a masking
attack and returns 26 out of 120 malicious sensors without false positives.
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Figure 7.8: An elicited event close to a genuine event can be correctly characterised since the
characterisation step assigns the two events to different conflicting groups.
Figure 7.9: A spoofed event, made as a partial genuine event. The cross-scale relationship is
not respected.
Figure 7.10: A genuine event that is mostly masked introduces a characterisation problem. The
characterisation algorithm is not fooled by the presence of event-like peaks and is able to infer
that the measurements were masked.
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7.3 Robustness of Measurements Inspection Against Worst-
Case Attacks
The role of measurements inspection is to force the attacker to a trade-off between the degree of
damage and the chance of staying undetected. In other words the goal is to make high-damage
attacks detectable and to make undetected attacks cause low damage. While mimicry attacks
focus on causing high-damage with a best effort to stay undetected, worst-case attacks explore
the whole measurements space to find the best choice both in terms of selected sensors to
compromise and of malicious measurements that replace the genuine ones. Given an attacker
with fixed capabilities, we seek to infer if at least one attack exists that subverts event detection
and misleads anomaly detection, using the attacker’s capabilities, which include:
1. Controlling an arbitrary subset of C sensors.
2. At time T , having full knowledge of the genuine measurements at t < T .
3. Knowing the event detection function.
4. Knowing the anomaly detection algorithm.
If anomaly detection is successful under these conditions, we are guaranteed that no other
attacker with C or less compromised sensors can perform an attack that both triggers or
masks an event and stays undetected. Thanks to this knowledge, worst-case attacks provide
information about the measurements inspection algorithm’s blind spots that an attacker may
exploit to evade it. Thus, worst-case attacks seek the worst-case scenarios, as opposed to the
best-effort approach of mimicry attacks. The worst-case approach is certainly more complex
than the mimicry one. Moreover, as we will see in detail, the time needed to solve a worst-case
attack problem can be in the order of hours or days with a general purpose CPU. These times
are mostly incompatible with the time dynamics of the measured phenomenon, so we will run
oﬄine analyses rather than simulating attackers that seek to craft the measurements in real-
time. Still, we will need to approximate the measurements inspection algorithm with a simple
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function to achieve a feasible solution time that allows us to run many experiments and extract
meaningful statistics about the resilience gains offered by measurements inspection. While this
is practicable for the detection algorithm, the algorithms for characterisation and diagnosis are
difficult to represent because of their decision process. So, we remark that whilst the worst-
case approach is valuable to evaluate the resilience to the most sophisticated attackers, and to
uncover the main vulnerabilities of the measurements inspection algorithm, it cannot replace
the mimicry approach in the performance evaluation, especially for the characterisation and
diagnosis step.
In this section, we consider worst-case attacks for multiple purposes. Firstly, we will retrieve
information about the maximum number of malicious sensors that a WSN can tolerate, so that
we can give an assurance of the robustness of measurements inspection against malicious data
injections, and even offer a fair method to compare different approaches. Moreover, we will
use the worst-case approach to study the injection strategies that are more difficult to defend
against, by analysing the measurements that optimise the misleading of event-detection whilst
staying undetected. This study, in turn, reveals the vulnerabilities that make up most of the
WSN risk and if they can be associated with the innate WSN data characteristics or with
shortcomings of the anomaly detection algorithm. Finally, we will introduce the first security-
driven design methodology in the literature for WSN deployments. Given a maximum number
of malicious sensors that can be present in a WSN, we are able to provide at design time how
many sensors need to be deployed to guarantee that the anomaly detection algorithm is not
evaded. This provides a way to obtain guarantees about the gain in security introduced by
anomaly detection. Hence, this method can be used both for designing critical WSNs with
strict security requirements and to make a feasibility analysis that states whether it is worth
applying anomaly detection given a maximum budget in sensor devices.
We consider the problem where an attacker seeks to compromise the smallest subset of sensors
in a WSN that allows to craft malicious measurements capable of triggering or masking events,
without being detected by the anomaly detection system. A different approach is considered in
[LM05b], where the authors propose an algorithm to reverse engineering linear classifiers, for-
mulating the difficulty of evading the classifier as a complexity problem. The attacker searches
7.3. Robustness of Measurements Inspection Against Worst-Case Attacks 167
the lowest cost sample (for the attacker) that evades the detection by the linear classifier. In
[Nel+10], the authors propose an extension of this framework to the family of convex-inducing
classifiers, i.e. classifiers that partition their sample space into two sets, one of which is con-
vex. The model proposed in [Nel+10] also models the optimisation problem considering that
the attacker has a limited number of attempts to probe the system, which, depending on the
application, is more realistic than the model in [LM05b]. However, both models are limited to
the family of classifiers to which they can be applied, whereas in many real applications non-
linear detection systems are used. A more general approach is proposed in [Big+13], where a
gradient-based strategy can be applied to evade a broad range of machine learning algorithms.
More recently, evasion attacks have targeted deep neural networks in computer vision problems,
demonstrating the existence of adversarial examples, i.e. those images that can be misclassi-
fied by deep learning algorithms while being only imperceptibly distorted [Sze+13; GSS15;
Pap+16].
In this chapter, the attacker model differs from [LM05b; Nel+10; Big+13] in that we consider
that the attacker’s cost to minimise is the number of sensors to be compromised in order to
evade the anomaly detector. As a consequence, although the values of the measurements for
the compromised sensors that evade the system are needed, they do not affect the attacker’s
cost, as in [LM05b; Nel+10; Big+13]. A second difference is that in our approach, it is not
necessary to reverse engineer the anomaly detector, but we look for the blind spots that allow
us to craft a malicious sample able to evade the system given a set of compromised sensors and
the information about the other measurements in the WSN. A third difference is that we do not
restrict the applicability of our work to linear classifiers, even though non-linearities increase
the time required to solve the problem.
The algorithm is first run on the novel wavelet-based detection algorithm introduced in Chapter
6, which, to our knowledge, gives the best results against sophisticated attacks. Indeed, such
an algorithm is able to detect both eliciting and masking attacks in event detection WSNs,
even when many sensors act jointly to mimic real event or rest conditions.
Although we assume this algorithm as the target for the evasion task, the same methodology
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holds also for other algorithms. In fact, we apply the same method also to another state-of-
the-art anomaly detection algorithm which is based on principal component analysis [CP07].
This shows that our novel study of worst-case adversaries can also be used to compare the
robustness of different anomaly detection algorithms, as we do in Section 7.3.3.
7.3.1 The Worst-Case Attack Problem
From the attacker perspective, the objective is to find the manipulations signals at time instant
i, mti(u), such that the resulting signal xti(u)+y(u)mti(u) (which is the observed signal at time
instant ti, i.e. including malicious data injections) evades detection and changes the output of
the event detection function.
For convenience of notation, we introduce the row vector y, where yi = y(uj), and uj :j∈1,...N
is an arbitrary ordering of all the spatial locations u ∈ Ω. Likewise, we introduce the T × N
matrices X and M, where Xij = xti(uj) and Mij = mti(uj).
The event detection function is assumed to have memory equal toW , meaning that the presence
of an event can be determined with the last W collections of measurements. For convenience
of notation, we then introduce:
Xwt = {xti(uj)} i ∈ 1, ...,W − 1 j ∈ 1, ...N
Mwt = {mti(uj)} i ∈ 1, ...,W − 1 j ∈ 1, ...N
(7.5)
We further assume that the anomaly detection algorithm operates on time snapshots, since the
most effective anomaly detection approaches that counteract malicious data injections generally
make use of spatial correlation [IL15b]. Even though there is a body of work that exploits
the temporal domain, i.e. analyses the measurements time series on single sensors [Sub+06;
BHL07; Sun+13], the temporal domain is completely under the attacker’s control during the
time when the sensor is compromised. As a consequence, unless the attacker is constrained to
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a maximum time, there always exists an attack in the time domain which gradually modifies
the measurements time series, e.g. to depict the presence of a false event, with the temporal
dynamics of a real event. On the contrary, we will focus on the spatial domain, which contains
reliable uncorrupted information when a subset of sensors is still genuine.
Since eliciting and masking events requires considerable changes in the measurements, which
are likely to disrupt correlations, misleading event detection whilst evading anomaly detection
can be modelled as the optimisation problem defined in (7.6), which minimises the number of
malicious sensors required by the attacker to subvert the event detection output whilst staying
undetected.
min
y
N∑
j=1
(yj) (7.6a)
s.t.
yj ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ 1, ..., N (7.6b)
e(Xwt) 6= e(Xwt + 1Ty Mwt) ∀t ∈ 1, ..., T −W + 1 (7.6c)
a(Xi + y Mi) ≤ Td ∀i ∈ 1, ..., T (7.6d)
Note that 1 is the 1 × W row vector of all ones and  indicates the element-wise product.
The matrix Xwt + 1TyMwt denotes the observed measurements by all sensors (including the
malicious ones), at each time instant inside the window wt, hence it is a W × N matrix. For
convenience, we give an alias to this matrix:
X˘wt = Xwt + 1
Ty Mwt (7.7)
Constraint (7.6d) requires this signal to be undetectable at each time instant. This is expressed
with the function a(RN), which is the output of the detection algorithm and, for the wavelet-
based detection, it coincides with the anomaly score, defined in (6.13). The anomaly score is
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constrained to be less than the constant Td for the resulting signal in input. Although in this
thesis we will focus on analysing the specific detection algorithm introduced in Chapter 6, this
choice suits most detection algorithms, since eventually there is a quantity that is compared
with a threshold to decide if the data is anomalous or not.
Constraint (7.6c) requires the resulting signal and the original signal to have a different output
for the event detection function e(RW ×RN), which is supposed to be one if there is an event,
zero otherwise2. The presence of binary inequalities would force us to choose more complex
and burdensome optimisation algorithms, so we first evaluate the value of e(Xwt), to check if
the event condition is satisfied or not, and then constrain the absence of events if there is an
event, or constrain the presence of events if there is a rest condition. This is summarised by
the expression below:

e(X˘wt) = 1 if e(Xwt) = 0
e(X˘wt) = 0 if e(Xwt) = 1
(7.8)
This formulation is still a problem for common optimisation algorithms because the event
detection function has a binary output. However, we can consider e(RW × RN) as the event
confidence, i.e. the confidence whether an event is present, and that an event is detected when
this confidence is at least above a threshold Te, to obtain:

e(X˘wt) ≥ Te if e(Xwt) < Te
e(X˘wt) < Te if e(Xwt) ≥ Te
(7.9)
Constraints 7.6d and 7.6c will affect the values of the manipulations Mwt . Since these values
do not appear in the objective function, the goal of the optimisation is to find, for a fixed vector
of compromised sensors y, any combination of Mwt that satisfies the constraints.
2We assume that the potential risk of malicious data injections is just the incorrect event detection. In
general, there is also a second risk, which is a wrong characterisation of the events, e.g. incorrect estimation of
spread and intensity. This issue can be dealt with by introducing further constraints on the terms X˘wt , which
require the event to have specific characteristics. So, this aspect requires just a refinement of problem (7.6) and
we leave this for future work.
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The model that we have introduced above describes the worst-case scenario where the attacker
is able to keep the degree of anomaly low while introducing a significant change in the event de-
tection function. We have introduced two functions that measure such quantities: the anomaly
score and the event score. We have also introduced two thresholds for them: the event score is
compared to Te, which indicates the presence of events, and we assume it to be known thanks
to a prior optimisation of the event detection performance. Similarly, we introduced the thresh-
old Td for the detection of malicious interference, which we assume to be already optimised to
guarantee a maximum number of false positives. At this point we can solve the optimisation
problem, but, as we will see below, this will require us to make some simplifications to make
the problem tractable.
7.3.2 Optimising the Attacker’s Problem
Solving Problem (7.6) exactly is intractable, unless the WSN deployment size is in the order of
ten sensors. This is a consequence of many factors that we discuss below.
Elements of Complexity
Binary Variables In Problem (7.6), N binary variables appear, i.e. the targeted sensor
variables yj. This is a major problem since the choice of their values is a binary optimisation
problem, with
(
N
C
)
possible solutions. It is well known that
(
N
C
) ≥ (N
C
)C , and since we are inter-
ested in values of C that are comparable to N , the number of solutions is generally exponential
in N . For example, C = N/4 gives
√
2
N
combinations. So, even if Problem (7.6) was efficiently
solved, finding a solution would be practical only for small deployment sizes.
Event Score Function The event score function introduces two main challenges:
1. It may be arbitrarily complex. This results in irregularities (e.g. non-linearities, disconti-
nuities, non-smoothness) that require the use of expensive optimisation algorithms, which
make several evaluations of the event score function on its domain.
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2. The input size of the event score function is WN , whereas the other terms in (7.6) have
an input size of N . Consequently, the event score function needs to be simple enough to
enable the application of fast optimisation algorithms that can cope also with high values
of W and N . In general, event detection algorithms are not expressed in a simple way,
as they include decision trees, statistical operations etc. In the following we introduce
a simplification method to express the event detection function in terms of sufficient
conditions, which enables us to run an efficient optimisation algorithm.
Anomaly Score Function Similarly to the event score function, the anomaly score function
may be complex as the result of: thresholds, random choices, differential equations, etc. Unlike
event detection, simplifications of the anomaly detection algorithms require a more careful
analysis, since they are likely to bias the optimisation problem. Indeed, whilst a simplification
of the event detection function generates a proportional inaccuracy in the problem solution,
even a small modification to the anomaly detection function may introduce weaknesses that
have a considerable impact on the solution. Indeed, the newly introduced weaknesses will likely
be exploited by the optimisation algorithm, whose goal is to find the attack that requires less
resource.
Nevertheless, simplifications are necessary as complex anomaly detection not only complicates
the optimisation, but also causes exploding computational complexity, as its input is composed
of unknown variables. In the specific case of the wavelet-based algorithm, the anomaly score
includes the evaluation of squared P -order polynomials for the calculation of the higher scales
contribution in (6.12). Although evaluating each of them on a known input has an asymptotic
complexity O(N), evaluating them on unknowns requires the calculation of (N
2
)
products,
which is O(N2), with an increase in complexity of a factor N . So, even if anomaly detection is
generally not particularly time-consuming, optimising its input may have execution times that
are higher by a few orders of magnitude.
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Tearing Down the Problem Complexity
For each of the identified issues, we simplify the original problem by using surrogate models
(which are computationally cheaper) to approximate the original problem. Afterwards, the
solution obtained with the simplified models is tested and adapted for the original problem.
Relaxing Binary Variables The presence of binary variables makes the problem intractable
even for low values of N , since it necessitates the exploration of a solution space whose size
increases exponentially with N . To explore the solution space of the targeted sensors in polyno-
mial time, there are well-known heuristics [Ber14], which start with the relaxation of the binary
variables into continuous variables between zero and one. So, we will follow this approach.
In a second phase, the continuous values are converted into binary, paying attention to the
constraints, which will not necessarily be satisfied after the conversion. In this phase, our ap-
proach slightly differs from well-known heuristics. Indeed, in our specific problem the objective
function includes binary variables only. This feature simplifies finding a solution to the original
problem, since we can evaluate a choice of the binary variables by directly checking the value
of the objective function.
The idea is to make the conversion by turning C out of N values of yj into one and the
remainder into zero, considering that the sensors that are mainly exploited by the attacker
are those with higher difference between genuine and malicious values. Denoting with y′ and
M′i the targeted sensors and manipulations that are the solution of the relaxed problem, the
criterion that identifies a possible subset of sensors to compromise is summarised below.
Algorithm 17 Binary Constraint Relaxation
Require: y′, M′i, C
Ensure: y
1: sortInd = argsort(y′ M′i)
2: yj = 0 ∀j ∈ sortInd(1), ..., sortInd(N − C)
3: yj = 1 ∀j ∈ sortInd(N − C + 1), ..., sortInd(N)
This can be done when the event detection algorithm has a memory equal to one, which allows
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to consider each time instant i separately. To extend this procedure to the case where the
event detection memory is greater than one, we use the average of y′ M′i for all the values
of i within the time window. This value identifies how much each sensor is exploited by the
attacker on average.
The value of C is the minimum number that allows to respect the constraints, which is unknown.
Hence, we will test all values of C in the interval [
∑N
j=1(y
′
j),
∑
y′j>0
]. The left bound comes from
the observation that the solution for the original problem cannot be better than the solution
for the relaxed one. The right bound comes from the observation that with C =
∑
y′j>0
, there
is certainly a feasible solution, which is:
yj =

1 if y′j > 0
0 if y′j = 0
(7.10)
It is then sufficient to set the values of Mi to y′M′i, to get a solution for the original problem,
in particular with C =
∑
y′j>0
.
In summary, we select a subset of sensors for which y′j is not zero, we set them equal to one,
and check if they enable the adversary to change the output of event detection whilst evading
anomaly detection. This is an unknown value, but we are guaranteed that the problem is
well-posed because (7.10) is a feasible solution. To test if a combination of yj is valid, we
check if a combination of Mi exists that satisfies the constraints. In that case, yj and Mi are
a solution for the original problem, with objective function equal to
∑N
j=1 yj. The basic idea
is similar to that of the Relaxation Induced Neighborhood Search (RINS) heuristic [DRP05],
since a binary variable is zero if its correspondent in the relaxed solution is zero. However,
RINS ultimately runs a simplified binary optimisation, while we simplify the problem until all
variables are continuous. Thus, we do not run any binary optimisation.
Linearising the Event Score Function An event score function evaluates the compliance
of the measurements with a set of features that describe the common event patterns, which are
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defined both in the temporal and in the spatial domain. Generally, there may be many criteria
that are sufficient to infer that there is an event, e.g. relative change of the measurements in
time and absolute values. This makes the event detection a logical OR of a function applied to
the measurements. For instance, in Section 7.3.3 we show that an event may be detected when
at least one sensor reading is above a threshold. Another example is given in Section 7.3.3,
where an event is detected if the variability in at least one neighbourhood of sensors is above
the values that normally apply to rest conditions.
Hence, to reduce the computational burden introduced by the event detection function and still
cover a variety of event detection criteria, we transform the event detection constraint into the
logical OR of Z inequalities (with Z equal to the number of sufficient conditions for identifying
an event) between a linear combination of the measurements, in both the temporal and spatial
domain, and a constant threshold:
e(X˘wt) ≥ Te ≈
A(1)X˘wtB
(1) ≥ Te1 ∨ A(2)X˘wtB(2) ≥ Te2 ∨ ... ∨ A(Z)X˘wtB(Z) ≥ TeZ
(7.11)
Where the terms A(1), ..., A(Z) and B(1), ..., B(Z) are respectively 1×W and N × 1 matrices of
real coefficients. The A matrices represent the temporal analysis of the event detection function
(e.g. change points), whereas the B matrices analyse the spatial domain (e.g. event diffusion
pattern). Their multiplication with the W ×N matrix X˘wt returns a scalar, which is compared
with the thresholds Te1 , ..., TeZ .
In eliciting scenarios, (7.6) becomes a series of Z optimisation problems because each problem
will try to satisfy one of the Z sufficient event conditions. The best solution among all of
them is the best general solution. On the contrary, in masking scenarios constraint (7.6c) of
optimisation problem (7.6) becomes a set of Z constraints, and all of them need to be satisfied
as usual, leading to a logical AND. Indeed, none of the sufficient event conditions should be
satisfied to infer that there is no event.
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Linearising the Anomaly Score Function The anomaly score function in (6.13) involves
two nonlinear terms: the high scales contribution I(τ ) and the function q that takes it as input
and returns the maximum accepted low scale coefficient.
The term I(τ ) involves the computation of nsn2τ squares of N -order polynomials, where ns and
nτ are, respectively, the number of scales and translations. This has an asymptotic complexity
O(nsn2τN2). Computing I(τ ) exactly becomes intractable for values of N in the order of
hundreds. However, the squares of the N -order polynomials can be replaced with the linear
approximation given by the product of the polynomial with its constant term, making problem
(7.6) more scalable with the number of sensors.
The constant term includes the wavelet transform of the original measurements signal, while
the variables contain the manipulations, i.e the difference between the corrupted and original
signal. So the energy of the manipulations signal is the difference between the energies of the
signal corrupted by malicious interference and of the original signal. Because of the nature of
the problem, the energy of such a difference is smaller than the energy of the original signal:
otherwise anomalies would be evident. Hence, the most relevant terms in the square of the
corrupted signal are those that are multiplied by the constant term.
The function q can also be linearised to obtain an entirely linear approximation for the anomaly
score. Since the input and output of function q in (6.13) are in a monotonic relationship
(larger high scales coefficients are usually matched by larger low scale coefficients), standard
linearisation techniques, such as linear regression [GH06], give accurate results.
Note that the evasion requirement is not guaranteed with the linearised anomaly score, since it
may also give lower estimates. This requires us to validate a solution found with the linearised
anomaly score against the actual anomaly detection algorithm, before accepting it.
Transforming Bilinear into Linear Terms After linearising the anomaly score function,
the only term that makes the optimisation problem non-linear is the presence of the bilinear
terms yjMij. Bilinear problems can be transformed into linear problems with some loss in
optimality.
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This is achieved by introducing the dummy variables:
Wij = yjMij i ∈ 1, ..., T j ∈ 1, ...N (7.12)
Rather than adding the equation above as a constraint, which would still be bilinear, we use
the McCormick envelopes [McC76], which are known to well approximate (7.12).
Wij ≥Minfij yj
Wij ≥Msupij yj + Mij −Msupij
Wij ≤Msupij yj
Wij ≤Mij + Minfij yj −Minfij
Minfij ≤Mij ≤Msupij
Minfij ≤Wij ≤Msupij
(7.13)
The McCormick constraints are introduced for all j ∈ 1, ..., N , giving a total of 8N additional
constraints per each time instant. The result is the surrogate problem (7.14), which replaces
the variables as in (7.12), and whose minimum is an overestimation for the original problem.
min
y
N∑
j=1
(yj) (7.14a)
s.t.
yj ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ 1, ..., N (7.14b)
e(Xwt) 6= e(Xwt±Wwt)∀t ∈ 1, ..., T −W + 1 (7.14c)
a(Xi±Wi) ≤ Td ∀i ∈ 1, ..., T (7.14d)
Note that the McCormick constraints require the variable Mij to be within [Minfij ,M
sup
ij ], and
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Minfij is required to be equal or greater than zero. For this reason (7.14) introduces a slight
modification to (7.6), which considers that the manipulations can also be negative, i.e. the at-
tacker can also decrease the measurements. In particular, since events are assumed to cause the
measurements to increase, the manipulation will be summed for eliciting attacks and subtracted
for masking attacks.
With such a modification, Mij becomes the magnitude of the manipulations, therefore Minfij
can always be set to 0 (which corresponds to no malicious manipulation), while Msupij can be
set to a positive value. It is also possible to set it to the measurements range size. However,
since the time needed to solve the problem increases with the variables range size, it may be
worthwhile to find a reasonable value for Msupij by starting with a small value and increasing
it until the problem has a feasible solution. Note that there is always at least one feasible
solution, which is N = C, since a genuine rest condition should always be allowed to transition
to a genuine event and vice versa.
Solving Algorithm
To solve problem (7.14), we use Algorithm 18: findAttackVector. This builds the optimisation
problems that are involved in the eliciting/masking attack and collects the results.
In a first step, it builds the optimisation problem with the constraints described in the previous
sections. These include the relaxed domain constraints for the targeted sensors variables at line
4, the McCormick constraints at line 6, and the undetectability constraints at line 19. Note
that after replacing the bilinear variables yjMij with the dummy variables Wij, the variables
yj and Mij are present only in McCormick constraints. So, the problem will be optimised
with respect to the dummy variables Wij, while the original variables will be set to satisfy the
McCormick constraints. This part is common for both eliciting and masking scenarios, which
are considered separately at lines 22 and 30 respectively.
At lines 25 and 34, findAttackVector passes the optimisation problem that it has built to
Algorithm 19: solveRelaxedAndCheck. Since eliciting problems are solved as the best solution
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Algorithm 18 findAttackVector
Require: Xwt
Ensure: Cmin, M∗, y∗
1: elicit = e(Xwt) < Te
2: Pr = new optimisation problem {Initialise a new optimisation problem.}
3: for j ∈ 1, ..., N do
4: Add constraint to Pr: yj ∈ [0, 1] {Binary constraints relaxation}
5: for i ∈ 1, ...,W do
6: Add constraint to Pr: McCormick constraints (7.13). Replace all occurrences of yjMij
in Pr with Wij {Bilinear constraints relaxation}
7: end for
8: end for
9: if elicit then
10: X˘wt = Xwt + W
11: else
12: X˘wt = Xwt −W
13: end if
14: for τ ∈ Ω do
15: D(τ ) = (TwavS)(s0, τ )
16: I(τ ) =
∑
t
∑
s∈hs,...,Hs(T
wav
ns X˘wt)
2(s, τ )m(s, t− τ )
17: a(X˘wt , τ ) = q(I(τ ))/D(τ )
18: al(X˘wt , τ ) = Linearise (a(X˘wt , τ ))
19: Add constraint to Pr: al(X˘wt , τ ) < Td {Linearised Evasion constraints}
20: end for
21: Cmin = N , M∗ = {0, ..., 0}, y∗ = {0, ..., 0}
22: if elicit then
23: for z ∈ 1, ..., Z do
24: Add constraint to Pr: A(z)X˘wtB(z) ≥ Te {Eliciting constraint}
25: C ′,M′,y′ = solveRelaxedAndCheck(Pr,Cmin) {Eliciting problem built. Now solve it.}
26: if C ′ < Cmin then
27: Cmin = C ′, M∗ = M′, y∗ = y′
28: end if
29: end for
30: else {Masking Scenario}
31: for z ∈ 1, ..., Z do
32: Add constraint to Pr: A(z)X˘wtB(z) ≤ Te {Masking constraints}
33: end for
34: C ′,M′,y′ = solveRelaxedAndCheck(Pr,Cmin) {Maskng problem built. Now solve it.}
35: if C ′ < Cmin then
36: Cmin = C ′, M∗ = M′, y∗ = y′
37: end if
38: end if
39: return Cmin, M∗, y∗
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Algorithm 19 solveRelaxedAndCheck
Require: Pr,Cmin
Ensure: C ′, M′, y′
1: C ′ = Cmin, M∗ = {0, ..., 0}, y′ = {0, ..., 0}
2: Solve Pr and get the relaxed solution Mr, yr
3: objr =
∑
j∈1,...,N y
r
j
4: for C ∈ objr, ..., Cmin do
5: P ′ = copy of Pr
6: y′ = yr
7: sortInd = argsort(y Mi)
8: y′i = 0 ∀i ∈ sortInd(1), ..., sortInd(N − C)
9: y′i = 1 ∀i ∈ sortInd(N − C + 1), ..., sortInd(N)
10: Solve P ′ and get the solution M′
11: if M′ and y′ respect the non-linearised undetectability constraint a(X˘wt) < Td then
12: C ′ = C, M′ = Mr, y′ = yr
13: end if
14: end for
15: return C ′, M′, y′
among the Z optimisation problems that arise by enabling the sufficient event conditions one
by one, solveRelaxedAndCheck is run Z times between lines 22-29, and the eliciting solution
is the best among all of them. Masking problems, instead, are solved as the solution to the
problem that rejects all the Z sufficient event conditions. So, masking scenarios require only
one call to Algorithm 19, which solves the problem built between lines 30-37. This problem
contains Z event-detection constraints that all require the event conditions not to be satisfied.
Specifically, solveRelaxedAndCheck firstly solves the relaxed problem with continuous values for
yj (line 3). Because of the relaxation, the solution gives a lower bound to the minimum number
of malicious sensors needed. Hence, in a second phase, it sets to 1 the yj that produce the
highest C values of yjMij, which corresponds to the C compromised sensors that are mostly
used. The remainder are set to 0 and the new problem, where the binary variables have fixed
values, is solved (lines 4-10) to find the values of Mij that satisfy the constraints, if any.
If a solution is found, it is a solution also for the original problem (7.14). However, the latter
includes a linear approximation of the real anomaly detection algorithm, which is the one that
should be evaded. For this reason, the solution is considered only if it achieves evasion on the
anomaly detector (lines 11 -12).
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This algorithm was implemented using the Gurobi solver [GO15] as a back-end for the opti-
misation of the basic problems. Gurobi is an efficient solver for linear and (convex) quadratic
optimisation. However, findAttackVector requires the optimisation of several problems and the
construction of complex constraints which become especially burdensome with high values of N .
To point out the problem’s complexity, we report in Table 7.3 the execution times in minutes of
the findAttackVector function, executed by an Intel R©CoreTM i7-2600 CPU @ 3.40GHz. Such
times are distinguished according to the type of attack (eliciting/masking) and by number of
sensors N . Each time is the average obtained for 20 measurements sets, generated randomly
with the method described in Section 7.3.3. The times refer to a single experiment, which is a
particular eliciting or masking scenario, within a specific WSN deployment, and with a specific
set of original measurements.
Table 7.3: Execution times for a single run of findAttackVector, in minutes.
Attack N 10 30 60 90 100 200
Eliciting 6.5 15 52.9 50.6 75 99.6
Masking 3.5 4.5 5.4 6.6 7.66 14.8
Note that the eliciting problem is more time-consuming because it requires us to run Algo-
rithm solveRelaxedAndCheck Z times and return the best result. The masking problem is less
burdensome since, instead of Z optimisation problems, there are Z event detection constraints,
but Algorithm solveRelaxedAndCheck is run only once per experiment.
The times in Table 7.3 start to be high when we run each experiment several times, and
consider more experiment scenarios. With 20 samples per experiment, which is the case for
our evaluations, solving all the problems took 114 hours. For comparison, we have also run the
experiments by removing, one-by-one, the simplifications that we have introduced, and observed
that the algorithm could not find any solution within a two-weeks period. This confirms that
the approximations made in Section 7.3.2 are necessary to make the problem tractable, even
though the calculations are run oﬄine at deployment time. Note that parallel computing would
not bring significant benefits into the problem, since the constraint of respecting the inter-sensor
correlations would require the different parts to frequently communicate with each other, which
results into a loss of the main advantages of parallelism.
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7.3.3 Evaluating the Resilience of Wireless Sensor Networks toWorst-
Case Attacks
With the worst-case attack problem well defined and made tractable, we can now find the attack
vector for a specific WSN, defined as the sensors to compromise and the measurements to be
injected into those compromised sensors that achieve evasion and change the event detection
output. In the following, we present the results of the application of the solving algorithm and
discuss them to understand risks and advantages of measurements inspection algorithms, as
well as of the event detection algorithm and of WSNs in general.
The analysis requires a WSN with well-defined deployment and the measurements from all
sensors collected at different times. However, the results for a specific deployment and for fixed
characteristics of the physical phenomenon do not enable us to draw generic conclusions about
the damage that can be caused by an attack, and the weak spots that may be exploited.
Hence, our approach is to fix only a WSN deployment area, i.e. the area where sensor nodes
can be installed. Within such an area, we identify multiple deployment configurations, with
different sensor densities, to evaluate the impact of the increase in inter-sensor correlation which
follows from increases in the sensor density. To also take into account the variability that exists
between different rest conditions and events, we generate 20 rest conditions, for which the
eliciting attack vector is calculated and 20 event scenarios, for which the masking attack vector
is calculated. Each scenario is made of 100 temporal samples to study the response in time
of both the event detection and the measurements inspection algorithm. Scenarios differ from
each other in the shape of the deployment and in the original measurements, which are not
under the control of the attacker.
After running the optimisation algorithm for each configuration of the aforementioned elements,
we take the average of all the minimum numbers of malicious sensors that are needed to subvert
event detection across the 20 different scenarios. In this way, we have reliable and contextualised
information about the degree of resilience of a WSN.
In principle, different configurations of sensors might be deployed to compare the different
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degrees of resilience that can be obtained. However, one can exploit the data collected with
a specific deployment and interpolate to approximate what the measurement perceived by a
sensor at a generic location would be.
Other than by interpolation, the measurements can be produced by a model, i.e. a physical
model of the monitored phenomenon, which works as a simulator of measurements that may
be perceived. This approach also makes the data collection step easier as it can generate an
arbitrary set of event scenarios, which may be rare. We introduce below the model-generated
measurements for wildfire monitoring WSNs as a case study.
Case Study: Wildfire Monitoring WSNs
Wildfire monitoring WSNs are well suited for the evaluation of measurements inspection tech-
niques. Indeed, they observe events, i.e. fires, which have non-trivial diffusion patterns in space
as a fire affects the sensors in a different and unpredictable way. Moreover, the deployments can
cover wide areas, so we can run a comprehensive analysis about the impact of the deployment
size on the performance of anomaly detection.
The data measurements being used below are model-generated temperatures produced with the
wildfire model described in Section 7.2.5. We consider a set of N sensors randomly scattered
in an area of 100 × 100 m2, hence the deployment area’s size is 10000m2. Consequently, the
average sensor density is well defined and it is equal to:
ρN = DA/N
1
m2
(7.15)
where DA is the deployment area, i.e. DA = 10000m2 in our analyses. Although real deploy-
ments may be considerably larger, e.g. in the case of forests, within the chosen deployment
size we can reasonably rely on measurements inspection only. Within larger deployment ar-
eas, in the order of 10 hectares, we need to complement measurements inspection with other
techniques, such as software attestation, as discussed in Chapter 8.
The quantity ρN , rather than N , is what ultimately matters for the performance of event
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detection and anomaly detection, since it tells how fine-grained is the information gathered
about the physical phenomenon. Nevertheless, since the deployment area is well defined, we
will refer to the number of sensors rather than their density, since it is easier to visualise and
to interpret.
The time evolution of the fires is modelled with a linear interpolation of both the black bodies
temperatures and their radius. An average spread ratio of 0.4m/s is reasonable for typical
environmental parameters (such as slope of the terrain, wind speed and grass type) [NHS08].
Existing simulation environments such as FARSITE – developed by the U.S. Forest Service
[Fin+98] – are more accurate and consider different combinations of the variables involved, in-
cluding wind, fuel, terrain slope etc. However, these simulators focus on the wildfire’s spreading
behaviour and do not provide the spatio-temporal distribution of temperatures.
An example of the resulting temperature evolution in time is shown in Fig. 7.11. The fire
originates at the bottom left corner of the WSN space and spreads across the deployment area.
If there is no intervention, the fire is supposed to proceed undisturbed and may also cover the
whole WSN deployment space, as shown in Fig. 7.11d.
Note that the event evolution has both a temporal and a spatial effect. The temporal effect
is the measurements increase in time, which is linked to the fact that the fire is getting more
powerful and temperatures increase as a consequence (after a certain point they saturate). The
spatial effect is in the spreading of the fire area: the temperatures of more and more sensors are
affected by the fire. This effect has an important impact on the feasibility of masking attacks:
indeed, if the event can eventually be perceived throughout the whole WSN, the attacker needs
to compromise a number of sensors very close to N to prevent event detection. For this reason,
rather than masking an event for its whole duration, an attacker may seek to highly delay the
detection time instead.
Hence, in the following experiments, the constraints that impose the change of the event detec-
tion output are considered only for the first 6 minutes since the fire outbreak when, as shown
in Fig. 7.11b, the fire can already be well spread. Firstly, we will analyse the resilience gains
offered by measurements inspection when considering a simplistic event detection algorithm
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Figure 7.11: Example of fire evolution in time. The WSN area is a two-dimensional space. The
circles identify the sensors and colours map the temperatures, in Kelvin. Note that the sensors
are not placed in a grid but randomly scattered.
that does not exploit spatial correlation. After that, we will introduce a more suitable event
detection algorithm and show that the resilience gains can be dramatically improved if the
event detection algorithm is well designed.
Simplistic Event Detection Algorithm
The performance of measurements inspection is dependent on the event detection algorithm
since it determines how much effort is needed by the malicious sensors to subvert the event
detection result. If this effort is minimal, then even the best measurements inspection algorithm
would have poor performance.
To clarify this point, we consider an oversimple event detection algorithm for the wildfire
monitoring WSN, which is also the same algorithm usually adopted by temperature sensors for
home fire alarms, i.e. :
186 Chapter 7. Robustness of Measurements Inspection
(X˘i,1 ≥ Te) ∨ (X˘i,2 ≥ Te), , ...,∨(X˘i,N ≥ Te) (7.16)
That corresponds to triggering a fire alarm if any of the N temperatures is above Te, usually
set to 60◦C (corresponding to 333.15 Kelvin). This choice makes it particularly easy to spoof
an event, since only one malicious sensor needs to focus on subverting event detection. The
remainder of malicious sensors can collude in endorsing its measurements and making them
undetectable. This is confirmed by the results obtained and shown in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4: Minimum number of malicious sensors for both eliciting and masking attacks, with
different sensors number (and density in turn). The eliciting attacks require a small set of
sensors to be compromised due to the event detection algorithm, which requires just one sensor
to trigger.
Attack N 10 30 60 90 100 200
Eliciting 3 3 5 7 7 7
Masking 4 11 21 33 34 81
The results with eliciting attacks above are obtained by averaging the output of Algorithm
18 using 20 different scenarios with no fire as input. Here the real measurements are around
293.15K (20◦C). The results with masking attacks are obtained by averaging the output
of Algorithm 18 using 20 randomly generated event scenarios as input. Here, a fire starts
immediately spreading until it saturates and can be perceived throughout the whole WSN
(such as in Fig. 7.11d). However, the attack is judged successful if no fire is detected for the
first 6 minutes (an example of fire spread at 6 minutes is the one in Fig. 7.11b). Generally, at
this stage the fire is above the 60◦C for about 25% sensors, while the measurements inspection
algorithm requires the attacker to compromise around 37% sensors to mask the event whilst
staying undetected, with a gain of about 50%.
There are two main reasons behind the performance against eliciting attacks, both connected
to the event detection algorithm. The first is that one single sensor is needed to spoof an event,
hence the extra 2-4 sensors that are needed to avoid detection by the measurements inspection
algorithm are actually a 200%-400% gain. The second reason is that it is not unlikely for
temperatures to jump from 20 to 60◦C in a few metres, since the temperatures may show a
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large variation in the presence of a fire, thus the attacker needs to compromise a small area,
i.e. a few sensors.
The goal of the algorithm that detects malicious data is analogous to charactering the admissible
ranges, as a function of the measurements collected. This must be done under all possible
genuine circumstances, including the presence of any event of interest. The inaccuracy of
anomaly detection, and the need to cater for all the possible scenarios introduce uncertainty in
the characterisation of admissible measurements. Therefore, even with 200 sensors, 7 malicious
sensors are enough to introduce a variation of 40◦C and change a 20◦C measurement into 60◦C.
The detection of malicious data is an ill-posed problem in this case, because we are giving to a
single sensor the power to decide on the event’s presence, but, in practice, more sensors share
information about the same event. This is also shown in the masking results in Table 7.4,
where the number of sensors needed to mask the event defined in (7.16) is almost one order of
magnitude bigger than in the eliciting case.
This happens because, with such event detection, all the sensors with temperature greater than
Te need to be compromised and report a temperature less than Te. This implies both that C
must be greater than the number of sensors with temperature higher than Te, and that the
constraints introduced by spatial correlation are respected by more sensors.
From this simple experiment, we conclude that the event detection algorithm highly
affects the chance of detection. In particular, if it involves few sensors, spoofing and
eliciting events become simple. The detection of spoofed events would benefit from an event
detection algorithm that is as strict as possible: i.e. that capture as many features of the event
as possible. However, this choice simplifies the masking task, since it is sufficient to mask just
one of the features required to prevent event detection.
Ultimately, the best choice of event detection algorithm, from a security perspective, is a trade-
off between the thorough characterisation of an event’s characteristic and the characterisation
of its most relevant features. This trade-off is governed by the eliciting and masking risks,
which differ especially because they cause different types of damage.
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Event Detection Algorithm Improvements
In this section, we consider a more sophisticated event detection algorithm that makes use of
both temporal and spatial correlations to identify changes in the measurements distribution and
verify that the change is experienced by multiple sensors. To improve the accuracy of event de-
tection, some techniques also make a comparison between different attributes, e.g. temperature
and humidity [SNQ12; SLM13], in conjunction with analyses in the spatial and/or temporal
domain. Even though our approach is compatible with these event detection algorithms, we do
not analyse them in detail since it is the event information captured in the spatial domain that
ultimately matters in discriminating genuine from malicious sensors, as conveyed in Section 4.
The event detection criterion presented here is based on the observation that the sensed mea-
surements follow different distributions in the absence and in the presence of events. This holds
true especially in the temporal domain as the physical phenomena induce higher measurements
variability in the presence of events. Changes in variability are likely perceived by more sensors,
as they are all perceiving the same phenomenon. Hence, the presence of events can be verified
by testing for increases in the average variability within a neighbourhood:
1
N(j)
∑
N(j)
δW
X˘ij
> Te (7.17)
In (7.17) δW
X˘ij
is the variability of the measurements within a W -wide time window [ti−W , ti−1],
perceived by a generic sensor j. N(j) indicates its neighbourhood. The variability of the
measurements is averaged across the neighbourhood to exploit the spatial correlation properties
of events.
The variability of a signal is generally measured with the variance, which would be calculated
in a W -wide time window as expressed below.
δW
X˘ij
= Var({X˘kj}i−1k=i−W ) (7.18)
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The non-trivial problem with the use of variance in the event detection algorithm is the calcula-
tion of the variance itself. The most widely adopted algorithm is the unbiased sample variance,
which is defined as:
1
W − 1
W∑
i=1
(X˘ij − X˘j)2 (7.19)
where:
X˘j =
1
W
W∑
i=1
(X˘ij) (7.20)
When the values of X˘ij are known, evaluating this formula has a complexity O(W ), but when
they are unknown, the complexity becomes O(W 3) because it involves W squares of the sum of
W + 1 monomials. For large values of W , problems with such event detection algorithm have
an infeasible computational complexity just for defining the event detection equations.
For this reason, rather than (7.19), we use an approximation [ZWC12], which is:
1
W 2
W∑
i=1
W∑
k=i+1
(X˘ij − X˘kj)2 (7.21)
The advantage of this approximation is that it changes the number of monomials from W + 1
to 2. Hence, the complexity for evaluating this formula when yj are unknowns is O(W 2) rather
than O(W 3).
To further reduce the complexity introduced by the variance-based event detection equations,
another approximation of the variance can be used, which is made up of justW polynomials with
2 monomials, reaching a complexity of evaluating the formula of O(W ). Such an approximation
is:
1
2W
W∑
i=1
(X˘i+1 j − X˘ij)2 (7.22)
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Note that constraints of the kind 1
2W
∑W
i=1(X˘i+1 j − X˘ij)2 ≥ Te, which would be introduced
for eliciting problems, make the problem non-convex. While convex problems can be solved in
polynomial time, non-convex problems are known to be NP-hard. To avoid this problem, we
can remove the square and obtain:
1
2W
W∑
i=1
X˘i+W j − X˘ij (7.23)
The value returned by (7.23) may sensibly differ from the real variance, but still evaluates the
data variability in time. Note that since the differences are not squared, the value may be either
positive or negative. In wildfire monitoring applications we expect this value to be positive
when an event manifests, since the measurements will generally increase as a fire breaks out,
and become negative when it starts to be extinguished. Hence, we build the new event detection
algorithm by comparing the variability measure (7.23), averaged across a neighbourhood, to a
positive threshold. Ultimately, our new event detection criterion is:
1
N(j)
∑
N(j)
1
2W
W∑
i=1
X˘i+W j − X˘ij > Te (7.24)
The results with the new event detection algorithm are shown in Table 7.5. Note that the
masking results have increased by 3.5 times on average, while the eliciting results have increased
by 8.7 times on average. As a consequence, the gap between eliciting and masking results has
been reduced too. Masking attacks still find it harder to evade anomaly detection because the
gap between the events used for masking and rest conditions is higher than the gap between
rest conditions used for eliciting and event conditions.
Table 7.5: Minimum number of malicious sensors. The improvement in the event detection
algorithm increased the resiliency, especially against eliciting attacks.
Attack N 10 30 60 90 100 200
Eliciting 6 14 25 33 33 66
Masking 6 20 53 75 80 162
Note that since we defined the neighbourhood of a sensor as the sensors whose distance is less
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than 80 m, with a maximum of 3 sensors an attacker can influence all the neighbourhoods in
the network. Indeed, this is the minimum number of circles with radius equal to 80 needed to
cover a square area with size 100. This means that with just 3 sensors an attacker can spoof or
mask any event if no anomaly detection is in place3, and that if we subtract 3 from the results
in Table 7.5 we obtain the gain in resilience brought in by the wavelet-based measurements
inspection algorithm. This is measured as the number of additional sensors that an attacker
needs to compromise thanks to the measurements inspection algorithm.
To compare with another state-of-the-art technique, we have also run the same optimisation
algorithm using the anomaly detection algorithm described in [CP07], based on Principal Com-
ponent Analysis (PCA). Being based on linear transformations, this algorithm did not require a
linearisation step and could be immediately used in the optimisation Algorithm 18. In this case
we have run each experiment 20 times. The results showed that even with the highest number
of sensors, i.e. 200, 1 malicious sensor was enough to spoof an event most of the times, and
in a few cases, the number of sensors to compromise increased only up to 3. For the masking
scenario the average was 1, with a maximum of 4 across the 20 experiments. Even though the
PCA-based anomaly detection outperforms many similar techniques and is able to cope also
with correlated anomalies, including collusion scenarios, in the worst-case scenario it does not
introduce a significant gain in resilience.
In conclusion, we have discussed that by controlling 3 sensors or fewer, an attacker can
subvert the event detection algorithm in (7.24). To achieve that also whilst stay-
ing undetected, the PCA-based anomaly detection algorithm forces the attacker to
compromise one to three further sensors, whereas the wavelet-based anomaly de-
tection algorithm demands a substantially higher number of compromised sensors.
Indeed, wavelet-based anomaly detection forces the average of the temporal varia-
tion in the neighbourhood, which is the criterion that identifies events in (7.24), to
be spread across the neighbourhood. In this way, the subsets of colluding sensors
need to be large, otherwise there will be some genuine sensor that has information
3This is because the event detection algorithm makes an average of the temporal variation of each sensor in
the neighbourhood. Hence, if a sensor produces an extremely low/high temporal variation, it can mask/elicit
an event on its own.
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about the event presence/absence and whose measurements are not consistent with
those of the malicious ones. The analysis shows that the mimicry-based test suite
can be used also for comparing different anomaly detection techniques.
7.3.4 Study of the Worst-Case Adversary
In the previous section we have shown how many compromised sensors are needed to change
the event detection output whilst staying undetected. However, beside the minimum num-
ber of compromised sensors, the optimisation algorithm also returns the specific choices that
an adversary would take in the process of impairing event detection whilst evading anomaly
detection, with a budget of compromised sensors.
With such information, we are able to learn the most sophisticated strategies to violate event
integrity. This can be useful in identifying the main threats in the WSN, as well as the main
weaknesses of the anomaly-detection algorithm.
With the help of graphical tools, we analyse some examples of worst-case attacks and extract
this kind of attack-related information. The analysis is first done for eliciting attacks and then
for masking attacks, in the sections below.
Discussion of Eliciting Results
In Fig. 7.12, we show the effects of the malicious data injection attack produced in output by
the optimisation algorithm. These measurements are able to spoof an event, i.e. making the
event detection condition (7.24) true, and preventing detection by the wavelet-based anomaly
detection algorithm.
A time snapshot of the original measurements (without the attack) is shown in Fig. 7.12a,
7.12b and 7.12c, for deployment sizes of 10, 60 and 200 sensors respectively. The violet colors
indicate that the temperatures are not high, so there is no fire in the WSN area. Here the
temperature measurements are pretty homogeneous and mainly perturbed by noise.
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Figure 7.12: Examples of Elicited scenarios with increasing number of sensors. The circles
represent the sensors. The white crosses indicate which sensors are compromised. Colours map
the measurements space: bluish colours are for low temperatures, reddish colours are for high
temperatures.
The subset of malicious measurements returned by the optimisation algorithm, manages to
spoof an event. In particular, the compromised sensors transform the scenarios shown in Fig.
7.12a, 7.12b and 7.12c respectively into the scenarios shown 7.12d, 7.12e and 7.12f. The resulting
measurements, shown at a fixed time instant, which is the time where event detection starts
to trigger, are noticeably higher than the originals. Moreover, from these figures we can learn
how one optimal attacker would act or, from the opposite perspective, the main risks of the
WSN. These observations are summarised below.
Contiguity of Targeted Sensors In every eliciting scenario, the targeted sensors, i.e. the
sensors that the attacker would choose to compromise and to replace their measurements, are
contiguous. This means that a sophisticated attacker would target the sensors in the same
area, and that all of them are likely needed to spoof an event. Indeed, if even one sensor was
not compromised, it would keep reporting rest-condition measurements. This instead is not a
194 Chapter 7. Robustness of Measurements Inspection
problem for the sensors that are far apart from the set of compromised sensors because, after
a certain distance, spatial correlation fades away and it is plausible that they do not perceive
the fire at all.
The main implication of this observation is that attacks to measurements integrity in WSNs
would be better counteracted if the measurements inspection algorithm was supported by other
techniques which trade a higher cost for better reliability. For instance, it may be the case of
manual inspection of the sensor nodes, or of the use of tamper-proof hardware. If this is done
for a subset of sensor nodes that are judiciously chosen, there may be significant improvements
for a small increase in cost. In particular, the sensor nodes that undergo this special treatment
should be: 1. Randomly chosen, to avoid that the attacker uses special treatment for them.
2. Well-spaced, to avoid introducing less protected areas in the WSN.
Optimal Location for Spoofing Events Fig. 7.12d, 7.12e and 7.12f share the characteristic
that the spoofed event starts from one of the WSN’s corners. In all likelihood, this is because
sensors at the WSN’s corner have fewer neighbours, and hence there are fewer sources of
information that need to be compromised.
This result has relevant implications on the design of both the event detection algorithm and
the WSN itself. Event detection should indeed treat the information coming from sensors that
are more isolated with more suspiciousness, both for the detection and the rejection of events.
The WSN instead, may be deployed in such a way that events at the boundary of the WSN
are rare. For instance, a wildfire monitoring WSN may have the outermost sensors bordering
on fire-resistant areas.
Real Event Mimicry If we compare Fig. 7.12f with Fig. 7.11a or 7.11b, we note a striking
similarity between the characteristics of real and spoofed events. Just like real events, spoofed
events represent the propagation of heat from one or more sources, where the temperature is
maximum, towards the outskirts where the temperatures progressively decay. These char-
acteristics were emulated by the evasion optimisation algorithm without domain-
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specific knowledge about how events should look like. Of course, the optimisation
problem includes the event detection algorithm in its constraints, but this just requires the
measurements variation to increase in time, while there is no information related to the events’
spatial patterns. This means that it is the measurements inspection algorithm which has learnt
the events pattern and has forced the spoofing action to mimic real events. The anomaly de-
tection algorithm learns only one characteristic of spatial correlation, which is the cross-scale
relationship. On the contrary, it learns no specific information about the propagation pattern of
a fire. We conclude that the cross-scale relationship indirectly captures information about how
events manifest, so the attacker is forced to mimic real events and cannot trigger fire detection
with unrealistic measurements.
Discussion of Masking Results
In Fig. 7.13, we show the effects of some of the worst-case masking attacks, calculated by the
optimisation algorithm. The malicious measurements are able to mask an event, i.e. making the
event detection condition (7.24) false, and prevent detection from the wavelet-based anomaly
detection algorithm.
Fig. 7.13a, 7.13b and 7.13c show the measurements perceived under real events, after 6 minutes
from the fire outbreak, in deployments of 10, 60 and 200 sensors respectively. Fig. 7.13d, 7.13e
and 7.13f show optimal masking attacks against these scenarios, i.e. the measurements after
the masking attacks that transform the event conditions in Fig. 7.13a, 7.13b and 7.13c into rest
conditions. A generic temperature decrease is observable in the measurements after the attack,
especially in larger deployments. The observations about the worst-case attacks in masking
scenarios are reported below.
Minimum Effort The resulting measurements in Fig. 7.13d, 7.13e, and 7.13f are rest mea-
surements, because the event detection algorithm does not trigger. However, we note that only
Fig. 7.13f is a pure rest scenario, whilst Fig. 7.13e and 7.13f are closer to event conditions
than to rest conditions. In other words, the event score that is compared to the threshold in
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Figure 7.13: Examples of Masked scenarios with increasing number of sensors. The circles
represent the sensors. The white crosses indicate which sensors are compromised. Colours map
the measurements space: bluish colours are for low temperatures, reddish colours are for high
temperatures.
(7.24) to infer the presence of events, has been brought just below the threshold (here we are
considering measurements variability for detecting events, so high temperatures are not suffi-
cient to identify a fire). In practice, these measurements correspond to the scenario that one
would observe immediately before the breakout of a fire, i.e. when measurements are increas-
ing, but not enough to infer the clear presence of a fire. For the scenario with 200 sensors in
Fig. 7.13f, this does not occur because the best attack strategy is to keep the measurements in
the bottom right corner unchanged, as they are already compatible with a pure rest condition.
However, since the fire to mask reaches high temperatures even at its boundary, the malicious
sensors are forced to considerably decrease the measurements to prevent inconsistencies with
the neighbouring genuine sensors, i.e. those not perceiving the fire.
Making the minimum effort in subverting event detection is generally more convenient for the
attacker, since having reached a good-enough condition in compromising the event’s integrity,
all the remaining resources can be concentrated on staying undetected. Something similar
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happens also in the eliciting scenario, since the spoofed events are also at the boundary of
event detection, i.e. they are the smallest event that can trigger event detection, yet for the
masking case this is more evident.
The practical implication of this observation is that the anomaly detection algorithm could
be improved by analysing the temporal evolution of the event score. Indeed, the malicious
measurements will likely aim at making the event score close to the threshold for the attack
duration; nonetheless, the typical event evolution causes a more transitory behaviour around
the threshold in general. Thus, it may be worthwhile checking that the time evolution of the
event score does not show anomalous behaviours such as saturation just below/above the event
detection threshold. Even though this is an analysis in the time domain, it refers to an index
–the event score– which is defined also in the space domain. As we highlighted in Section
7.3.1, anomaly detection based only on the time domain can be circumvented by an attacker
by mimicking the temporal dynamics of the monitored phenomena.
Smoother Transitions In Fig. 7.13d, we observe that the southernmost malicious sensors
make up smooth transitions between the malicious measurements in the north, which have been
significantly decreased, and the genuine measurements at south-east, which corresponds to low
temperatures.
This may seem counter-intuitive because in the original genuine scenario, depicted in Fig. 7.13a
the transitions are less smooth and they raise no anomaly. However, we should note that the
masking attack causes a change of context, i.e. from a fire scenario to a scenario with no fire. In
the presence of fires, the zones on fire can show a higher gradient with the zones that have not
been reached by the fire yet. In the absence of fires, instead, the measurements are more ho-
mogeneous since the sensors are subject to similar environmental conditions. This is a physical
characteristic of the way events manifest, that the wavelet-based anomaly detection algorithm
has captured. As a consequence, the masking sensors are forced to reduce the measurements
gradient whilst decreasing the measurements for masking the fire.
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C explosion in Time The purpose of masking is to prevent event detection and, in our case
it may mean silencing fire alarms. With no fire alarm, fires may not be dealt with, so they
could keep spreading and covering wider areas of the WSN, as mentioned in Section 7.3.3. As a
consequence, the sensors that are not perceiving the event at all at a certain time, may perceive
it in the future. So, if C sensors are needed to mask an event at time t, C + ∆C are needed
at time t + ∆t. For instance, in Fig. 7.13c we show a fire that has covered most of the WSN
deployment, and from Fig. 7.13f we deduce that the attacker needs to compromise 75% sensors
to mask the event.
This effect depends on the nature of the events and in particular on the area they cover. If the
average area covered by an event is smaller than the WSN deployment, then masking attacks
are more threatening. The same consideration holds if the timeliness of intervention is crucial.
For instance, delaying fire detection even by a few minutes may have dangerous consequences.
7.3.5 Design of Secure Wireless Sensor Networks
Evaluating the risk of a system makes sense only if such risk can be mitigated when high. Mea-
surements inspection is generally able to highly reduce this risk but, when there is poor cross-
sensor correlation in the measurements, its benefits are substantially reduced. Nevertheless,
measurements inspection has considerable advantages compared to other integrity verification
techniques, including a very little overhead on the system and negligible installation cost. So,
since sensor nodes are not expensive, it is worthwhile studying the performance improvements
that are obtained by increasing the deployment density and the cross-sensor correlation in turn.
Understanding how the number of sensors reduces the risk is not trivial, so this operation
would highly benefit from a numerical analysis similar to the problem of calculating the attack
vector that achieves evasion, but from the opposite perspective. Rather than calculating the
minimum number of malicious sensors that are needed to change the output of event detection,
the quantity of interest is the minimum number of deployed sensors that are needed to achieve
resiliency to a required number of malicious compromises.
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This problem shares some similarities to that of k-coverage deployment in sensor networks
[HT05], which deals with the problem of guaranteeing a minimum of k sensors in the sensing
range for a set of WSN spatial locations. The goal is to ensure that if an event is present
at a certain location, at least k sensors are able to detect it. This approach is based on the
assumption that each sensor can detect an event on its own, which holds for applications such
as target detection and localisation. However, the events’ presence can be determined only with
statistical analyses on many sensors in other applications, e.g. detection of natural disasters,
pathological conditions, and nuclear threats. Hence, a point in space may need to be in the
sensory range of many sensors to be covered. Moreover, k-coverage does not deal directly with
the problem of malicious nodes, but rather considers genuine faults and uncertainty [DCI02;
ZC04]. In the case of malicious interference, the k-coverage model can be applied only if
malicious sensor nodes are independently distributed. Instead, an attacker may compromise
contiguous sensors to gain full control over a WSN area.
Our approach is to guarantee a resiliency requirement, which is the condition that anomaly
detection triggers if the event detection is subverted with less than Cmax malicious sensors.
Because of such an if-then condition, it is not trivial to map the requirement to a set of con-
straints. Thus, we rather transform the design problem into multiple attack vector calculation
problems with the function designDeployment shown in Algorithm 20.
This algorithm is a binary search in the space of all possible values N , that adds a tolerance for
the solution tol, such that the returned solution overestimates the real solution by maximum
tol times. This is to reduce the optimisation time, since the algorithm designDeployment can
include many iterations of findAttackVector, which is computationally expensive, especially
when high values of N need to be tested during the binary search.
Moreover, Algorithm 20 gives assurance about the number of compromised sensors that can
be tolerated only for a specific scenario, i.e. a set of original genuine measurements which will
be partially compromised. To obtain an assurance that applies to generic scenarios, we run
Algorithm 20 under multiple scenarios, generated at line 6, and extract the maximum.
In our experiments, we have run each experiment under 20 different scenarios and calculated
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Algorithm 20 designDeployment
Require: Cmax, tol
Ensure: Nmin
1: N = 2Cmax
2: N infmin = Cmax
3: N supmin =∞
4: N ′ = 0
5: while (N −N ′)/(N) > tol and N > Cmax do
6: Generate W ×N measurements matrix Xwt
7: Cmin, M∗, y∗ = findAttackVector(Xwt)
8: if Cmin < Cmax then
9: N infmin = N
10: else
11: N supmin = N
12: end if
13: N ′ = N
14: if N supmin <∞ then
15: N =
⌊
N infmin+N
sup
min
2
⌋
16: else
17: N = 2N
18: end if
19: end while
20: return N supmin
the deployment size that guarantees resilience to a varying number of compromised sensors. We
used a tolerance tol=0.10, which gives a maximum overestimation of N by 10%. The results
are summarised in Table 7.6.
Table 7.6: Nmin: Minimum number of deployed sensors that guarantee resilience to a maximum
of C compromised nodes.
Attack C 10 30 60 90 100 200
Eliciting 20 75 180 400 >400 >400
Masking 22 45 93 119 124 398
These results show that for the masking case, the required number of sensors is definitely lower
and has a lower rate of increase. This is not surprising as masking has proved more difficult to
achieve from the attacker’s perspective.
To mitigate this gap, the event detection algorithm may be set to trigger when more confident
about the fire, but this inevitably delays the event detection. Instead, a more effective solution
may be to define different levels of alarms. For instance low-risk, medium-risk and high-risk
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alarms, depending on the spread of the fire. Indeed, the cost of spoofing an event would be
proportional to the risk level, since the spoofed fire’s spread is constrained by the number of
malicious sensors. Clearly, if the event reaction is delayed until the risk of the alarm gets high,
the system still gets some relevant damage, but if the counteraction is proportional to the risk
of the alarm4, the damage is minimised. This aspect should be taken into consideration when
designing an event-detection WSN.
Thanks to Algorithm 20, the resilience of a WSN can be calculated and guaranteed at design
time. The result may also be used for a feasibility analysis that checks if the cost savings given
by measurements inspection with respect to other techniques for measurements integrity, such
as manual intervention, are effectively worth the cost increase given by the enlargement in the
deployment size. However, while the resilience of the WSN obtained through measurements
inspection can be estimated through the methodology introduced above, there is currently no
means to make analogous analyses for other techniques, or to combine them.
7.3.6 Conclusions
Analysing the potential damage of malicious data injections in WSNs requires a well defined
problem for the attacker. In this section, we have considered the case of event detection WSNs,
where the attacker has two conflicting goals. The first is to mislead event detection, by either
triggering event detection when no event occurs or masking real events. The second is to evade
the anomaly detection algorithm that may unveil the measurements manipulation.
We have first evaluated the robustness of measurements inspection through the creation of
mimicry attacks, which build malicious data from an accurate selection and moulding of data
observed under normal circumstances. With this approach, mimicry attacks obtain data that
can represent accurately a false event or a false rest condition, which can cause high damage
whilst achieving high chance of staying undetected.
We have designed and implemented an automatic test suite, which is able to autonomously
4E.g., with low risk: activate sprinkler systems, with medium risk send firemen, with high risk dispatch
firefighting helicopters.
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select the data to mimic, use it to build malicious measurements and adapt the latter to the
current context. The test suite abstracts from the details of both the measurements inspection
algorithm and the event detection algorithm, so it is context-independent and requires only an
historical dataset of measurements as a knowledge base.
We have applied the test suite to the wavelet-based approach, with a synthetic and a real
dataset and we conclude that the detection gives highly reliable results. Good results have
been achieved for the characterisation and diagnosis phase, even though there is a substantial
increase of complexity compared to detection. These are due to error propagation effects as
well as to the complexity of the problem itself.
Then, we have introduced worst-case attacks, which identify the worst case scenarios by analysing
the measurements space and identifying a set of malicious measurements that guarantees both
the ability to stay undetected and to change the main output of the event detection algorithm
(i.e. whether there is any event). However, we have faced several challenges that prevent to
resolve the problem exactly in a reasonable time. Therefore, we have introduced an algorithm
that approximates the desired result and can be solved computationally. With such an algo-
rithm, a network operator can be informed of how the WSN can tolerate worst case scenario
attack.
We have tested the algorithm on a wildfire monitoring WSN and extracted an assurance for the
minimum number of compromised sensors that can be tolerated against eliciting and masking
attacks. Moreover, we have shown that the algorithm can be applied to different anomaly
detection algorithms. Effectively, the algorithm proved also as a methodology to compare the
resilience provided by different approaches.
Moreover, we have gained valuable knowledge from the application of this algorithm, such
as the impact of the event detection algorithm, which can considerably reduce the benefits
of measurements inspection if it does not characterise events properly. In particular, a loose
characterisation of events favours spoofing, while a strict characterisation makes the masking
task easier. A trade-off is required in the number of event conditions that are evaluated to
maximise the benefits of measurements inspection against both eliciting and masking attacks.
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When a good event detection algorithm is in place, measurements inspection constrains the
attacker to closely mimic event or rest conditions for achieving evasion. Our results have allowed
us to study the attacker’s strategies that can achieve this goal. The analysis of the worst-case
attacks has revealed important information that may improve the design of a WSN and of the
anomaly detection algorithm. For instance, we have observed that it is more advantageous for
the attacker to compromise neighbouring sensors, and that compromising the sensors at the
boundaries of the WSN deployment is the easiest way to spoof events.
Finally, we have presented the first technique that assures resilience to malicious data injections
in WSNs at design time. Such an algorithm provides the minimum number of sensors that need
to be deployed to guarantee detection with a maximum number of malicious sensors that can be
tolerated. This not only gives security guarantees, which are generally missing in the anomaly
detection field, but also evaluates the applicability of anomaly detection itself.
Chapter 8
Combining Measurement Integrity with
Sensor Integrity
The techniques presented so far enable us to infer if the measurements sensed by a WSN can be
trusted or not, and the robustness evaluation methodology presented in the previous chapter
allows a network operator to quantify the reliability of such techniques and to design a WSN
with an assured degree of reliability. The measurements inspection techniques presented in
Chapters 5 and 6 build a degree of trust in an untrusted environment, as they verify the integrity
of the measurements through the measurements themselves, which may be compromised.
In contrast, other techniques that differ from measurements inspection allow us to increase the
WSN’s trustworthiness by ascertaining the devices’ trustworthiness. This could be achieved
through manual verification; however, it would expensive for large deployments and impractical
for WSNs that operate in harsh environments. The body of work concerned with software
attestation instead verifies the integrity of the software running on the sensor nodes by exploiting
the capabilities of the WSN devices themselves. If the software is proved to be uncorrupted,
we expect that the measurements cannot be compromised through software-driven malicious
data injections. In other words, the trustworthiness of the software running on a device can be
transferred, to some extent, to the measurements observed by that device.
This characteristic can be exploited to alleviate a strict trade-off between the degree of confi-
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dence in the measurements’ integrity and the cost to obtain it. In fact, current solutions for
the integrity, and the security in general, of WSNs are highly biased towards one of the two.
In particular, the security level of attestation and the low cost of measurements inspection are
their most attractive characteristics and we seek to extract the benefits of both, while keeping
drawbacks to a minimum, by combining the two approaches. Attestation gives reliable informa-
tion about the software integrity of a sensor node, but it introduces an ad-hoc communication
protocol and additional computations, which become burdensome when run on many sensors
and multiple times. Measurements inspection instead, has the ability to detect integrity viola-
tions with no extra communications (when run by the base station or a remote server) and low
computational overhead. Moreover, it is more and more reliable when a subset of sensors is
genuine, hence once attestation verifies the integrity of a few nodes, measurements inspection
can extend the attestation’s result to many neighbouring sensors.
The work presented in this Chapter was done in collaboration with with Rodrigo Vieira Steiner,
as a colleague PhD Student at Imperial College London. Since software attestation is within his
areas of expertise, Mr Steiner took part of the attestation-specific issues, while I took care of the
issues regarding measurements inspection. Together, we designed the methods and protocols
presented below, and built simulations and analyses.
This chapter presents a study of how these two techniques can be best combined, since there
is a wide range of possibilities, and it is not obvious which combinations are better before-
hand. In many cases, the way in which both mechanisms are combined ends up favouring the
characteristics of only one of them, and some combinations might even degrade the overall
performance when compared with each of the individual approaches. Instead, a judicious com-
bination, which depends also on the application’s integrity requirements, enables us to optimise
the usage of the integrity verification techniques across the node layer and at the measurements
layer. Indeed, we will be able to determine how many attestations are needed to trust all the
WSN nodes, including those that are not attested, by exploiting the correlation analysis done
by measurements inspection.
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8.1 Software Attestation: a Generic Signature-Based Ap-
proach
Attestation is an integrity verification mechanism that allows a trusted device, named verifier,
to validate the memory contents of an untrusted device, called a prover [SL16]. In particu-
lar, software-based attestation mechanisms are capable of attesting untrusted devices without
the use of tamper-resistant hardware or any other particular piece of hardware that could be
used to restrict an adversary’s control over the prover, such as ROM or a Memory Protection
Unit (MPU).
These mechanisms follow a challenge-response protocol as illustrated in Figure 8.1. The process
starts with the verifier generating a challenge, which is essentially a random number, and
sending it to the prover. The prover then uses the challenge to traverse its own memory in a
pseudo-random fashion computing a checksum of the memory addresses accessed and sends the
result to the verifier. It is assumed that the verifier knows in advance the expected memory
contents of the prover, so it can perform the same computation and validate the response.
However, the prover not only must come back with the correct response, it has to do so within
a time limit after the challenge has been sent. This time limit is imposed to prevent an adversary
from performing additional operations to masquerade any possible modifications it may have
done to the prover’s original memory contents.
Figure 8.1: Attestation overview.
In practice, besides the time taken to execute the attestation routine, the timeout also has
to incorporate the time necessary to send the challenge and receive the response. While it is
possible to specify a time limit for sending the packets over the network, it is not possible to
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make this time constant. Therefore, an adversary could attempt to reduce its network delay,
earning time to execute more operations.
In theory, the best adversary has zero delay, meaning its time advantage would be the maximum
time allowed to send and receive the messages over the network. To prevent this from happening
the attestation routine has to be implemented in a time-optimal way. The routine comprises a
main loop, where it handles the memory accesses, which must be executed a number of times.
To hide any modifications, an adversary would need to insert new instructions into the loop,
introducing a fixed overhead per iteration. Consequently, the number of iterations is defined
according to the maximum network Round-Trip Time (RTT) allowed, such that the adversary’s
overhead is greater than its advantage.
8.2 Attack Model Refinement
Since in this chapter we are considering software attestation beside measurements inspection, we
need to refine the attack model presented in Chapter 4 to include also the attacker’s capabilities
with respect to the ability to tamper with the sensor nodes and software.
Even though measurements inspection can address also malicious data conveyed through e.g.,
environment manipulations, network integrity violations, or hardware tampering, we will focus
on malicious data injection attacks conveyed through malicious software run by compromised
nodes. In particular, we assume that the adversary cannot modify the node’s hardware, other-
wise software-based attestation would not be applicable. Hardware modification attacks include
also expanding the node’s memory with a flash memory or an SD card which contain, e.g., a
copy of the authentic software. On the contrary, we do not restrict how an adversary may com-
promise a node’s software. Measurements inspection is capable of identifying sensor nodes with
compromised hardware, as long as a sufficient subset of sensors keeps its hardware unchanged,
which is generally the case since physical attacks do not scale. However, in this chapter, we focus
on the cooperation between both schemes and leave the cases where only individual techniques
are effective for future work.
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We also assume the WSN sink cannot be compromised, for instance being equipped with
tamper-proof hardware, as it plays the role of the verifier. Fundamentally, if the sink gets
compromised, then the whole WSN is compromised. We further assume that provers are within
direct communication range and can only communicate with the verifier during attestation.
This prevents a prover from relaying the challenge to another, more powerful, device to run
attestation on its behalf. In practice this requirement can be met by distributing multiple
tamper-resistant verifiers across the network.
Finally, we assume the network maximum RTT can be known a priori and that an authentica-
tion system is in place. All of these assumptions are requirements well-known in literature for
the application of software-based attestation [SL16], and while we could relax them, by using
hardware-based or hybrid attestation, that would mean equipping each and every sensor in the
network with the specific hardware demanded by such techniques.
8.3 Anomaly-Based Measurements Inspection vs Software
Attestation
While attestation is effective to determine if a specific node has been compromised, it is expen-
sive since it adds the network overhead of the challenge-response protocol and prevents a node
from doing any task other than the response computation. When attestation is used to ascer-
tain the integrity of the measurements by inferring it from the integrity of the node’s software,
its cost increases even more as the challenge-response protocol needs to be executed with high
frequency. This is a consequence of the time lapse between the time a sensor node is attested
and the time when the measurement is taken, in which the sensor node could potentially be
compromised. This problem has not been addressed yet in the literature, and we solve it by
combining attestation with measurements inspection, which decreases the attestation frequency
by two orders of magnitude, regardless of the compromise rate.
Indeed, while most works focus on the integrity test of attestation [Ses+04; PS05; Ses+08;
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ZL10], the impact of performing attestation, especially in terms of energy consumption, are
not well covered. Chen et al. [CWW10] investigate how often attestation should be triggered
in order to optimize the network lifetime without degrading the detection rate of compromised
nodes. They reach the conclusion that higher compromise rates require higher attestation
frequencies; however, it is difficult to know how fast an adversary can compromise network
nodes.
In Section 3.4.3, we have reported the overhead in computations and communications intro-
duced by state-of-the-art measurements inspection algorithms, and we can observe that, espe-
cially in communications, the overhead is generally kept low. However, measurements inspec-
tion techniques have significantly poorer detection performance when most sensors nodes are
malicious and collude in the injection of malicious data. For this reason, Tanachaiwiwat and
Helmy [TH06] propose the deployment of tamper-resistant sensor nodes that authenticate sus-
picious sensors. This chapter is concerned with integrity problems rather than authentication,
and detects malicious activity in highly compromised networks by assuming that only the data
sink is tamper-resistant.
Although compromised nodes may perform attacks to undermine the network confidentiality
and availability, which could be detected by attestation but not by measurements inspection,
it is in attacks to data integrity that both schemes overlap. Moreover, while attestation is good
at telling if a node has been compromised or not, it has no way of determining which nodes
should be attested, whereas measurements inspection is good at pointing the finger at suspicious
nodes but less effective in determining maliciousness. In this sense, the techniques complement
each other. In real applications, we envision the coexistence of both mechanisms and based
on a comparative study, which to our knowledge has not been done before, we propose novel
methods to maximise the benefits of their complementary capabilities. Our goal is to combine
them while keeping the high security level of attestation and the low cost of measurements
inspection. Nevertheless, there are many ways to integrate the two approaches, and it is not
obvious which combinations are better beforehand. To the best of our knowledge, no work
in the literature presents a direct comparison of measurements inspection and software-based
attestation in WSNs. In this chapter, we analyse and compare the two approaches in detail,
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focusing on the aspects that make them complementary.
We start by comparing the performance of measurements inspection and software attestation
in this Section. Then, we identify the benefits and drawbacks of these two techniques, examine
how their parameters may be tuned to overcome these limitations and analyse the cost involved,
and finally move to the design of the combination schemes, which manage to overcome such
limitations and obtain a more convenient trade off between security and cost, compared with
the individual techniques.
8.4 Combination Potentials and Issues
Attestation and measurements inspection are very different in nature. Besides the difference in
performance, they also vary significantly with respect to: constraints introduced, test frequency
(how often the integrity of the WSN is tested), and power overhead. We analyse these aspects
below.
Constraints Introduced. Measurements inspection introduces the need for a trusted inspector,
i.e. an entity which can run the anomaly detection algorithm and be trusted for its output. To
address this, it is often cheaper to make a special device in charge of running the algorithm,
such as the base station or a tamper-proof sensor node. Good performance is achieved when
the data of many sensors is available, so the best candidate for running the detection algorithm
is a centralised sink node that receives all the measurements. When this is not practicable, e.g.
because the WSN is particularly large, the local sink, e.g. the cluster head, should be in charge
of the analyses.
Similarly, software-based attestation introduces the need for a trusted verifier to attest un-
trusted nodes. Furthermore, attestation requires the network maximum RTT to be a known
constant and works under the assumptions that the adversary cannot modify the prover’s hard-
ware.
Test Frequency. Measurements inspection should be run on every data batch used by the
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application. If the application layer makes aggregations that collapse multiple time samples
into one, then it is convenient to run anomaly detection on such aggregates. This results
in a better aimed protection of the application task and in a reduced detection frequency.
The latter can also be reduced when the application layer uses the measurements of each time
instant separately, provided a mechanism that extends the validity of a detection check to future
samples. An example is a temporal correlation check that ascertains the physical process is
coherent in time [IMGL17].
Software attestation has analogous requirements. As soon as the software integrity is verified,
the measurements produced during the time of a successful attestation are genuine. However,
the sensor node may misbehave before or after the verification is complete. The larger the
time gap between attestation and measurements transmission, the smaller the reliability. This
requirement forces the verifier to be close, from a network-layer perspective, to the prover,
because more transmission hops increase the overall delay and reduce the attestation’s relia-
bility. Note that this contrasts with the requirement of measurements inspection to have the
uppermost sink as the inspector, since there may be many hops between it and another sensor
node.
Power Overhead. When the anomaly detection algorithm is run by the sink, there is no com-
munication overhead. On the contrary, such entity is subject to a computational overhead that
is generally polynomial in the number of measurements [IL15b]. These characteristics lead to
a low overall overhead.
Software attestation instead, introduces a communication overhead, due to the attestation pro-
tocol, as well as a computational overhead, especially for the verifier, which needs to validate
every prover’s response. This step is deliberately computational intensive, otherwise a mali-
cious node would be able to restore the original software and reply to the challenge in time.
Both in computation and communication, the overhead of attestation is noticeably higher than
measurements inspection.
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8.4.1 Trade-off Tuning
Individually, measurements inspection provides reasonable security confidence with low-power
overhead while software-based attestation achieves high security confidence with high-power
overhead. However, different choices in the usage and parameters of the individual techniques
give a different balance in the cost/security trade-off. We analyse this aspect below.
Highly Reliable Software Attestation. Software attestation is mostly reliable when the Attes-
tation Frequency (AF ) is high. The attestation frequency is defined with respect to a single
sensor node, i.e. the number of attestation challenges received by a single sensor node, divided
by the number of measurements sent by the same sensor. Hence, we refer to AF as the attes-
tation frequency averaged across all sensor nodes. For instance, if only one sensor is attested
each time it sends a measurement, then AF = 1/N .
Assuming all sensors are equally important, they should all be attested with the same frequency.
In such a case, the reliability of attestation is high when AF ≈ 1, i.e. when an attestation
response is sent together with each measurement report. However, with such a choice, the com-
munication overhead is three times as high on average (because of the challenge and response
messages). A noticeable computational overhead is also present for the calculation of the attes-
tation response, which, in this scenario, becomes the main task of the sensor nodes processors.
In conclusion, using AF ≈ 1 reduces the network lifetime, requiring a high maintenance cost
either to replace nodes’ batteries or to insert new nodes.
Low-Power Software Attestation. The cost of software-based attestation can be reduced by
decreasing AF . This can be done by either reducing the time between two attestations or the
number of attested sensors. However, the reliability of attestation deteriorates when the time
between two attestations, i.e. T
AF
, is close to the time needed to swap the genuine software with
a malicious one, where T is the time between two measurement transmissions.
A possible way to reduce the power of software-based attestation, is then to reduce the number
of attested sensor nodes. This can be done by selecting a random subset of nodes to attest
which is small compared to the total N nodes. Similarly to the detection step in measurements
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inspection, when attestation fails for at least one sensor, a more thorough analysis can be
triggered, i.e. attesting all other nodes.
Such “attestation-based detection” is reliable only when the number of attested nodes is com-
parable to N −C, i.e. the number of genuine sensors. Therefore, unless almost all sensor nodes
are compromised, the power overhead cannot be reduced significantly without a significant loss
in reliability.
Low-Power Measurements Inspection. Measurements inspection makes a reliable measurements
integrity check during the detection step: when the false information introduced by malicious
sensors is far from reality and there are genuine sensors whose correlation with malicious sensors
is disrupted, detection unveils the presence of malicious data.
This is generally the case when there are at least G genuine sensors, where G depends on
the WSN deployment, on the monitored physical phenomenon, and on the kind of malicious
measurements. Measurements inspection is also able to identify malicious sensor nodes in the
characterisation step. However, for this step to be as successful as detection, a higher value for
G is required.
To keep power consumption at a minimum, measurements inspection needs to accept the pres-
ence of potentially malicious sensors and identify only the most likely compromised. Thereafter,
if the remaining malicious nodes keep injecting malicious data, the attack becomes less efficient,
and they need either to make the false measurements closer to reality or to become more de-
tectable.
Highly Reliable Measurements Inspection. To increase the number of discovered malicious nodes,
measurements inspection needs to rely more on the detection and less on characterisation. For
instance, characterisation can just produce a set of possible scenarios, i.e. mutually exclusive
hypotheses to the detected anomaly with the corresponding malicious sensors.
A further investigation, which is conducted in a reliable way, such as with surveys in the field,
would then reveal which hypothesis is correct and which sensors are malicious in turn. Checking
all the sensor nodes in the field, however, is generally expensive and prevents a prompt reaction
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to the attack.
In conclusion, attestation can ascertain the measurements’ integrity, provided that it is run
close to the measurement transmission time. Running attestation for all measurements is too
expensive, but running it for an arbitrary subset decreases reliability. Measurements inspection
is able to detect the presence of malicious measurements and identify suspicious sensors, but
the final decision about a sensor’s maliciousness should be taken with a more reliable approach.
The two techniques complement each other as measurements inspection can trigger attestation
in anomalous scenarios only, reducing the attestation frequency and keeping reliability high. In
the next section, we will design novel methods to combine the two techniques based on such
observations.
8.5 Design and Analysis of Combinations of the Two Ap-
proaches
In the previous section, we have observed that, by relying on either measurements inspection
or attestation, it is not possible to improve significantly in power overhead without impairing
the degree of security or vice versa. The objective of the combination is to achieve a more
convenient trade-off, i.e. with much higher security confidence than measurements inspection,
and lower power overhead compared with software-based attestation.
While the power overhead is well defined, the security confidence may be measured with different
metrics. In the following, we consider that confidence in the integrity of the system is determined
by two factors: identifying as malicious only malicious scenarios (true positives) and not genuine
scenarios (false positives). These two metrics will be used to evaluate the performance of
measurements inspection, attestation, and their combination.
To compare the different techniques with each other we express the TPR and FPR as a function
of the variables involved in the problem, i.e. the number of compromised sensors and the
algorithms’ parameters. This analytical approach allows us to analyse the influence of each
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variable on the security confidence and compare the techniques under different circumstances
without the need to run ad-hoc experiments for each scenario. Besides being more lightweight,
the analytical approach enables us to express the TPR and FPR of the combination schemes
that we will present as a function of the TPR and FPR of attestation and measurements
inspection. So, rather than evaluating the performance of a combination scheme in a set of
arbitrary scenarios, we obtain general context-independent performance information. To do
that, we initially show the TPR and FPR of measurements inspection and attestation in the
following sections.
8.5.1 Measurements Inspection Performance
In measurements inspection, detection, characterisation and diagnosis are different tasks, where
the TPR and FPR in each step depends on the TPR and FPR in the previous steps. Moreover,
the performance of detection is different from the performance of characterisation and diagnosis.
Indeed, detection operates at the granularity of the network, or of a cluster of nodes, while
characterisation and diagnosis operate at the granularity of sensors.
As we discussed in the previous chapter, we can link the performance of detection to the
random variable C, representing the number of malicious nodes in the network. Instead, the
performance of characterisation and diagnosis are linked to the random variable SM , indicating
that a generic sensor S is malicious (or dually SG, the event that a generic sensor S is genuine,
where P (SG) = 1− P (SM)). The notation used in this chapter is summarized in Table 8.1.
If considering the whole measurements inspection process, a true positive is a malicious sen-
sor that is diagnosed as malicious and characterised as anomalous, after anomaly detection
triggered. A false positive, instead, is a genuine sensor diagnosed as malicious, after being
characterised as anomalous. This can occur, e.g., because the anomaly is falsely detected or
the characterisation falsely blames that sensor. Considering the three steps separately, the
probability of having a true positive from measurements inspection is:
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Table 8.1: Notation Summary.
Term Description
N Number of sensor nodes
C Number of malicious sensor nodes
ADT Anomaly Detection triggers
ACSF Sensor S fails Anomaly-based Characterisation
ADSM Anomaly-based Diagnosis output for sensor S is “Malicious”
MISF Sensor S fails Measurements Inspection
ATSF Sensor S fails attestation
ATSP Sensor S passes attestation
g Group size
SG Sensor S is genuine
SM Sensor S is malicious
TE Total number of examined sensors
TG Total number of groups
TM Total number of malicious sensors
TMF Total number of malicious sensors that fail a given test
TPR True Positive Rate
FPR False Positive Rate
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P (MISF |SM) = P (ADTACFADSM |SM) =
P (ADSM |ACFADTSM)P (ACF |ADTSM)P (ADT |C > 0)
(8.1)
Where MISF is the event that sensor S fails measurements inspection, ADT denotes the event
that the anomaly detection algorithm triggers, ACSF the event that characterisation fails, and
ADSM the events that the sensor is diagnosed as malicious.
The probability of a false positive is:
P (MISF |SG) = P (ADTACFADSM |SG) =
P (ADSM
|ACFADTSG)P (ACF |ADTSG)(
P (C = 0)P (ADT |C = 0ZZSG ) + P (C > 0)P (ADT |C > 0ZZSG )
) (8.2)
In the absence of a probabilistic model for both approaches, the probabilities can be approx-
imated with experimental frequencies. In particular, the probabilities listed above can be
characterised with True Positive Rates (TPR) and False Positive Rates (FPR). Indeed, the
frequency of (MISF |SM) and (MISF |SG) correspond to the measurements inspection TPR and
FPR, which we refer to as TPRMI and FPRMI . We give a proof for the former, while an
analogous proof holds for the latter. Let TE denote the total number of examined sensors, TM
denote the total number of malicious sensors, and TMF denote the total number of malicious
sensors that fail measurements inspection, then:
P (MISF |SM ) =
P (MISF ∩ SM )
P (SM )
≈
TMF
TE
TM
TE
=
TMF
TM
= TPRMI (8.3)
With a similar reasoning, the P (MISF |SG) can be approximated with the measurements inspec-
tion FPR (FPRMI).
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8.5.2 Attestation Performance
Let c be the prover’s CPU clock speed, a be the adversary time advantage, and o be the
adversary overhead per iteration of the attestation routine, then the number of iterations i can
be calculated as [Ses+05]:
i ≥ (c · a)
o
≥ m ln(m) (8.4)
Where m is the size of the memory being attested. Since the memory is traversed in a pseudo-
random fashion, a minimum number of iterations is necessary to probabilistically assure (based
on the Coupon Collector’s Problem [MU05]) that each memory address is accessed at least
once.
Under the assumptions made by software-based attestation mechanisms, that both the maxi-
mum network RTT and the minimum adversary overhead per iteration are known a priori, it
is possible to define the number of iterations of the attestation routines to be executed such
that a malicious sensor SM has only a negligible chance  to pass attestation. This chance is
the possibility of a collision — when the genuine and malicious memory contents output the
same checksum value. Thus:
P (ATSF |SM) ≥ 1−  (8.5)
Whereas, a genuine node will always pass attestation:
P (ATSF |SG) = 0 (8.6)
We can characterise the attestation TPR, which we refer to as TPRAT , by analysing the fre-
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quency of the event (ATSF |SM). Let TE denote the total number of examined sensors, TM denote
the total number of malicious sensors, and TMF denote the total number of malicious sensors
that fail attestation, then:
P (ATSF
|SM ) =
P (ATSF
∩ SM )
P (SM )
≈
TMF
TE
TM
TE
=
TMF
TM
= TPRAT (8.7)
By definition FPRAT = 0, so the security confidence provided by attestation is nearly ideal.
This is the main advantage of attestation compared with measurements inspection. However,
as we discussed in Section 8.4.1, using such confidence to the guarantee the measurements
integrity requires ideally all sensors to be attested, and for each new measurement (AF = 1)
that is collected, which is most likely impractical. Our goal is to use measurements inspection
to achieve a degree of security which is as close as possible to the approach just described, but
for a much lower attestation frequency.
The combination of the two techniques gives rise to a full spectrum of solutions in the trade-off
between power efficiency and security, depending on how and when measurements inspection
hands over to attestation. Predicting the resulting performance for a given choice is complex, as
it depends on the measured performance of each single approach and on their inter-dependence.
For this reason, we present three different combination approaches and express their perfor-
mance as a function of the variables involved.
8.5.3 Detect and Attest
The architecture of our first proposed combination, denoted with Detect and Attest (D&A),
is shown in Figure 8.2. This scheme is designed to exploit only the most reliable step in
measurements inspection, which is detection, and relay the characterisation task to attestation.
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Detection Measurements
Are there anomalies? Stop
Attestation Malicious Sensors
No
Yes
Figure 8.2: D&A Scheme.
Performance
Since D&A is the series of the detection step from measurements inspection and the result of
attestation, the output TPR is the product of the TPRs of both:
TPRD&A = TPRADTPRAT (8.8)
A false positive occurs when measurements inspection detects an anomaly, regardless of the
presence of malicious data, and attestation fails on a genuine node. Thus, the FPR of D&A is:
FPRD&A =
(
P (C = 0)FPRAD + P (C > 0)TPRAD
)
FPRAT (8.9)
Where the term in brackets is the probability that anomaly detection triggers. This coincides
with the expected attestation frequency, since all sensor nodes are attested when anomaly
detection triggers:
AFD&A = P (C = 0)FPRAD + P (C > 0)TPRAD (8.10)
8.5.4 Group Subset Attestation
In our second proposed combination, Group Subset Attestation (GSA), measurements inspec-
tion is used in the detection step and produces the groups of possible malicious nodes, while
attestation acts as a judge to take the final decision. Its architecture is depicted in Figure 8.3.
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We observe that GSA uses measurements inspection for detection of anomalies and the group-
ing part of characterisation. Then it iteratively selects a random member for each group and
attests it. When the ratio of genuine sensors in a group outweighs the ratio of malicious sensors
or vice versa, the attestation for that group stops and the result for the majority of sensors
is applied to the whole group. The guard condition that determines whether the number of
attestations is high enough for the group is:
‖|S ∈ g : SG| − |S ∈ g : SM |‖
|g| > δGSA (8.11)
This condition makes sure that the ratio of genuine sensors in a group outweighs the ratio of
malicious sensors by δGSA or vice versa. GSA keeps attesting all nodes in a group until the
condition is met. When δGSA = 1, the condition is never met and GSA coincides with D&A,
but with lower values, the number of attestation is lower compared to D&A and GSA may be
more convenient.
To maximise energy efficiency, GSA may attest only one node per group. However, this choice
is only accurate if the nodes in a group are all genuine or all malicious, which in general cannot
be guaranteed. Indeed, measurements inspection is highly accurate in the grouping from the
measurements perspective, i.e. the measurements in one group are either genuine or malicious.
However, integrity violations at the node layer cannot be identified if the measurements are
genuine. When used as a standalone technique, the identification of such malicious sensors
is just delayed to the moment when the measurements become malicious. With GSA, if a
node runs malicious software but reports genuine data at the time it is attested, we would
infer that all nodes in the same group are malicious. This, in turn, causes wrong detection of
non-compromised nodes whose measurements correlate with that of the malicious node.
The optimal value of δGSA makes an exhaustive attestation of groups that are mixtures of
genuine and malicious nodes, and only one for groups where nodes are either all genuine or
all malicious. The value used in the experiments is 0.25, which gives a percentage of attested
nodes around 25%.
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Detection Measurements
Are there anomalies? Stop
Grouping Groups
Group FilteringFiltered Groups
Iterative Selection Group Subset
AttestationMalicious Sensors
No
Yes
Figure 8.3: GSA Scheme.
Performance
The performance of GSA is a mixture of the performance of measurements inspection in de-
tecting anomalies and correctly grouping sensor nodes, and the attestation performance. Note
that for each group only a subset of sensors is tested, hence the TPR is:
TPRGSA = δGSATPRADTPRAT+
(1− δGSA)
(
P (S′M |g(S) = g(S′)SM )P (AS
′
TF
|S′M )+
P (S′G|g(S) = g(S′)SM )P (AS
′
TF
|S′G)
)
TPRAD
(8.12)
Where P (AS′TF |S ′M) ≈ TPRAT and P (AS
′
TF
|S ′G) ≈ FPRAT .
We denoted with TPRAD the TPR of the anomaly detection part of measurements inspection,
and with P (S ′M |g(S) = g(S ′)SM) the probability that the sensor chosen for attestation S ′ is
malicious given that the considered sensor S is malicious and belongs to the same group as
S ′. Namely, if the malicious sensor node is an attested node (they are δGSA of the total on
average), then detection is correct if anomaly detection triggers and the node fails attestation.
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Otherwise, the characterisation is correct only if the correct group is selected. Thus, the FPR
becomes:
FPRGSA =
(
P (C = 0)FPRAD + P (C > 0)TPRAD
)
(
FPRAT δGSA + (1− δGSA)
(
P (S′M |g(S) = g(S′)SG)TPRAT
+P (S′G|g(S) = g(S′)SG)FPRAT
)) (8.13)
The attestation frequency here is equal to:
AFGSA =
(
P (C = 0)FPRAD + P (C > 0)TPRAD
)
δGSA (8.14)
Compared to D&A, the attestation frequency is always lower, while the TPR and FPR are
as good or better if the anomaly-based grouping is correct, and worse otherwise. In the next
combination scheme we aim to achieve even lower attestation frequency by attesting only the
sensors marked as malicious by measurements inspection.
8.5.5 Cascade
In large WSNs, the number of groups may be high, so even though GSA would bring remarkable
benefits, the overhead introduced by attestation may still be non-negligible. To reduce even
further the attestation frequency, we observe that the main cause of failure for measurements
inspection is that anomalies may arise as a consequence of an unforeseen or unprecedented
scenario that caused a wrong estimate of the measurements probability. Instead, software-
based attestation produces undisputed proofs of a sensor’s maliciousness if the strict time
constraints are always guaranteed by genuine sensor nodes. So, it may be convenient to use
software attestation to confirm a sensor node’s maliciousness after it has been identified as such
by measurements inspection, as shown in Figure 8.4. We refer to this approach as Cascade.
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Figure 8.4: Cascade Scheme.
Performance
The TPR and FPR of the scheme are:
TPRCascade = TPRMITPRAT (8.15)
FPRCascade = FPRMIFPRAT (8.16)
The Cascade scheme power overhead is lower than attestation since the attestation frequency
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is:
AFCascade = E[C|C > 0]P (C > 0)TPRMI + P (C = 0)FPRMI (8.17)
This is also lower than the attestation frequency of GSA, when the measurements inspection
FPR and the number of malicious nodes are low. Instead, with higher FPR, the Cascade
scheme makes many attestations, while the number of attestations for the GSA scheme is
upper bounded by the number of groups given in output by characterisation.
Note that if the software attestation time constraints are reliable then TPRAT = 1 and
FPRAT = 0, so, compared with attestation, the Cascade solution trades a reduced power
overhead for a lower TPR, which coincides with that of measurements inspection.
8.6 Analytical Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the D&A, GSA and Cascade techniques in a WSN of 200 sensor
nodes, of which a varying number C are compromised. Sensors collect a measurement about
every 4 minutes. The probability of attack is as high as 10−2, implying that, on average, there
is an attack about every 7 hours. This value is in the same order of FPRAD, so the analytical
results remain substantially unchanged also for lower attack probabilities. When an attack
occurs, the probability that a sensor is malicious has a uniform prior distribution across all
sensors (i.e. each sensor is malicious with probability 1/C).
The evaluation is done by calculating: 1) The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves,
i.e. the relationship between TPR and FPR in the identification of malicious nodes. 2) The
attestation frequency, i.e. the time between two attestations divided by measurements trans-
mission period, and averaged across all nodes.
The ROC curves of the combination schemes are obtained through the results of Section 8.5.
The ROC curves for measurements inspection are obtained by interpolating the experimental
curves obtained in Section 7.2.5. The ROC curves for attestation are obtained by modelling
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(a) C = 50 (b) C = 100 (c) C = 150
Figure 8.5: ROC curves comparison varying the number of malicious sensors C1.
the degradation in the reliability of attestation, when the time between two attestations is close
to the time needed to swap the genuine software with a malicious one, and vice versa. Thus,
the probability that an attacker manages to compromise a measurement and pass attestation
behaves like an exponential probability distribution:
1− e−λ( 1AF−1) (8.18)
The parameter λ models the time needed to replace the genuine software and restore it. In
particular, we show the performance of attestation when λ = 0.5, which is the case where the
probability that a malicious node passes attestation is close to 0 when AF = 1, and quickly
increases to about 0.4 and 0.6 for AF = 1/2 and AF = 1/3, respectively.
8.6.1 ROC curves comparison
Figure 8.5 shows the ROC curves for both individual and combined techniques. In particular,
the TPR of software-based attestation is shown for AF = {1, 1/2, 1/3}, corresponding to one
attestation run as soon as a new measurement is collected, or once every two or three measure-
ments are collected. The TPR decreases with the attestation frequency since a quick attacker
may substitute the original software with a malicious version, inject malicious data, and replace
the original software before attestation is run again.
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Figure 8.6: AF curves comparison1.
We observe that the highest TPR of measurements inspection, achieved at the rightmost point of
the ROC curve, is an upper bound on the TPR of Cascade. Nevertheless, while measurements
inspection achieves such TPR with FPR close to 1, Cascade achieves it with FPR close to
0. The performance of D&A and GSA is not limited by measurements inspection since they
mainly exploit the detection step, whose performance is comparable to attestation’s. Indeed,
their ROC curves nearly overlap with that of attestation.
8.6.2 Attestation Frequency Comparison
To make a fair comparison, we also consider the attestation frequency of each scheme, since
with AF ≈ 1 there is no advantage in using a combination scheme in place of simple attestation.
Figure 8.6 shows that the points where Cascade performs at its best are expensive, as the
attestation frequency is close to 1. Instead, when the attestation frequency of D&A is as low
as 0.02, the TPR in Figure 8.5 is close to attestation. Finally, GSA has a small attestation
frequency which saturates and holds even for the highest values of TPR. In conclusion, Cascade
is generally not convenient, since it covers a point in the reliability-cost space where reliability
is close to measurements inspection and cost is close to attestation. For D&A and GSA,
the reliability is almost as high as attestation. The cost for GSA is always comparable to
measurements inspection. For D&A, the cost can be kept low for a low decrease in reliability.
1A perturbation of ±0.02 was introduced in GSA and D&A to better distinguish the curves.
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8.7 Numerical Simulations
In the previous section, we abstracted from the computations and network protocols that enable
the application of each combination scheme, so we address them below. Preliminarily, we
address the process of tailoring software-based attestation for measurements reliability, which
has not yet been analysed in the literature.
We validate the analytical ROC curves and complete them with the time needed to achieve a
certain TPR, which corresponds to the latency in the reaction to malicious data. Finally, we
make an accurate estimation of the spent energy thanks to a fine-grained analysis of the sensor
nodes’ activities, including the transmission of each network packet. This allows us to calculate
the impact of each approach on nodes’ battery life.
To investigate these parameters accurately, we have set up simulations of a realistic application
scenario in the open-source Castalia [NIC07] simulator. Simulations allow running both the
individual and combined schemes under exactly the same scenario, giving accurate comparisons
that highlight the gains in performance and energy consumption, and allow evaluation with
more devices than would be practical with real nodes.
8.7.1 Simulation Settings
The simulations consider 200 nodes in a star-topology network, where the base station is located
at the centre performing the role of network coordinator, measurements sink, and attestation
verifier. Sensors measure the temperature and send the observed value to the sink about every
4 minutes. Nodes are equipped with the CC2420 RF transceiver [Ins13], which is common
for its low-power transmissions. Namely, this device spends 57.42 mW while transmitting (at
0dBm), 62 mW while receiving and 1.4 mW while in sleep mode [Ins13].
For C out of 200 sensor nodes, the temperatures sent to the sink are replaced with higher values
to trigger the detection of a wildfire, thanks to the mimicry-based test suite described in Section
7.2.2. The simulations are run for all individual and combination schemes, with three different
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values of C: 50, 100, and 150. The parameters relevant to the simulations are summarised in
Table 8.2. After 5 hours the simulation is stopped and we calculate the TPR and FPR for the
detection of malicious nodes, and the energy consumption.
Table 8.2: Simulation Parameters.
Parameter Value
CPU clock 500 kHz
Transmission Output Power 0 dBm
CAP duration 125.83 s
CFP duration 0 ms
Superframe Duration 125.83 s
Inactive Portion 125.83 s
Beacon Interval = Sampling Period 251.66 s
Maximum RTT 0.06 s
For the transmission of measurements and attestation-related data, we use the 802.15.4 MAC
protocol [GCB03] because it provides us low energy consumption and a hierarchical architecture.
802.15.4 defines both the physical and data-link layer of the ISO OSI stack, including a CSMA-
CA protocol for handling collisions by sensing the channel before transmissions and using the
random backoff technique to make sensor nodes wait before retransmitting.
The data-link layer of 802.15.4 defines a frame structure which includes, among other, bit
strings for ACK management, sequencing number, and source/destination addresses. The
protocol makes use of a coordinator node that dictates how and when nodes can communicate
through the use of a superframe structure, illustrated in Figure 8.7, which constitutes an active
and an inactive period, where nodes are allowed to transmit or switch off their communication
devices to save energy, respectively.
Furthermore, at the application level we define a transmission schedule so that nodes transmit
their measurements one after the other, thus avoiding collisions. The coordinator informs nodes
about the duration of the next superframe sections with a beacon frame. The latter may be
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Figure 8.7: 802.15.4 MAC superframe.
followed by a Contention Access Period (CAP), where all nodes communicate with CSMA-CA.
Then a Contention Free Period (CFP) may follow, which is divided into Guaranteed Time
Slots (GTS), where only one node is allowed to transmit. Finally, an inactive period ends the
superframe, where no communication occurs and hence the sensor nodes can switch off their
communication devices to save energy. The durations of these periods are shown in Table 8.2.
In 802.15.4, when only one node is the coordinator, it gets the name of PAN coordinator.
Once it receives all measurements it can trigger the measurements inspection, attestation, or
a combined scheme. Note that when just measurements inspection or no scheme is in use,
the nodes can go to sleep right after they transmit their data. Whereas, if a scheme with
attestation is in place, the nodes must keep awake as they do not know in advance whether
they will be attested. Since the communication pattern is not fixed we cannot use the canonical
802.15.4 guaranteed time slots. Also to avoid collisions, so that the network round-trip time
can be reliably estimated, attestation is performed one node at a time. When the sink is done
attesting all nodes for a collection round, it sends a message signalling to nodes that they can
go immediately to sleep until the next active period.
8.7.2 True Positives / False Positives Results
We calculate the TPR, defined as the number of malicious nodes that are detected at least once
during the simulated attack. We do not assume the presence of intrusion reaction systems,
therefore a detected node keeps carrying out the attack. This constitutes an upper bound on
the system’s performance since both the energy consumption and the detection of further nodes
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Figure 8.8: TPR/FPR curves comparison with different numbers of malicious sensors C.
improves with the correct characterisation of malicious nodes. Indeed, a malicious node that is
detected does not need to be evaluated again by either attestation or measurements inspection.
The performance of the latter is also likely to increase, since fewer malicious nodes gain from
collusion.
Figure 8.8 shows the TPR and FPR for each scheme with different numbers of malicious sensors.
Rather than their final values, we show the cumulative TPR and FPR time series. Indeed, the
time needed to achieve a certain TPR is decisive to minimise the attack’s damage. Analogous
considerations hold for the FPR. The combination technique with the best performance is
certainly D&A, whose curves are the closest to those of attestation. Since D&A uses the
detection step of measurements inspection, the TPR curves, in Figures 8.8a, 8.8b, and 8.8c,
jump from 0 to 0.99 after 28, 28, and 10 collection rounds respectively, which are the points
where anomalies are detected and attestation is triggered.
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The curves of the Cascade scheme are close to measurements inspection, but an improvement
is brought in the FPR curve in Figure 8.8d, which is decreased from 0.15 to 0. Higher TPR
can be achieved by increasing the measurements inspection FPR and letting attestation take
care of the false positives by attesting them. However, this choice increases the attestation
frequency, as discussed in Section 8.6. The simulations also confirmed that D&A can achieve
an FPR close to 0 and a TPR around 0.99. In the case of GSA the TPR is around 0.96 and
the FPR is close to 0, especially when 50 and 100 sensor nodes out of 200 are malicious. When
150 sensors are malicious the FPR is evidently higher than D&A, but the TPR that eventually
gets close to 1 makes GSA still a valid choice. Indeed, when the system detects that 150 out
200 sensor nodes are malicious, it means that a severe attack has taken place. In such scenario,
generating false positives is not the main concern since the system needs a thorough recovery
and reconfiguration process anyway.
8.7.3 Energy Consumption Comparison
In Table 8.3, the energy consumption during simulation time, averaged across all nodes, is
reported for each scheme. First, we note that attestation has an energy consumption which
is between 33 and 58% higher than measurements inspection, and that the latter does not
introduce a perceptible increase with respect to the case where no security scheme is applied
(NONE in Table 8.3). Note that, to have a complete estimate of the techniques’ costs, we
need to also consider that measurements inspection may require a higher density of sensors to
achieve good detection performance.
Compared with measurements inspection, GSA and Cascade generally demand less than 1%
extra energy. The increase for D&A, instead, is between 3 and 10%. To understand practical
implications of such differences in energy consumption, we used the results in Table 8.3 to
retrieve the expected number of days until the batteries would drain. As a reference, we
assumed a typical power source of two alkaline long-life AA batteries, which store an energy
of 18720 Joules [Ene]. As reported in Table 8.4, we see that the average duration of the
batteries without measurements inspection nor attestation is about 48 days. Note that for
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Table 8.3: Average Energy Consumption (Joules) after 5 hours.
C Scheme NONE MI ATT GSA D&A CASC
50 79.54 82.86 109.84 83.65 91.14 83.59
100 81.51 80.96 116.65 80.91 83.73 80.04
150 82.01 79.67 125.81 80.45 83.35 80.07
Table 8.4: Days To Battery Depletion.
C
Scheme NONE MI ATT GSA D&A CASC
50 49.03 47.06 35.51 46.62 42.79 46.66
100 47.85 48.17 33.43 48.20 46.58 48.73
150 47.55 48.95 31.00 48.48 46.79 48.71
some applications such a battery life may not be enough. The main reason behind it is the
power consumption of the CC2420 RF transceiver. A more advanced device may give better
battery life; however, our main interest is the comparison of the energy spent when using
different techniques rather than its absolute value.
When running measurements inspection, there is no significant change in battery life. With
attestation instead, the batteries last 10 to 15 fewer days. GSA and Cascade generally cause
the batteries to last 1 fewer day, while with D&A battery life diminishes by 2 to 4 days.
8.8 Conclusions
Combining measurements inspection with attestation achieves high accuracy in identifying ma-
licious nodes whilst significantly reducing power consumption. We proposed three combination
schemes: Detect and Attest, Group Subset Attestation, and Cascade. The first gives most rele-
vance to the attestation step, the third stresses the measurements inspection steps, while the
second is at a point in between. In this way, the spectrum of combinations is well covered.
Measurements inspection detects malicious measurements by inspecting the measurements
themselves to find changes in their internal correlation structures. When performed in a cen-
tralized way, for instance by the base station, this approach requires no additional computations
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from the sensor nodes themselves. From this perspective, it can be considered very lightweight.
However, the accuracy in distinguishing genuine from compromised nodes is limited by the
unpredictability of the sensed phenomenon, which introduces uncertainty in the measurements
correlations. Attestation, on the other hand, ascertains the integrity of a node by verifying
its memory contents through a challenge-response protocol. This approach has a considerable
overhead on sensor nodes, which have to exchange additional messages and for a period cannot
do anything other than calculating a computationally intensive response. Nonetheless, attes-
tation can be very reliable if the challenge can only be responded to in time by the genuine
nodes.
In this Chapter we:
1. Presented different ways of combining the two aforementioned integrity verification mech-
anisms.
2. Made a performance evaluation of each combination both analytically, at the techniques’
components abstraction level, and numerically, through in-depth simulations.
Contribution 1 has been achieved by studying how to join advantages and neutralise drawbacks.
We have conceived three different approaches: Detect and Attest, Group Subset Attestation,
and Cascade. The first gives most relevance to the attestation step, the third stresses the
measurements inspection steps, while the second is at a point in between. In this way, the
spectrum of combinations is well covered.
Contribution 2 consists of evaluating all the combination schemes both analytically and through
simulation. The Cascade scheme has shown to be limited by the measurements inspection’s
maximum TPR, which is achieved only with frequent attestations. Instead, both D&A and
GSA offer a considerable gain in performance, which resulted very close to attestation’s, but
for significant less energy. This is confirmed by the energy results from the simulations and
is due to the dramatic reduction in the number of attestations, which is observable in the
analytical evaluation. A good trade-off between energy and performance is achieved by both
D&A and GSA schemes. The former should be preferred when a couple of fewer days in battery
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life do not have a considerable impact on costs. The latter, instead, is the best solution when the
cost for the maintenance and materials involved in the battery replacement process is critical.
While the individual techniques forced to choose between accuracy close to 100% with power
overhead of 33-58%, or accuracy close to 50% with power overhead close to 0, the combination
schemes allow us to choose accuracy in the range 96-99%, with a power overhead in the range
1-10%.
This work considered software-driven malicious data injections where the WSN is partially
compromised. However, it can be extended to consider more general attack models, such as
an adversary that physically tampered with the sensor nodes hardware to increase their clock
speed, or that tampers with almost all sensor nodes. Attestation cannot be applied in the first
scenario, while measurements inspection has poor detection accuracy in the second. In such
extreme cases there is the need to give to the two techniques the possibility of raising alarms
on their own.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
9.1 Summary of Thesis Achievements
This thesis provides progress in the field of security in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs),
which are ubiquitously used in emerging fields such as Internet of Things (IoT) applications,
but they are vulnerable to compromise and the integrity of the measurements collected by
sensors needs to be ensured. This is essential as wrong measurements could lead the system
to a wrong reaction, which may have considerable detrimental effects in applications such as
critical infrastructure monitoring, disaster management, and human health.
To cause such kind of damage, an attacker can exploit malicious data injections, consisting
of manipulations that enable an attacker to gain control over the measurements collected in
the WSNs, which give control over the system’s functionalities in turn. An attacker may, for
instance, conceal the presence of problems, or raise false alarms through the injection of well-
designed malicious measurements. To deal with this problem, some techniques belonging to
the family of measurements inspection, have been proposed [RLP08; Lop+10; Jur+11; Xie+11;
IL15b]. However, we have analysed these techniques in detail (Chapter 3) and concluded that
they have been evaluated under simplistic assumptions, such as independent attacks from dif-
ferent compromised sources and the introduction of a random bias in the measurements. In
this thesis instead, we have considered collusion-enabled attacks, where multiple compromised
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measurements are injected according to a common plan. Moreover, the compromised mea-
surements are not considered to be random, which is rather the case for faulty behaviours,
but they are designed to reproduce a plausibly genuine behaviour. A genuine behaviour under
wrong circumstances may have disastrous effects, such as evacuating a building when there is
no emergency, or not dispensing insulin when the level of glucose in a patient is high.
We have advanced the current state-of-the-art to consider collusion attacks in WSN applications
where the physical phenomenon may be subject to significant variations in space, especially in
the presence of events of interest, such as fires, volcanic eruptions, and physiological conditions
(Chapter 5). We have proposed a novel anomaly detection approach based on pairwise linear
regression, to produce measurements estimates that are reliable in the presence of collusion
attacks. Indeed, this method is based on robust aggregates of the pairwise estimates that
have been designed specifically to resist collusion. We have shown that our algorithm can
detect violations to the measurements integrity also under collusion attacks that spoof false
events or mask real events. This technique is lightweight as it is based on simple statistical
operators (weighted mean and median, Pearson correlation etc.) and gives good results when
a single event occurs. Moreover we have given a methodology to apply the same technique to
applications that are much different in nature, which makes our approach valid regardless of
whether the measurements indicate blood pressure, temperature, vibrations, etc.
We have proposed a novel approach that ascertains the measurements integrity in the most
general case, i.e. where many events can manifest at once in unpredictable ways (Chapter 6).
The novel method is based on a test on the cross-scale relationship among the measurements,
achieved by means of the wavelet transform. The new anomaly detection algorithm checks that
the measurements variation observable between neighbouring sensors can be explained by the
general status of the physical phenomenon, i.e. the events that are occurring and that can be
observed with a higher granularity of analysis. We have shown that thanks to this analysis
we can detect measurements integrity violations even when the attacker exploits the changes
in correlations brought in by events, such as by spoofing an event next to a genuine one, or
partially masking an event to divide it into multiple events. Moreover we have introduced a
new algorithm to identify the sensors that are likely responsible for the manipulations (charac-
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terisation) and to distinguish between malicious interference and genuine faults (diagnosis).
We have tested the robustness of our methodology by modelling the problem as an adversarial
machine learning problem (Chapter 7). Indeed, we have observed that the attacker’s goal is to
classify malicious data, but at the same time the attacker will try to evade such classification
and modify the injected data accordingly. This characteristic introduces many differences in
the problem compared with the classification of, e.g. faults or events. We have explored in
detail two different approaches to the problem of evading anomaly detection:
1) The mimicry approach, based on building malicious data from genuine data to spoof and
mask events whilst maximising the effort to stay undetected. This approach has proven par-
ticularly useful to analyse the trade-off between True Positive Rate (TPR) (malicious data
correctly classified) and False Positive Rate (FPR) (genuine data classified as malicious). We
have applied the mimicry approach on both a synthetic and a real dataset, and run both the
wavelet-based approach and the algorithm described in [Rez+13], which is based on Iterative
filtering (IF). We observed that our algorithm achieved TPR ≈ 1 with FPR ≈ 0 whereas
IF cannot achieve high TPR without a significant increase in FPR, especially when events
manifest. Indeed, our algorithm has the advantage of learning the properties of genuine
events beforehand, whilst IF judges all the measurements without such knowledge.
2) The worst-case approach, where the damage to event detection and the evasion of anomaly
detection are guaranteed by solving an optimisation problem. With this approach we are
able to provide an assurance to a network operator about the degree of resilience offered by
measurements inspection in a deployed WSN, or even drive the design of the WSN itself by
indicating which is the density of sensors that guarantees the resilience to a certain number
of compromised devices. We have tested this approach on a wildfire monitoring WSN and
gained some valuable knowledge about the problem tackled in this thesis. In particular,
we have concluded that spoofing attacks are more successful when a few conditions are
sufficient to trigger event detection, whilst the masking task can be achieved with less effort
when many conditions are necessary to detect events. We have also observed that malicious
data injections are more difficult to detect when neighbouring sensors are compromised and
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when located at the boundaries of the WSN deployment. Moreover, we have shown that
the worst-case approach can be applied to compare the assurance in terms of resilience
to compromised sensors that is given by different measurements inspection algorithms. In
particular, we have shown that our wavelet-based detection algorithm provides substantially
higher resilience gains compared with the anomaly detection algorithm described in [CP07],
based on principal component analysis.
Having concluded that the attacker needs to control large-enough sets of contiguous sensors to
achieve a successful and undetected spoofing or masking attack, we have studied the impact
of sparse trusted devices on the performance of measurements inspection. The presence of
trusted devices may be guaranteed through maintenance operations, such as manual inspection
and in field reconfiguration. However, this is an expensive approach which is against the WSN
principles of self-monitoring and self-healing, thus we have devised a combination with software
attestation (Chapter 8), which automatically ascertains the integrity of the software running
on sensor nodes, but is also more expensive compared to measurements inspection. Indeed,
to keep high confidence in the measurements integrity, many attestations are needed, which
introduce the overhead of a challenge-response protocol and that of calculating the response.
The required number of attestations increases significantly with the number of collected mea-
surements; however, thanks to the integration with measurements inspection, we were able to
significantly reduce them. We designed different combination schemes that achieve an excellent
trade-off between cost and resilience, whereas the single techniques forced to choose between
resilience and cost. The integration of measurements inspection with attestation enables a
WSN operator to choose the most appropriate combination scheme, and customise it according
to the application requirements.
9.2 Final Remarks
Throughout the presentation of this thesis, we have had the chance to make some significant
contributions towards the solution of practical problems that are faced in real WSN applications.
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Wireless sensor networks have become pervasive in both business, personal, and public appli-
cations, so they are a critical resource to secure. Unfortunately, the high importance given to
such systems is not matched by an adequate attention to their security, despite the degree of
exposure that is suffered because of the nature of the problem itself.
This thesis has raised awareness of the several threats that may lead an attacker to get in control
of parts of a WSN system, which enable him to modify the sensed measurements. Moreover,
we have shown how such control enables to cause some disastrous effect such as loss of life and
shutdown of critical infrastructure.
This is possible if the attacker is able not only to alter the measurement data, but also to remain
undetected. So, we have proposed a set of methods and methodologies, belonging to the body
of work known as measurements inspection, to enable the detection of malicious interference
and remain resilient even when many sensors have been compromised. Our tools have proven
particularly effective, and provided significant improvements over the state-of-the-art in terms
of detection rate against false positive rate. We have always constrained our algorithms to keep
false positives reasonably low for the practical needs of the application, as we have witnessed
that false positive rates that are considered acceptable in literature, often lead to frequent
shutdown of the sensor, reconfiguration and/or restart, which can be so expensive that the cost
of detection may be prohibitive.
We have designed our techniques to exploit the fraction of genuine devices that survive in a
compromised WSN. To reduce also the risk in extreme scenarios, however, it may be desirable to
resort to maintenance, which ascertains the integrity of the devices through manual inspections,
as well as the integrity of the software through reconfigurations.
As an alternative to maintenance, we offered a combination of measurements inspection with
software attestation, which produces new highly reliable and cost-effective techniques to ascer-
tain the integrity of the WSN measurements. With this approach, the need for maintenance
is minimised, and given a budget for defending against cyber-security threats, we enabled to
select the optimal balance of technologies that guarantee the system’s resilience and minimise
maintenance cost.
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We have devised that resilience-enabling techniques, even though extremely effective, have
limited applicability if it is not possible to quantify the resilience gains offered. Indeed, there
is a need for assurance, i.e. the quantification of the maximum risk that a WSN is subject
to. We have introduced novel algorithms and numerical tools for the automatic creation of the
most threatening attack scenarios, as well as for the calculation of the attacker’s cost, which
translates into the system’s risk of being significantly damaged. So, we have transformed the
abstract concept of “degree of resilience” into real measurable costs. Moreover, we have also
enabled a WSN owner to tune such risk depending on the application requirements, thanks to
an automated adjustment of the WSN deployment, which assures a maximum risk at design
time.
9.3 Future Work
Measurements inspection techniques exploit the inter-measurements correlations that hold un-
der genuine circumstances to detect malicious data injections. The probability of success de-
pends on many factors which we have covered in this thesis: the time available for the attack,
the knowledge of other measurements transmitted in the past and, above all, the number of
compromised sensors. In this thesis, we have considered WSN applications such as fire monitor-
ing, volcano monitoring, earthquake monitoring, and wearable and implantable health devices.
Their inter-measurements correlations enabled our novel measurements inspections techniques
to detect inconsistencies in the data, even with a large number of compromised sensors.
However, in other applications, the measurements coming from different sensors may be less
correlated because of irregularities in the environment that cause the information contained in
the spatial distance to become unreliable. It is the case, for instance, of water monitoring in
large areas involving different rivers and basins, or areas characterised by many obstacles. In
this case, if a single event manifests at a time, the estimation-based framework described in
Chapter 5 is still applicable, since it calculates the correlations oﬄine, thus learning implicitly
discontinuities in the environment. The main limitation is with our wavelet-based approach,
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which is based on Euclidean distance. Indeed, obstacles and irregular environments can cause
low degrees of correlations even for two close sensors. In the future, there is the need to cater for
this condition with more general tools, such as the wavelet transform on graphs, where spatial
distance should be replaced by an estimate of the correlations, which constitute the graph’s
edges. The accuracy of detection will probably be lower compared with an application where
the environment is mostly regular, so it may be worthwhile relying on the advantages obtained
from the combination with software attestation (Chapter 8) to mitigate this problem.
We also need to consider that the deployment size has a significant impact on the measure-
ments inspection accuracy. In Chapter 5, we have considered small-scale WSNs such as home
fire alarms and healthcare monitoring, and observed that the attacker needed to compromise
respectively 8 out of 15 and 7 out of 8 sensors to run a successful undetected attack. Instead,
for wildfire monitoring WSNs the attacker needed to compromise more than 150 out of 200
sensors. Even though the percentage of compromised sensors is comparable, there is a signif-
icant difference in their absolute values. So, if we assumed that the cost for compromising a
sensor does not vary with the deployment size, our techniques would be suitable mainly for
large-scale deployments. Nevertheless, the attacker’s cost for compromising the sensor nodes
may be increased through proactive security mechanisms. For instance, the devices may be
protected with tamper-proof hardware, and the risk of malware propagation may be reduced
with software diversity. In small-scale deployments the cost for these mechanisms needs to be
faced only for a few sensors, so it is more viable compared with large-scale deployments. The
trade-offs involved would benefit from a more detailed investigation which we plan to address
in our future work.
Finally, we wish to continue our studies on the coexistence between anomaly detection and
attestation. In particular, we wish to cover also the scenarios where only one out of the two
techniques can identify an integrity violation, whereas in Chapter 8 we have considered only the
scenarios where both techniques can detect it. Among others, we wish to consider an adversary
that physically tampered with the sensor nodes hardware to increase their clock speed, or that
tampers with almost all sensor nodes. Attestation cannot be applied in the first scenario,
while measurements inspection has poor detection accuracy in the second. In such extreme
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cases there is the need to give to the two techniques the possibility of raising alarms on their
own. So, we plan to develop a complete tool that can address all the possible attacks to the
measurements integrity by coordinating the contribution of heterogeneous techniques.
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